

David Anhaght^c
The ‘Invincible’ Philosopher

AVEDIS K. SANJIAN

Editor

Scholars Press
Atlanta, Georgia

DAVID ANHAGHT^c, THE 'INVINCIBLE' PHILOSOPHER
Avedis K. Sanjian, Editor

Copyright © 1986 by
The Regents of the University of California

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

David Anahagt, the "invincible" philosopher.

(Studies in Near Eastern culture and society ; 7)

Bibliography: p.

1. David, the Invincible. I. Sanjian, Avedis

Krikor, 1921- . II. Series.

B765.D184D38 1986 186'.4 86-20443

ISBN 0-55540-067-1 (alk. paper)

ISBN 0-55540-068-X (pbk. : alk. paper)

Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper

Table of Contents

Portrait of David Anhaght ^c	viii
Preface	ix
Avedis K. Sanjian	
David Anhaght ^c (the Invincible): An Introduction	1
Avedis K. Sanjian	
David on the <i>Definitions of Philosophy</i>	17
George Nakhnikian	
Plato in David's <i>Prolegomena Philosophiae</i>	27
Abraham Terian	
The Armenian Version of David's <i>Definitions of Philosophy</i>	37
Robert W. Thomson	
Universals in David, Boethius, and al-Farabi's Summary of Porphyry's <i>Isagoge</i>	47
Haig Khatchadourian	
The Cross of God: The Religious Philosophy of David the Invincible	65
Hagop Nersoyan	
"An Encomium of the Holy Cross of God" by David the Invincible Philosopher	81
The Ethical Concepts in the Philosophy of David the Invincible	101
Avedis K. Sanjian	
On David's Neoplatonism	111
Milton V. Anastos	

Bibliography	119
A. Primary Sources	119
B. Secondary Sources	124
C. Papers Presented at the Conference	146
Dedicated to the 1500th Anniversary of	
David the Invincible, Erevan, May 1980.	
The Contributors	149



Portrait of David Anghat.

Reproduced from MS 1746 (A.D. 1280), Matenadaran, Erevan,
Armenian S.S.R.

Preface

The fifth/sixth century Armenian philosopher David Anhaght^c (the Invincible) is recognized as the foremost Neoplatonist in Armenian philosophical literature and acknowledged as the founder of several fields of Armenian philosophy. During the past several decades, he has been the focus of intensive scholarly attention in Soviet Armenia and his works have been the subject of numerous monographic studies. Moreover, thanks to the efforts of the eminent Soviet-Armenian scholar Sen Arevshatyan, the Armenian versions of David's four works, *Definitions of Philosophy*, *Commentary on Porphyry's "Isagoge,"* *Interpretation of Aristotle's "Categories,"* and *Interpretation of Aristotle's "Analytics,"* have appeared in critical editions as well as in Russian and modern Armenian translations.

The intense interest in David the Invincible was climaxed in 1980, when the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) included on its calendar of events the 1500th anniversary of the philosopher's birth. Celebrations were held throughout the world, beginning in May of 1980 with an international conference sponsored by the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences in Erevan, the capital of Soviet Armenia. More than fifty scholars participated in the proceedings.

In Erevan, the formal plenary session convened in the auditorium of the headquarters of the Academy of Sciences and was followed by a two-day conference. The proceedings concluded with a festive commemorative program held at the Sundukyan Theater, attended by official representatives of academic institutions from other republics of the Soviet Union. The publication of several monographs and texts, including the facsimile reproduction of a manuscript copy of David's *Definitions of Philosophy*; the naming of a major boulevard in Erevan after

the philosopher; and the extensive media coverage of the event in Soviet Armenia—all attest to the fact that David Anghaght's 1500th anniversary was a major "Armenian national event." It was also a major Soviet "cultural event," marked by an official session in Moscow sponsored by the Soviet Academy of Sciences and by the issuance of a commemorative postage stamp bearing David's portrait.

Notwithstanding this recognition and the vastness of available scholarship, David the Invincible Philosopher remains an enigmatic figure. Scholars generally agree that he was born in Armenia in the 470s and died there in the 550s or 560s and that he authored the four works mentioned above, but many questions pertaining to his life and writings are as yet unresolved. These include such questions as: What was David's true identity? What were his activities in Armenia after his long sojourn in Alexandria, Athens, and Byzantium? Under what circumstances did he actually earn the sobriquet "Invincible"? Was he a pagan philosopher, as some scholars insist, or was he a devout Christian who was canonized by the Armenian Church? What are the textual relationships between the Greek and Armenian versions of the three works that have been definitively ascribed to him, *Definitions of Philosophy*, *Commentary on Porphyry's "Isagoge,"* and *Interpretation of Aristotle's "Categories"*? And what about the authorship of a number of other works extant in Armenian that have been attributed to him? The resolution of these and other problems awaits further scholarly investigation.

With a view to participating in the worldwide tribute to David Anghaght^c and to providing a forum for the exploration of some of these controversial problems, I deemed it worthwhile, in my capacity as holder of the Narekatsi Chair for Armenian Studies at UCLA, to organize a one-day symposium on David, which was held in May of 1981. This was one in a series of public symposia on various Armenological themes sponsored by the UCLA Armenian Studies Program since 1979 as a part of its outreach activities.

The UCLA symposium brought together a group of scholars representing the disciplines of philosophy, intertestamental and early Christian literatures, and Byzantine and Armenian cultural history. Three had taken part in the 1980 Erevan conference, while four others, although invited, had been unable to make the trip to Soviet Armenia. Each of the participants had contributed to the interpretation and elucidation of various scholarly problems pertaining to David's activities and works.

My introduction was designed to lay the groundwork for the symposium by providing a general overview of the cultural milieu prevailing in Armenia prior to David's sojourn there. It traces the life, activities,

and writings of this Neoplatonic philosopher and focuses attention on their impact upon the historical development of Armenian philosophical literature.

In George Nakhnikian's view, during David's lifetime the autocephalic Church of Armenia, whose theology rests upon the Gospels and the authority of the apostle Paul, must have accepted the following theological propositions: (1) (Greek) rationalism, in its original and Hellenistic manifestations, is pride and folly, because faith transcends reason; (2) there is no salvation by reason, only by faith; (3) theology, not philosophy, teaches wisdom, and only a theology of faith is a true theology; and (4) morality derives its authority from the theology of faith. Nakhnikian argues that David—an uncompromising rationalist-Neoplatonist philosopher whose ideas are derived from Plato, Aristotle, and Pythagoras—implicitly or explicitly denies all four of these doctrinal principles. Hence it is not surprising that David should have been *persona non grata* in the eyes of religious authorities in his native Armenia and that he should have spent his twilight years in exile. But how does one reconcile this with the fact that David was canonized by the Armenian Church? Nakhnikian finds it "simply astonishing that the author of the *Definitions* and the rest of the technical philosophical corpus attributed to David should become a Christian saint," or that he could have written, as Hagop Nersoyan has suggested, the "Encomium of the Holy Cross of God" as a serious expression of his own convictions. Nakhnikian believes that the "Encomium" attributed to David is spurious; he also asserts that the *Definitions of Philosophy* provides "no clues at all as to how much of a Christian David was, or that he was a Christian at all." He contends that David's rationalistic philosophy is incompatible with the methodology of orthodox Christian theology; he also finds an irreconcilable conflict between the orthodox Christian principle that morality derives its authority from the theology of faith and David's thoroughly rationalistic theory of morality.

Both Abraham Terian and Robert W. Thomson deal with the contextual aspects of David's *Definitions of Philosophy*. Terian concentrates on David's sources in the development and presentation of his philosophical ideas, and Thomson focuses on the textual relationship between the Greek and Armenian versions of the same work.

Terian views David's *Definitions of Philosophy* as a philosophical treatise in the tradition of Plotinian Neoplatonism. Notwithstanding its eclecticism, the work leans heavily on Platonic norms and abounds with Platonic citations and allusions, especially in the central part, which deals with the six definitions of philosophy. Moreover, the last part of

the treatise is devoted to the Platonic method of division as applied to the genus philosophy and its species, theoretical and practical knowledge. Terian's study of David's sources leads him to conclude:

Although David stands within a tradition in Neoplatonism started by Porphyry that is sympathetic toward Aristotle and has much in common with the later Neoplatonists, there can be no question about his overwhelming reliance on Plato in the *Prolegomena*. . . . There is no complexity of concepts in his work, and the few structures of his thought that cannot be placed within Platonism are discernible within Pythagoreanism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. The construction that he puts upon the doctrines of other philosophers he supports with blocks of Platonic "proof text."

Comparing the Greek original of David's *Definitions of Philosophy* with the Armenian version, Thomson concludes that the translator, without altering the basic ideas of David's philosophy, introduced a number of changes in order to make the book easier to understand by the readership in Armenia. Citing specific examples, he shows that actual mistakes in rendering the Greek are rare; that little effort was made to infuse Christian ideas into the text; and that the Armenian text, which often abbreviates the original, also contains not just occasional explanatory words or phrases, but several additions of some length. Thomson claims that "some works of a more technical nature than David's *Definitions of Philosophy* required even greater adaptation when translated into Armenian," and cites other translations, particularly of theological texts, which have been doctored for a tendentious purpose, adding that "there is nothing peculiarly Armenian about this very general phenomenon." Thomson also rejects a blanket verdict of slavishness with regard to certain Armenian translations of technical works made in the so-called "Hellenizing" style; rather, he considers the willingness to adapt in a creative fashion as a sign of vitality and of intellectual awareness of the problems involved. He sums up his essay by stating: "So the great influence of David's work on later Armenian thinkers is not only explained by the fact that he was a significant expositor of the philosophy of late antiquity. I suggest that the sympathetic adaptation of his works into Armenian played a large role in the emergence of David as 'the Invincible Philosopher.'"

Haig Khatchadourian's essay provides a critical exposition of the fundamentals of David's views on universals as they are presented in the *Commentary on Porphyry's "Isagoge"* and the *Interpretation of Aristotle's "Categories"*; he then analyzes the views of Boethius, another commentator on the *Isagoge*; and finally, he gives a summary presentation of the Islamic philosopher al-Farabi's reformulation of the concept of a universal in his paraphrase of Porphyry's *Isagoge*.

Whereas Nakhnikian finds it inconceivable that David could have authored the "Encomium of the Holy Cross of God," Hagop Nersoyan's essay makes a strong case for its inclusion among David's works. Nersoyan concedes that there are many differences between David's philosophical works and the "Encomium." The former are written in a sober, controlled, professional style, whereas the "Encomium" is "poetry, relatively free of constraints, expressive only of a single driving idea," replete with biblical imagery, and displaying an enthusiastic religious commitment. Nersoyan agrees with Nakhnikian that there is no way of knowing whether the author of the philosophical works was a Christian, whereas the author of the "Encomium" is clearly a devout Christian, most eager to proclaim his faith. Nersoyan also points out differences in the methodology of establishing the truth of propositions, for the philosophical writings deal largely with metaphilosophy and method, whereas the "Encomium" makes a substantial religious-metaphysical claim. Yet Nersoyan argues that the same person could very well have written both the philosophical works and the "Encomium," just as Boethius, a contemporary of David's, wrote not only philosophical commentaries but also religious treatises on the Holy Trinity and the theological work "One Person and Two Natures in Christ."

It is known, of course, that the period in which David lived was marked by violent Christological controversies. During his stay in Armenia, David had become aware of the politically motivated efforts to downgrade Greek culture and that Alexandrian Christology, to which the Armenian Church adhered, was in danger of giving way to rival claims. Hence David may have acceded to Catholicos Giwt's request to write the "Encomium" and other related religious works in Armenian for his Armenian audience. Nersoyan is convinced that "it is almost certainly as the answerer of questions regarding Christology that David became an intellectual champion in Armenia, which means that the title 'Invincible' was bestowed upon him less as a philosopher than as a defender of [Christian] orthodoxy." Moreover, he argues that the conceptions underlying David's philosophical works and the "Encomium" are not incompatible. In the second part of his essay Nersoyan analyzes the existential import of the "Encomium," which, he claims, combines philosophy and poetry, theory and experience, and which "places the Cross within and at the center of a cosmic framework." In view of this, it was deemed appropriate to include in the present volume the first English translation of the "Encomium," accompanied by Nersoyan's extensive commentaries.

My own paper shows that the ethical concepts in David's philosophy represent a blend of Hellenic, Hellenistic, and Christian ideas, and that

they constitute a rather systematic attempt to "Christianize" pagan philosophy and to place Greek ideas within a Christian theological context.

Finally, in contrast to the other contributors to this volume, Milton V. Anastos raises the basic question as to whether David was, in the strict sense, a true Neoplatonist. He argues that David's Neoplatonism rests on his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, which, he contends, "is an elementary introduction to the *Categories* of Aristotle and in no sense a Neoplatonic document." Anastos believes that David's works provide no evidence that he had either adopted or dealt with any of the characteristic Neoplatonic philosophical terms and concepts, for David seldom cites, or relies upon, Neoplatonic writers; rather, his whole philosophical argument is built upon the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, and the Pythagoreans. Although David does occasionally mention the names of Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus, Anastos maintains that there is no indication that David had any real acquaintance with Plotinus's *Enneads* or the works of any of the later Neoplatonists, except for Porphyry's *Isagoge*. Anastos's study of David's sources, therefore, has led him to the conclusion that David was "a Platonist but hardly in the mainstream of the Neoplatonic movement—if he was a Neoplatonist at all."

Conversely, should it be proved that David and the Pseudo-Dionysius were identical and that he was the author of the treatises "On the Heavenly Hierarchy" and "On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy," then David would be "revealed as an indubitable, though Christianized, Neoplatonist, with Monophysite leanings." Like Robert Thomson, however, Anastos rejects this ascription. Yet David does give prominence to *Theaetetus* 176ab, a Platonic text that enjoyed a great vogue among the Neoplatonists, and his references to Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus indicate that he had some affinity for the Neoplatonists. In the final analysis, responding to the basic question that he raised, Anastos concludes: "Perhaps it can be said that he [David] resembled the Neoplatonists in that, like them, though relying on Plato as the principal guide to philosophy, he found room in his system for the Pythagoreans and Aristotle."

It is apparent that the approaches and interpretations of the contributors to this volume are as varied as the disciplines they represent. Moreover, no claim can be made that there emerged a consensus on the controversial problems enumerated earlier. Yet, on the whole, it can be said that the analyses of various issues have made a significant contribution to a better understanding of David's role as a philosopher and of his singular legacy to the cultural and intellectual history of Armenia.

It has often been said that Armenian culture, which has been in touch with the East and with the West and has drawn its inspiration from both, occupies a unique place in the complex of Near Eastern cultures.

As a repository of diverse cultures, it also serves as an important link between the Oriental and the Occidental. It seems to me that David the Invincible and his works confirm the validity of this assertion.

In order to acquaint the reader with the research carried on thus far and to facilitate future investigations, the present volume includes the extensive bibliography published by the Miasnikyan Library in conjunction with the conference held at Erevan in 1980. The data contained in this basic bibliography are considerably augmented by additional source material found during my own research. Also included is a list of the papers presented at the Erevan meetings; printed texts of these papers were made available to the symposium participants.

The publication of this volume was made possible through a generous grant from Mr. Alex Manoogian, well-known industrialist and philanthropist in Detroit, Michigan, and a staunch supporter of the UCLA Armenian Studies Program. To him we owe a deep debt of gratitude.

Finally, our profound thanks to Marina Leasim Preussner of the Gustave E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies for her valuable editorial assistance.

A.K.S.

David Anahgt^c (the Invincible): An Introduction

AVEDIS K. SANJIAN

David the Invincible, who is recognized as a prominent expositor of the Neoplatonic philosophy of late antiquity, is also known as one of the most outstanding figures in Armenian intellectual history. Nevertheless, his life, activities, and his philosophical writings, as well as the religious works attributed to him, have engendered considerable scholarly debate. In this brief introduction, I shall attempt to provide the consensus of opinion pertaining to David's biography, the cultural milieu in which he lived and labored, and the contents and textual characteristics of his works viewed against the background of the Neoplatonic school of philosophy. I shall also highlight the uniqueness of David's contributions to Armenian cultural and intellectual history.

The Christianization of Armenia in the fourth century and the adoption of a national alphabet in the fifth were the two most important historical factors that determined the essentially religious and national characteristics of Armenian intellectual, literary, and artistic life. This ethnic culture was developed almost exclusively by the clergy in the numerous monastic institutions in historic Armenia, Asia Minor, Cilicia, and elsewhere, and drew its inspiration from both the East and the West. In the fifth century, translations of Greek and Syriac works into Armenian and the creation of original works produced an era of intellectual and literary activity which has been aptly described as the Golden Age of Armenian literature. It was an era that aimed at assimilating the richness of the Christian literary tradition.

The crowning achievement of the Golden Age was the translation of the Bible into Armenian. This literary masterpiece and the milieu in which it

was produced also inspired the translations of nearly all the works of the Church Fathers. The speed with which this work was accomplished is perhaps unparalleled in the history of Christianity. This body of translations, in which Armenian literature is at its best, includes the liturgical, apologetic, canonical, theological, and doctrinal writings of the early Church Fathers, as well as their epistles, discourses, biblical commentaries, and patristic literature in general. Also included among the translations are works on ecclesiastical history, martyrologies, and writings on the "external arts" of philosophy, rhetoric, and grammar.

The pioneers in the development of the external arts in Armenia were the scholars of the so-called Philhellene School.¹ During the period extending from the second half of the fifth century to the first quarter of the sixth, they rendered into Armenian many ancient texts on grammar, rhetoric, and especially classical Greek philosophy. Thus, within a short span of time Armenian scholars had at their disposal the rich legacy of such great thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, Philo, Porphyry, Dionysius of Thrace, Aphthonius, Theon of Alexandria, and others. The translations, as well as the original works of the Philhellene scholars, laid the foundations for the secular sciences in Armenia and paved the way for David Anghaght's unique contributions to the development of Armenian philosophical literature.

The majority of scholars who have studied the philosophical works of David agree that he was born in Armenia in the 470s and died there in the 550s or 560s. He was born in the village of Nergin in the Armenian province of Taron, which explains why he is often referred to in medieval Armenian sources as David Nerginats'i. At a young age, David went to Alexandria, Egypt, where he received his training in philosophy under the tutelage of Olympiodorus the Younger, one of the leading Neoplatonists of the Alexandrian school. Armenian sources claim that after spending many years in Alexandria teaching philosophy and engaging in scholarly research and writing, David spent several years in Athens and Constantinople. It is claimed that he earned the nickname Anghaght (Invincible) because he emerged victorious in many public debates with either Christian heretics or Byzantine philosophers. In Western sources he is also known as David Armenios.

At an advanced age, when David was already a highly acclaimed philosopher in the Greek-speaking world, he returned to his native Armenia and devoted himself to teaching philosophy and the sciences. The "enlightened" scientific teachings of this Hellenized Armenian scholar,

¹For the standard work on the Philhellene School, see Hakob Manandian, *Hunaban Dprots'ē ew Nra Zargats'man Shrjannerē: K'nnakan Usumnasirutiwn* [The Philhellene School and Its Periods of Development: Critical Study] (Vienna, 1928).

however, are said to have met with the displeasure and even opposition of the traditionalist, conservative clergy. Early medieval Armenian sources indicate that David, "suffering many tribulations, deprivations and persecution at the hands of his fellow-countrymen," was compelled to take refuge in the northernmost part of Armenia, near the Georgian border.² According to a medieval colophon copied from an earlier source, David took refuge and later died in the monastery of Haghbat. His remains were subsequently removed to his native Taron and interred in the monastery of Surb Aṛak^celots^c at Mush.³ This last event must have occurred after David's canonization by the Armenian Church.

The date and circumstances of the conferral of sainthood upon David are unknown.⁴ It is important to note, however, that among the numerous ancient Armenian authors only Eghishē, Movsēs Khorenatsⁱ, and David Anghagt^c have been canonized. David's inclusion in this select list raises an intriguing question, considering the fact that the four works definitively ascribed to him deal with philosophical themes that are fundamentally secular in nature. His canonization implies that he must have made a significant contribution to the Armenian Church; it also raises the question as to whether he authored other important works of a religious nature as well.

Since David's philosophical works fall within the Neoplatonic tradition of the Alexandrian school, it may be useful to give a brief summary of Neoplatonism as it developed in various intellectual centers. In his article on Neoplatonism in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Philip Merlan states:

Neoplatonism is the philosophy of Plotinus and Platonists influenced by him without necessarily accepting all his doctrines. Neoplatonism absorbed virtually all nonmaterialist and religious doctrines of earlier systems (especially the Pythagorean, Peripatetic, and Stoic) and is the only significant school of antiquity since the beginning of the fourth century [A.D.], a school that undertook to satisfy all intellectual and religious aspirations of man.⁵

²See Aṛak^cel Siwnetsⁱ, *Verlutsut^ciwn "Sahmanats^c Grots^c" Dawt^ci Anghagt^ci* [Commentary on David the Invincible's "Book of Definitions"] (Madras, 1797), p. 172. For David's presumed sojourn in Georgia, consult L. Melik^cset^c-Bek, "David^c Anghagt^ci Vras-tanum Linelu Hartsⁱ Shurjē" [On the Question of David the Invincible's Sojourn in Georgia], in *Grakan-Banasirakan Hetakhuzumner* [Literary and Philological Studies], Book I (Erevan, 1946), pp. 243-267.

³See Norair Bogharian, *Mayr Ts^cuts^cak Dzeragrats^c Srbots^c Hakobeants^c* [Grand Catalogue of the St. James Manuscripts] (9 vols.; Jerusalem, 1966-1979), II, 343.

⁴Maghak^cia Ōrmanian (*Azgapatum*, Vol. I [Beirut, 1959], section 295) points out that the names of Movsēs Khorenatsⁱ and David Anghagt^c are not mentioned as saints of the Armenian Church until after the fourteenth century.

⁵Philip Merlan, "Neoplatonism," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards, Vol. V (New York and London, 1972), p. 473.

The centers of Neoplatonism were Athens, Constantinople, Alexandria, and Syria. Two of its main currents were (1) the metaphysical-speculative version, which included the school of Plotinus, represented mainly by Porphyry and the school of Athens; and (2) the "scholarly" school of Alexandria, which culminated with Proclus (ca. 409-ca. 487). "A bitter enemy of Christianity, Porphyry wrote 'Against Christians'; his anti-Christian attitude continued in the schools of Syria, Pergamum, and Athens. . . ." Proclus too was an enemy of Christianity, but ironically "he was the fountainhead of much of medieval Christian philosophy, both scholarly and mystical."⁶ Another Neoplatonist, Simplicius, "tried to harmonize Plato and Aristotle to such an extent that according to him Aristotle never criticized Plato but attacked only misrepresentations of Plato's philosophy."⁷

The Alexandrian school began with Plutarch's pupil, Hierocles, "who may have been influenced by Christianity, as when he spoke of creation out of nothing or of providence in terms of personal intervention in human affairs by god and his messengers. . . . Ammonius exhibited a conciliatory attitude toward Christianity, to which he eventually became a convert, though probably in name only." Somewhat like David Anahaght's, "much of Ammonius' teaching was devoted to interpreting Aristotle's logical writings, where it was easier to remain non-committal with regard to problems sharply controversial between Christians and Platonists, such as transfiguration of souls and the eternity of the world." As pointed out by Merlan, Ammonius's exegetical method was "sober" and "philological," and "the same was true of his many students. Of these, some were Christian (Elias, David, Stephanus); some, such as Asclepius and Olympiodorus, were pagan. Olympiodorus, however, tried to present his views with a minimum of offense to Christians." In sum, while in Athens there was "hostility to Christianity to the bitter end, at Alexandria [there was] a gradual blending. The students of Ammonius were the last generation of Alexandrian Neoplatonists before the Islamic conquest" of Egypt in 642 A.D.⁸

Not unlike other Neoplatonists, particularly those of the Alexandrian school, David absorbed virtually all nonmaterialist and religious doctrines of earlier philosophical systems, especially the Pythagorean, Peripatetic, and the Stoic. Like other Alexandrian Neoplatonists, David tried to harmonize the philosophical teachings of Plato and Aristotle, but he did not go as far as Simplicius, who "tried to harmonize Plato and Aristotle to such an extent that according to him Aristotle never

⁶Ibid., p. 475.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

criticized Plato but attacked only misrepresentations of Plato's philosophy." Like his fellow Alexandrian Neoplatonists Ammonius, Olympiodorus, and Elias, David also paid special attention to the natural sciences, mathematics and Aristotelian logic and epistemology. Among the many philosophical and other problems that David dealt with in his writings, one of the most important was the so-called problem of universals, which was central to Plato's and Aristotle's metaphysics. As Haig Khatchadourian has pointed out, David's treatment of the problem of universals provides an excellent example of how he attempted to apply the classical approach of Alexandrian Neoplatonism to Plato and Aristotle, and to place it, as much as possible, within the context of Christian theology.⁹ Even though David's teachings were rooted in ancient Hellenic philosophical traditions, many of his ideas found fertile ground in Armenia, and his Neoplatonism did not prevent the fathers of the Armenian Church from utilizing his philosophy in support of their official Christian doctrines and ideology.

The four philosophical works ascribed to David Anghagt are: *Definitions of Philosophy*,¹⁰ *Commentary on Porphyry's "Isa-*

⁹See Haig Khatchadourian, "David Anghagt, The Invincible Philosopher," *The Armenian Mirror-Spectator* (Boston), October 18, 1980.

¹⁰The Armenian version of David's *Definitions of Philosophy* has survived in numerous MSS. For the MSS. in Erevan, see "Ts'uts'ak Matenadarani P'ilisop'ayakan Nyut'er Parunakogh Dzeragreri" [Catalogue of Manuscripts in the Matenadaran Containing Philosophical Materials], *Banber Matenadarani*, no. 3 (Erevan, 1956), 410-411. The text of this work has had several publications, which are given here in chronological order: (a) *Simëon Jughayets'i, Girk' Tramabanut'ean* [Book of Logic] (Constantinople, 1728), pp. 254-275; (b) *Girk' Sahmanats' Dawt'i Anghagt' P'ilisop'ayi ew Astuatsaban Vardapeti* [Book of Definitions by David, the Invincible Philosopher and Vardapet Theologian] (Constantinople, 1731); (c) *Dawit' Anghagt', Girk' Sahmanats'* [Book of Definitions] (Madras, 1797), pp. 1-143; and (d) "Dawt'i Erametsi ew Anghagt' P'ilisop'ayi Ênddêm Arakut'eants'n Ch'orits' Pihroni Imastaki ew Sahmank' ew Tramatur'iwink' Imastasi-rut'ean" [Thrice-Great and Invincible Philosopher David, Against the Four Objections of the Sophist Pyrrho and the Definitions and Divisions of Philosophy], in *Koriwn Vardapeti, Mambrë Vertsanoghi ew Dawt'i Anghagt'i Matenagrut'iwink'* [The Works of Koriwn Vardapet, Mambrë Vertsanogh and David the Invincible] (Venice, 1833), pp. 120-126; reprint ed. (Venice, 1932), pp. 26-122.

The critical text, with a Russian translation, introduction, and annotations was published by S. S. Arevshatyan, *Dawit' Anghagt', Sahmank' Imastasi-rut'ean* [Definitions of Philosophy] (Erevan, 1960). The same critical text is found in *Dawit' Anghagt', Erkasirut'iwink' P'ilisop'ayakank'* [Philosophical Works], with an introduction by S. S. Arevshatyan (Erevan, 1980), pp. 29-104. The modern Armenian translation will be found in *Dawit' Anghagt', Erker* [Works], with introduction and annotations by S. S. Arevshatyan (Erevan, 1980), pp. 35-126.

The English rendering of the text will be found in *Definitions and Divisions of Philosophy by David the Invincible Philosopher*, trans. Bridget Kendall and Robert W. Thomson, University of Pennsylvania, Armenian Texts and Studies, 5 (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press,

goge,"¹¹ *Interpretation of Aristotle's "Analytics,"*¹² and *Interpretations of Aristotle's "Categories."*¹³ With the exception of the *Interpretation of Aristotle's "Analytics,"* which has survived in its Armenian version

1983). See also Russian translation in *David Nepobedimyi (Anakht), Opredeleniia filosofii* [David the Invincible, Definitions of Philosophy], critical text, trans. from Classical Armenian, introduction, and commentary by S. S. Arevshatyan (Erevan, 1960). The text has also been published in Roumanian: *David, Introducere in filozofie*, trans., introductory study, notes, and commentary by Gabriel Liiceanu, Scrittori Greci și Latini, 13 (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1977). There is also a partial translation in Polish: "David Niezwyciezony, Definicje filozofii," trans. by Eugeniusz Sluszkiewicz, introduction by D. Jedynak, *Meander*, no. 10 (1971), 427-433.

¹¹There are numerous MSS. of the Armenian version of David's *Commentary on Porphyry's "Isagoge"* at the Matenadaran in Erevan, in Jerusalem, Venice, Vienna, and elsewhere. For the more than seventy MSS. at the Matenadaran, see "Ts'uts'ak Matenadaran," pp. 419-420. The text has been published in: (a) "Vertsanut'iwn Haghags Neratsut'eann Porp'iwri, Arareal i Dawt'e Anahagt'e P'ilisop'ayē Nerginats'woy" [Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, by the Philosopher David Nerginats'i the Invincible], in *Girk' Porp'iwri or Koch'i Neratsut'iwn, Horum Parunakin Vertsanut'iwnk' ew Lutmunk' Srboyn Grigori Tat'ewats'woyn* [Porphyry's *Isagoge*, also Including St. Gregory Tat'ewats'i's Commentary on the *Isagoge*] (Madras, 1793), pp. 69-323; and (b) "Dawt'i P'ilisop'ayi Nerginats'woy Verlutsut'iwn Neratsut'eann Porp'iwri" [The Philosopher David Nerginats'i's Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*], in *Koriwn Vardapeti*, pp. 251-356, reprint ed. pp. 157-263.

The critical text, with a Russian translation, introduction, and annotations, was published by S. S. Arevshatyan: *Dawit' Anahagt', Verlutsut'iwn "Neratsut'eann" Porp'iwri* [Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*] (Erevan, 1976). The same critical text is found in *Dawit' Anahagt', Erkasirut'iwnk' P'ilisop'ayakank'*, pp. 107-192, and in *Dawit' Anahagt', Erker*, pp. 129-248, in modern Armenian translation. The Russian translation appears in *David Anakht (Nepobedimyi), Analiz "Vvedeniia" Porfiria* [David the Invincible, Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*], critical text, trans. from Classical Armenian, introduction, and annotations by S. S. Arevshatyan (Erevan, 1976).

¹²For MSS. of the Armenian version of David's *Interpretation of Aristotle's "Analytics"* at the Matenadaran, see "Ts'uts'ak Matenadaran," p. 418. The text was first published in "Dawit' Anahagt' P'ilisop'ayi Meknut'iwn Ch'orek'tasan Glkhots' Aristoteli i Verlutsakann" [The Philosopher David the Invincible's Interpretation of the Fourteen Chapters of Aristotle's *Analytics*], in *Koriwn Vardapeti*, pp. 577-598, reprint ed. pp. 469-511.

The critical text, with a Russian translation, introduction, and annotations, was published by S. S. Arevshatyan, *Dawit' Anahagt', Meknut'iwn i "Verlutsakann" Aristoteli* [Interpretation of Aristotle's *Analytics*] (Erevan, 1967). The same critical text is found in *Dawit' Anahagt', Erkasirut'iwnk' P'ilisop'ayakank'*, pp. 303-337, and in modern Armenian translation in *Dawit' Anahagt', Erker*, pp. 251-300. A separate Russian translation appears in *David Nepobedimyi, Tolkovanie "Analitiki" Aristoteli* [David the Invincible, Interpretation of Aristotle's *Analytics*], critical text, trans. from Classical Armenian, introduction, and annotations by S. S. Arevshatyan (Erevan, 1967).

¹³For MSS. of the Armenian version of David's *Interpretation of Aristotle's "Categories"* at the Matenadaran, see "Ts'uts'ak Matenadaran," p. 417. This work, erroneously attributed to Elias, was first published by Hakob Manandian, *Meknut'iwn Storogut'eants'n Aristoteli, Ėntsayeal Ėliasi Imastasēri* [Interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories*,

only, David's works have been preserved both in Armenian and in Greek.¹⁴ It is generally agreed that all four of these works were originally written in Greek, and that they were rendered into Armenian after David's return to Armenia, either by David himself or, under his supervision, by another Philhellene Armenian scholar.

David's major work, *Definitions of Philosophy*, deals with virtually all the basic philosophical problems, refutes the skepticism of the Greek philosopher Pyrrho and his followers, and sums up David's own views on philosophical issues. Following in the tradition of Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, David offers six definitions of philosophy: philosophy is (1) the knowledge (or science) of beings according to which they are beings; (2) knowledge of divine and human realities; (3) meditation on death; (4) imitation of God, to the best of man's ability; (5) the art of arts and the science of sciences; and (6) love of wisdom. In his view, these closely interrelated and complementary definitions constitute the basis for a complete understanding of the subject, essence, and purpose of philosophy. Viewing philosophy as the science that enables man to comprehend the general laws of nature, David posits that cognition begins with material essences; then, passing through the stage of comprehension of nonmaterial forms, it concludes with the cognition of God, the absolute nonmaterial essence.

David makes a clear distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy, defines the soul's cognitive and animal (or physical) manifestations, and describes the ascending stages of human cognition, which gradually elevate man from a state of ignorance to a state of wisdom and are the means, as well, whereby man attains virtue. David also devotes considerable attention to the classification of the sciences, among which philosophy occupies a central place, and discusses a variety of epistemological and logical problems. My paper in this symposium will show that ethics also occupies a major place in David's *Definitions of Philosophy*. In his view, basically philosophy has a moral function in that it enables man to attain spiritual perfection by distinguishing between truth and falsehood and good and evil, and by aiding him in avoiding evil deeds, all of which ultimately serves the supreme human objective of being like God.

David's second important work, *Commentary on Porphyry's "Isagoge,"* deals with problems of logic, the concepts of universals and particulars, and Porphyry's predicables. In line with the Neoplatonic views

Attributed to the Philosopher Elias] (St. Petersburg, 1911). The critical text, with an introduction by S. S. Arevshatyan, will be found in *Dawit' Anhaght', Erkasirut'iwnk' P'ili-sop'ayakank'*, pp. 195-300.

¹⁴For the Greek versions of two of David's works, see Adolfus Busse, ed., *Davidis*

of the Alexandrian school, David attempts to harmonize Aristotle's and Plato's views on the question of universals. David's third work, *Interpretation of Aristotle's "Categories,"* was for a long time ascribed to the Alexandrian philosopher Elias;¹⁵ but Sen Arevshatyan has proved definitively that it is indeed the work of David.¹⁶ The Armenian version has survived in a single, defective manuscript copy (now at the Matenadaran in Erevan, MS. No. 1930), which lacks the beginning and end of the text. In the surviving thirty-eight chapters, David discusses in great detail two of Aristotle's ten categories, namely, substance and quantity (*goyats'ut'iwn* and *k'anak*); he also devotes considerable attention to the question of universals. David's fourth work, *Interpretation of Aristotle's "Analytics,"* is an analysis of the first four chapters of Book I of Aristotle's *Analytics* and is principally devoted to questions of syllogism.

In addition to the four books whose authorship has been definitively established, medieval Armenian sources ascribe three other works to David: "An Encomium of the Holy Cross" (*Nerboghean i Surb Khach'n Astuats'enkal*),¹⁷ "Five Parables" (*Aratsk' Hing*),¹⁸ and "On Division" (*Vasn Bazhanman*).¹⁹ The first work is one of the oldest examples of religious panegyric in Armenian literature; the other two are brief hand-

Prolegomena et in Porphyrii Isagogen Commentarium, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, XVIII/2 (Berlin, 1904).

¹⁵See *ibid.*, p. 107. Hakob Manandian also attributes this work to Elias (see n. 13).

¹⁶See Sen Arevshatyan, "Davit' Anhaght'i Zharangut'iwnē Nor Lusabanut'yamb" [A New Interpretation of David the Invincible's Legacy], *Banber Matenadarani*, no. 9 (1969), 7-22; and *idem*, *Formirovanie filosofskoi nauki v drevnei Armenii, V-VI vv.* [The Development of Philosophy in Ancient Armenia, Vth-VIth Centuries] (Erevan, 1973), pp. 275-285.

¹⁷The text of this work is found in "Dawt'i Anhaght'i P'ilisop'ayi Nerboghean i Surb Khach'n Astuats'enkal" [Encomium of the Holy, God-Receiving Cross by the Philosopher David the Invincible], in *Koriwn Vardapeti*, pp. 103-119, reprint ed. pp. 9-25. See also a partial modern Armenian translation of the text in *Ejmiatsin*, no. 9 (September 1957), 14-15.

¹⁸For MSS. of "Aratsk' Hing," see "Ts'uts'ak Matenadarani," pp. 413-414. The text has been published in "Dawt'i Anhaght'i P'ilisop'ayi Nerginats'woy Aratsk' Hing" [The Five Parables by the Philosopher David the Invincible Nerginats'i], in *Simēon Jughayets'i, Girk' Tramabanut'ean*, pp. 41-50; and "Dawt'i P'ilisop'ayi Aratsk' Hing" [The Philosopher David's Five Parables], in *Koriwn Vardapeti*, pp. 217-222, reprint ed. pp. 123-128. For MSS. of Simēon Erewants'i's commentary on this work, see "Ts'uts'ak Matenadarani," p. 448.

¹⁹For MSS. of "Vasn Bazhanman," see "Ts'uts'ak Matenadarani," p. 415. The text has been published in "Dawt'i At'enakani Hayots' P'ilisop'ayi Vasn Bazhanman" [On Division by the Armenian Philosopher, David the Athenian], in *Simēon Jughayets'i, Girk' Tramabanut'ean*, pp. 50-54; and "Vasn Bazhanman," in *Koriwn Vardapeti*, pp. 223-224, reprint ed. pp. 129-130. For MSS. of Simēon Erewants'i's unpublished commentary on this work, consult "Ts'uts'ak Matenadarani," pp. 448-449.

books on logic. To David are also attributed the Armenian translations of Aristotle and Porphyry, and of the grammar of Dionysius of Thrace and the oldest commentary thereon; however, Hakob Manandian has established, on philological grounds, that these translations were made by Philhellene Armenian scholars who preceded David.²⁰

Even though there still are many unresolved questions pertaining to the works authored by David, it seems certain that his writings could not have been limited to the four texts ascribed to him. His canonization by the Armenian Church strongly suggests that he must have dealt with theological and doctrinal issues as well as philosophical ones, for he lived at a time when religious controversies had torn asunder the unity of the Christian world and when the question of Christ's nature—His divinity and humanity—had divided the Church into the Dyophysite and Monophysite (or Chalcedonian and anti-Chalcedonian) camps.

The Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) adopted a confession of faith which reiterated the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed and declared Christ to be "Son, Lord, Only-Begotten, known in two natures, without confusion, without conversion, without severance and without division." When the council's decisions had been ratified by royal edict, the Eutychian Monophysites, who held that there was only one nature in Christ, were banished from the Byzantine empire and their writings were burned. The ensuing controversy raged unabated for thirty years and produced a serious schism in the Eastern Church. The Byzantine emperors sought to settle the dispute by appeasing the opponents of Chalcedon. Notable among these efforts is the *Henotikon* issued by Emperor Zeno, which declared the true manhood and the true godhead of Christ. It also anathematized the Nestorians and Eutychians—the proponents of the extreme views in the Christological dispute—and all those who held views contrary to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed. However, neither this nor subsequent conciliatory measures succeeded in resolving the controversy.

Among the Christological works composed in the late fifth and early sixth centuries, special mention must be made of a series of theological writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, a revered martyr of the first century A.D. The works are known under the titles "On the Heavenly Hierarchy," "On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy," "On the Divine Titles," "On Mystic Theology"; ten epistles are also attributed to Dionysius.²¹ The Armenian versions, done by the scholar Step'annos

²⁰See Manandian, *Hunaban Dprots'ē*.

²¹See Garegin Zarbhanalian, *Matenadaran Haykakan Targmanut'eants' Nakhneats', Dar IV-XIII* [Catalogue of Ancient Armenian Translations, IVth-XIIIth Centuries] (Venice, 1889), pp. 381-394.

Siwnets'i in 716–717, represent the oldest translations of these works.²² It should also be noted that the attribution of these works to Dionysius the Areopagite is erroneous; but to date the question of their authorship has not been resolved.

Sen Arevshatyan, the leading Soviet-Armenian specialist in scholarship dealing with David Anahaght^c, has suggested that serious consideration should be given to David as the probable author of two of the Pseudo-Dionysian works, "On the Heavenly Hierarchy" and "On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy."²³ Arevshatyan's investigations have shown that the oldest Armenian manuscripts of these two works have, at the beginning and at the end of each chapter, notations in Greek script indicating the name of David as their author; the notations read: "Dawt^ci" ("By David"); "Dawt^ci grets'aw" ("Written by David"); "Dawit^c, Srboyn Dionisi" ("David, by St. Dionysius"). In view of this evidence, Arevshatyan has proposed that ancient and medieval Armenian sources must have identified David with Dionysius the Areopagite insofar as the two aforementioned Pseudo-Dionysian works are concerned. Arevshatyan is also intrigued by the similarity in the initials of Dionysius the Areopagite and David Anahaght^c (also known in Greek sources as David Armenios)—both are "D.A."—and questions whether Dionysius's name was used as a synonym for David Anahaght^cs. More importantly, Arevshatyan has observed a number of striking similarities in the ideas expressed in David's *Definitions of Philosophy* and in the text of the Pseudo-Dionysian "On the Heavenly Hierarchy," especially on questions of ethics and the means for attaining human perfection and being like God. If these suppositions are valid, it can perhaps be argued that David's canonization occurred after the year 531, when the Pseudo-Dionysian works were officially adopted by the Council of Jerusalem. The fact that David was highly acclaimed in religious circles is attested in the manuscripts of the Greek versions of his *Definitions of Philosophy* and *Commentary on Porphyry's "Isagoge,"* which refer to him as a man "pleasing to God" and "endowed with divine wisdom."²⁴

²²Ibid.

²³See Dawit^c Anahaght^c, *Erkasirut'iwnk^c P'ilisop'ayakank^c*, pp. 18–23. Consult also R. Tvaradze, "On the Problem of David Anahaght's Relation to Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite," paper presented at the conference dedicated to the 1500th anniversary of David the Invincible, Erevan, May 1980.

²⁴See Dawit^c Anahaght^c, *Erkasirut'iwnk^c P'ilisop'ayakank^c*, p. 22, n. 10. Consult also Sh. Nutsbidze, *Taina Psevdo-Dionisiia Areopagita* [The Secret of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite] (Tbilisi, 1942); and idem, *P'etr Iver i antichnoe filosofskoe nasledie: Problemy Areopagitiki* [Peter the Iberian and the Ancient Philosophical Legacy: Areopagitical Problems] (Tbilisi, 1963), pp. 58, 151.

The uniqueness of David Anhaght^c as an intellect lies in the major contributions he made to the historical development of Armenian philosophical literature. His works encompass practically all branches of philosophy known in his own time, namely, epistemology, ontology, psychology, logic, ethics, and esthetics, all of which had been dealt with, to a greater or lesser degree, by his Philhellene predecessors' translations of ancient philosophical and scientific codexes prior to his return to Armenia. Yet none of these Philhellene scholars had had the sophisticated scientific training that David had acquired at the Neoplatonic "scholarly" school in Alexandria; nor had they benefited from intellectual contacts with well-known philosophers, as David had in Alexandria, Athens, and Constantinople. David's own philosophical writings were built upon the foundations laid by the Philhellenes; they were also instrumental in establishing philosophy in Armenia as a distinct intellectual discipline, apart from theology and other disciplines. The translations of his works into Armenian provided his fellow countrymen, for the first time, with a clear definition of the nature and scope of philosophy and its various branches and stated the problems and objectives of philosophical concern, which were rooted in ancient intellectual traditions. No less significant was David's contribution to the enrichment and refinement of the Armenian philosophical and scientific vocabulary and idiom.

Some modern scholars have suggested that David was the founder in Armenia of several branches of philosophy, particularly logic, and that his works expanded the intellectual horizons of generations of Armenian scholars throughout the Middle Ages and even as late as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This is attested by the inclusion of his works in the curricula of institutions of higher learning, by the significant number of commentaries on his writings, and by the abundance of surviving manuscript copies of his codexes. There can be little doubt that thanks to David's labors, philosophy came to occupy its distinctive place in Armenian cultural and intellectual history.

David's impact upon the development of philosophical thought and of the sciences in Armenia can be traced back to the seventh century. Influenced by David's classification of the sciences, the importance he attached to the study of physics and mathematics, and the scientific methodology he propounded, Anania Shirakatsⁱ (610–685) devoted himself to the study of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, geography, and cosmology, which resulted in the preparation of his major work, the *K^cnnikon*, a veritable encyclopedia of the early medieval exact sciences.²⁵

²⁵A general discussion of Anania Shirakatsⁱ's life and works will be found in an article by A. Abrahamyan in *Hay Mshakuytⁱ Nshanavor Gortsich^cnerē, V–XVIII Darer* [Famous

In the schools which he founded at Sanahin, Ani, and Haghbat, Gregory Magistros (990–1058), an outstanding Hellenophile scholar and Neoplatonist of the eleventh century, included in his curricula not only the works of the early Church Fathers, Plato, Aristotle, Porphyry, Philo, and other ancient philosophers, but also the philosophical works of David Anahaght.²⁶ Hovhannēs Sarkawag (1045–1129), another philosopher-scientist of the eleventh century, benefited greatly from David's concepts on physics, mathematics, and esthetics, and developed them further in his pedagogical activities and philosophical treatises.²⁷ Because of Sarkawag's efforts, David's philosophical legacy gained great popularity in the universities and monastic institutions of higher learning

Armenian Cultural Figures of the Vth–XVIIIth Centuries] (Erevan, 1976), pp. 122–124. For the major monographic studies of Shirakats'i's works, consult A. Abrahamyan, *Anania Shirakats'u Matenagrut'iwnē* [The Works of Anania Shirakats'i] (Erevan, 1941); and A. Abrahamyan and G. Petrosyan, *Anania Shirakats'i* (in Russian) (Erevan, 1970). Shirakats'i's philosophical views are discussed in V. K. Ch'aloyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun: Hin ev Mijin Darer* [History of Armenian Philosophy: Ancient and Medieval Periods] (Erevan, 1975), pp. 231–245, 247–257; H. Gabrielyan, *Hay P'ilisop'ayakan Mtk'i Patmut'yun* [History of Armenian Philosophical Thought], Vol. I (Erevan, 1956), pp. 492–535; and Gevorg' Khrolopyan, *Anania Shirakats'u Ashkharhayats'k'ē* [Anania Shirakats'i's Philosophical Views] (Erevan, 1964).

²⁶For a general discussion of the life and works of Grigor Magistros, see article by S. Arevshatyan in *Hay Mshakuyt'i*, pp. 213–223. Magistros's role in the development of Armenian philosophical thought is discussed in Gabrielyan, *Hay P'ilisop'ayakan*, Vol. II (Erevan, 1958), pp. 54–66; and Ch'aloyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, pp. 306–308, 317–321, 369–376. For Magistros's contribution to medieval Armenian literature, consult Manuk Abeghyan, *Hayots' Hin Grakanut'yan Patmut'yun* [History of Ancient Armenian Literature], Vol. II (Erevan, 1946), pp. 15–32, and idem, *Erker* [Works], Vol. IV (Erevan, 1970), pp. 33–51. See also *Grigor Magistrosi T'ghl'erē* [The Letters of Grigor Magistros], edited and annotated by K. Kostaneants' (Alexandropol, 1910).

²⁷The major monographic study concerning Hovhannēs Sarkawag is by A. G. Abrahamyan, *Hovhannes Imastaseri Matenagrut'yunē* [The Works of Hovhannes the Philosopher] (Erevan, 1956). For brief discussions of Sarkawag's contributions to the development of Armenian philosophical thought, consult Ch'aloyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, pp. 375–384; Abeghyan, *Hayots' Hin Grakanut'yan Patmut'yun*, II, 531–536; and idem, *Erker*, IV, 444–450. Brief discussions of Sarkawag's life and works are also found in an article by A. Abrahamyan in *Hay Mshakuyt'i*, pp. 235–245; Ghewond Alishan, *Hushikk' Hayreneats' Hayots'* [Reminiscences of Armenia], Vol. II (Venice, 1870), pp. 279–307; Eruand Tēr Minasian, "Haghbat ew Sanahin Vank'erē" [The Monasteries of Haghbat and Sanahin], in *Ararat* (Vagharshapat, 1901), pp. 338–343; Hamazasp Oskian, "Hovhannēs Sarkawagi Keank'ē ew Grut'yunnerē" [The Life and Works of Hovhannēs Sarkawag], *Handes Amsorya* (Vienna), nos. 3–4 (1925), 117–125, and nos. 5–6 (1925), 233–248. See also A. Madoyan and H. Mirzoyan, "Davit' Anahaght'i Sahmanats' Grk'i Ananun Meknut'yunē" [The Anonymous Commentary on David the Invincible's *Book of Definitions*], *Banber Erevani Hamalsarani*, no. 1 (1980), 115–128. The last study also includes the text of the commentary, which the authors attribute to Hovhannēs Sarkawag.

throughout Armenia and even in Cilicia. Moreover, the renowned poet and Catholicos Nersēs Shnorhali (1098–1173) wrote a commentary on David's *Definitions of Philosophy*.²⁸

The popularity of David's philosophical works reached its zenith in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Such outstanding Armenian philosopher-theologians of this era as Vahram Rabuni (13th century),²⁹ Hovhannēs Orotnets'i (1315–1386),³⁰ Grigor Tat'ewats'i (1346–1409),³¹ and Aṙak'el Siwnets'i (d. 1410)³² were greatly influenced by David's teachings on logic and epistemology, which formed the basis for developing their own concepts in these fields of philosophy. Vahram Rabuni

²⁸For MSS. of Nersēs Shnorhali's commentary on David's *Definitions of Philosophy*, see "Ts'uts'ak Matenadarani," pp. 435–436. For the MSS. of the same commentary in Jerusalem (nos. 401, 434, 885, 974, 989, 1078, 1084, 1291, 1410, and 1470), consult Bogharian, *Mayr Ts'uts'ak*, II, 333, 395; III, 386, 559, 588; IV, 115, 123, 504; V, 66, 187. For a study on this commentary, see A. Madoyan, "Davit' Anahagt' ev Nerses Shnorhali" [David the Invincible and Nerses Shnorhali], in *Davit' Anahagt', Hodvatsneri Zhoghovatsu* [David the Invincible, A Collection of Articles] (Erevan, 1980), pp. 123–142. For general discussions of Nersēs Shnorhali's life and works, see Ghewond Alishan, *Shnorhali ew Paragay iwr* [Shnorhali and His Family] (Venice, 1873); article by A. Madoyan in *Hay Mshakuyt'i*, pp. 256–267; Abeghyan, *Hayots' Hin Grakanut'yan Patmut'yun*, II, 73–130; and idem, *Erker*, III, 96–157.

²⁹Vahram Rabuni's philosophical works are discussed briefly in Ch'aloyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, pp. 389–392; and Henri Gabrielyan, *Hay Patmap'ilisop'ayakan Mtk'i K'nnakan Tesut'yun* [Critical Study of Armenian Historico-Philosophical Thought] (Erevan, 1966), pp. 49, 68–69, 157, 165. Consult also the introduction (pp. v–xxiii) to *Vahram Rabuni, Lulsmunk' "Storogut'eants'n" Aristoteli* [Vahram Rabuni, Interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories*], critical edition, with a Russian translation, introduction, and annotations by G. H. Grigoryan (Erevan, 1967).

³⁰For general discussions of Hovhannēs Orotnets'i's philosophical works, see article by S. Arevshatyan in *Hay Mshakuyt'i*, pp. 397–405; Gabrielyan, *Hay P'ilisop'ayakan*, II, pp. 154–221; and Ch'aloyan, *Hay P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, pp. 394–409. Consult also the introductions to the following works: *Hovhannu Orotnets'woy Verlutsut'iwn Storogut'eants'n Aristoteli* [Hovhannēs Orotnets'i's Commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*], critical text, introduction, and annotations by V. Ch'aloyan, and Russian translation by A. Adamyan and V. Ch'aloyan (Erevan, 1956); and "Hovhannu Orotnets'woy Hawak'eal i Banits' Imastasirats'" [Hovhannēs Orotnets'i's Philosophical Works], critical text and introduction by S. Arevshatyan and S. Lalafaryan, and Russian translation by S. Arevshatyan, *Banber Matenadarani*, no. 3 (1956), 343–386.

³¹For general discussions of Grigor Tat'ewats'i's life and works, consult article by S. Arevshatyan in *Hay Mshakuyt'i*, pp. 406–416; Gabrielyan, *Hay P'ilisop'ayakan*, II, 154–221; idem, *Hay Patmap'ilisop'ayakan Mtk'i K'nnakan Tesut'yun*, pp. 155–160, 315–318; and Ch'aloyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, pp. 409–419. See also S. Arevshatyan, "Tat'evi P'ilisop'ayakan Dprots'ē ev Grigor Tat'evats'u Ashkharhats'k'ē" [The Philosophical School of Tat'ew and Grigor Tat'ewats'i's Outlook], *Banber Matenadarani*, no. 4 (1958), 121–137.

³²Aṙak'el Siwnets'i's life and works are discussed in Abeghyan, *Hayots' Hin Grakanut'yan Patmut'yun*, II, 368–387; idem, *Erker*, IV, 421–440; and article by A. Madoyan in *Hay Mshakuyt'i*, pp. 417–426.

and Grigor Tat'ewats'i wrote their own commentaries on David's *Commentary on Porphyry's "Isagoge,"*³³ while Hovhannēs Orotnets'i and Arak'el Siwnets'i wrote a commentary on David's *Definitions of Philosophy*.³⁴ There was a revival of interest in David's works in the seventeenth³⁵ and eighteenth centuries as well, as evidenced in the philosophical writings of Simēon Jughayets'i (d. 1657)³⁶ and Catholicos Simēon Ere-wants'i (1710–1780),³⁷ two prominent figures in the history of Armenian philosophical and theological literature.

Several historians of philosophy have claimed that the Greek versions of David's philosophical works were also known to and utilized by a number of Persian, Arab, and Byzantine philosophers, beginning in the early Middle Ages. A. G. Sagadeev has shown a direct relationship between David's *Definitions of Philosophy* and al-Kindi's (ca. 800–870) principal work, *On First Philosophy*.³⁸ It has also been observed that David's philosophical-methodological principles are found in Avicenna's

³³For MSS. of Vahram Rabuni's unpublished commentary, see "Ts'uts'ak Matenadarani," p. 403. See also *ibid.*, pp. 408–409, for the list of MSS. of Grigor Tat'ewats'i's unpublished commentary at the Matenadaran. There is also a single MS. (no. 990) of the same work in Jerusalem (see Bogharian, *Mayr Ts'uts'ak*, III, 590).

³⁴The text of Arak'el Siwnets'i's commentary was published in *Dawit' Anhaght', Girk' Sahmanats'*, pp. 147–160. The list of MSS. of this commentary will be found in "Ts'uts'ak Matenadarani," pp. 392–393. There are also three MSS. (nos. 769, 948, and 1078) of the same commentary in Jerusalem (see Bogharian, *Mayr Ts'uts'ak*, III, 215, 502; and IV, 115). Similarly, there are two MSS. (nos. 718 and 885) of Hovhannēs Orotnets'i's commentary (see Bogharian, III, 162, 386). For a general discussion of Arak'el Siwnets'i's philosophical thoughts, consult Gabrielyan, *Hay P'ilisop'ayakan*, II, 228–241.

³⁵See H. K. Mirzoyan, "David the Invincible and Armenian Philosophical Thought of the 17th Century," paper presented at the conference dedicated to the 1500th anniversary of David the Invincible, Erevan, May 1980.

³⁶The development of philosophy in Armenia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is discussed in Ch'aloyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, pp. 449–516, and Gabrielyan, *Hay P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, II, 255–376.

For Simēon Jughayets'i's life and works, consult Ch'aloyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, pp. 460–472; Gabrielyan, *Hay P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, II, 272–308; and article by H. Mirzoyan in *Hay Mshakuyt'i*, pp. 491–500. For a more detailed study see H. Mirzoyan, *Simēon Jughayets'i* (Erevan, 1971). For MSS. of Jughayets'i's works, consult "Ts'uts'ak Matenadarani," pp. 444–445. The texts of his works were published in *Simēon Jughayets'i, Girk' Tramabanut'ean*.

³⁷For MSS. of Simēon Ere-wants'i's works, see "Ts'uts'ak Matenadarani," pp. 446–447. A brief discussion of his philosophical thoughts will be found in Ch'aloyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, pp. 491–496.

³⁸See A. V. Sagadeev, *Izbrannye proizvedeniia myslitelei stran Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka IX–XIV vv.* [Selected Works of Near and Middle Eastern Thinkers of the IXth–XIVth Centuries] (Moscow, 1961), p. 60; and *Dawit' Anhaght', Erker*, pp. 39, 218–219.

(980–1037) *Danishnamé* ("The Book of Science"),³⁹ and that there appears to be some connection between David's and al-Farabi's (870–950) treatments of problems concerning the syllogism.⁴⁰ It is, of course, equally true that the philosophical writings of Avicenna, Averroes, and other Arab or Persian philosophers were known to and utilized by Armenian philosophers as well, especially in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

Furthermore, Arevshatyan and L. Benakis claim that there are close connections between David's definitions of philosophy (and its division into theoretical and practical aspects) and his classification of the sciences and those found in John of Damascus's (ca. 675–750) chapter on dialectics in his principal work, *The Fountain of Knowledge*,⁴¹ and in Nicephorus Blemmydes's (1197–1272) major work, *Epitome Logica*.⁴² Finally, it should also be pointed out that in the eighteenth century David's two major works, *Definitions of Philosophy* and *Commentary on Porphyry's "Isagoge,"* were translated into Georgian by the eminent scholars Soukhvan Saba Orbeliani and Anton (Teymuraz) Bagrationi, which attests to the great interest aroused in David's philosophical works during the Age of Enlightenment in Georgia.⁴³

The Armenian versions of David's works have had many printings since their first publication in Constantinople in 1728;⁴⁴ indeed, he is the first among the Armenian philosophers whose works have attracted

³⁹See Ibn Sina, *Danish-namé (Dushambe)* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 132–133.

⁴⁰See A. V. Sagadeev, *Ibn-Rushd (Averroes)* (Moscow, 1973), p. 59.

⁴¹See K. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* (Berlin, 1855), pp. 642–643; and Linos Benakis, "David Hayé Aristoteli Byuzandakan Meknichneri Erkerum" [David the Armenian in the Works of Byzantine Commentators on Aristotle], *Patma-Banasirakan Handes* (Erevan), no. 1 (1981), 48–49.

⁴²See Nicephorus Blemmydes, *Epitome Logica*, in J.-P. Migne, ed., *Patrologia Graeco-Latina*, 142 (Paris, 1885), 687–1003. For discussions of Blemmydes's philosophical views, consult V. Bezobrazov, *Vizantiiskii pisatel' i gosudarstvennyi deiatel' Mikhail Psell* (The Byzantine Author and Statesman Michael Psellos) (St. Petersburg, 1890), pp. 125–126; Ch'aloyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, pp. 217–218; and Benakis, "David Hayé," pp. 52–54.

⁴³See Dawit' Anghat', *Erker*, p. 29. For the Georgian translations of David's works consult G. Kalandarishvili, *Ocherki po istorii logiki v Gruzii* [Outline of the History of Logic in Georgia] (Tbilisi, 1952); and P. Muradian, *Armiano-gruzinskie literaturnye vzaimootnosheniia v XVIII veke* [Armenian-Georgian Literary Relations in the XVIIIth Century] (Erevan, 1966). Consult also G. Mirzoyan, "K voprosu ob izuchenii armiano-gruzinskikh filosofskikh svyazi" [Problems in the Study of Armenian-Georgian Philosophical Relations], *Banber Erevani Hamalsarani*, no. 2 (1970), 141–156, with summary in Armenian; and Muradian, *Armiano-gruzinskie literaturnye vzaimootnosheniia v XVIII veke*, pp. 176–177, 181–183.

⁴⁴See nn. 10, 11, 12, 13.

the attention of printers. Modern scholarship dealing with his life and works began in 1829 with C. Neumann's study,⁴⁵ which was followed by a considerable number of studies by French, German, and English scholars.⁴⁶ This scholarly work was enhanced by A. Busse's publication in 1904 of the Greek versions of David's *Definitions of Philosophy* and *Commentary on Porphyry's "Isagoge"*;⁴⁷ while H. Manandian's and N. Adontz's studies, published in Russian prior to World War I, attracted the attention of Russian scholars to David's philosophical legacy.⁴⁸ It is important to note, however, that until the 1940s scholarship pertaining to David was confined to the historical and philological aspects of his works.

During the past thirty-five years the most exhaustive research into the philosophical writings of David Anhaght^c has been carried out by scholars at the Institute of Philosophy of the Armenian Academy of Sciences and at the Matenadaran in Erevan. Thanks to the efforts of Sen Arevshatyan, critical texts of the Armenian versions of David's works, accompanied by Russian translations, have already appeared during the past two decades;⁴⁹ this, in turn, has facilitated in-depth monographic studies, by Arevshatyan himself and by other scholars, dealing not only with the historical and philological aspects but also with the fundamental exploration of David's philosophical concepts within the broader framework of the history of ancient philosophy.

⁴⁵See C. Neumann, "Mémoire sur la vie et les ouvrages de David, philosophe arménien du V^e siècle de notre ère," *Nouveau Journal Asiatique*, 3 (1829), 49-86, 97-157.

⁴⁶See Davit' Anhaght^c, *Matenagitakan Ts'ank* [Bibliography] (Erevan, 1980), pp. 34-36.

⁴⁷See n. 14.

⁴⁸See Davit' Anhaght^c, *Matenagitakan Ts'ank*, pp. 28-34.

⁴⁹See nn. 10, 11, 12, 13.

David on the *Definitions of Philosophy*

GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN

The details of David Anhaght's life are not clear. The most educated guesses would indicate that he lived sometime during the last half of the fifth century and the first half of the sixth. What sort of man was David and what was Armenia like in his lifetime? Being who he was, could he have been at home in his native land after having become a Hellenistic philosopher, educated in the Alexandrian schools?

As a child I was taught that in A.D. 451 the Armenian nation fought a great battle against Persia on the field of Awarayr. Vardan Mamikonian, the Armenian general of that battle, is canonized. Ghewond Erêts^c, or the priest Leontius, also canonized, is equally celebrated for allegedly standing with a cross in his hand exhorting the Armenian troops. The Armenians lost the battle, but, according to the history that I was taught, they won a great moral victory. Their resistance persuaded the Persian ruler to stop trying to convert the Christian Armenians to Zoroastrianism and to destroy their ethnic identity. According to the history I learned, the defense of the land of the Armenians, the defense of its people, and the defense of their Christianity were all one and inseparable.

If this history is true, then during the one hundred and fifty years from 301—the year the Armenians adopted Christianity as a state religion—to 451, Christianity became entrenched in Armenia to the point that the land, the people, and the religion became one. I shall assume (subject to correction by scholars who specialize in these matters) that this description is true.

The Church of Armenia, from its inception, has been autocephalic. It views itself as representing Christianity according to the Gospels and the authority of Paul. Together with these features, which are common to every Christian community, the Church of Armenia has a distinctively Armenian identity. Its liturgy is mainly the Old and New Testaments cast in original poetry in classical Armenian (*grabar*). Its chants and melodies (*tagh* and *sharakan*) are Armenian melodies. Some of its holy places are located on traditionally Armenian soil. The roster of its saints includes Armenian historical figures.

There is no doubt that at some point in the history of Armenia the life of the Church became inseparable from the life of the Armenian people. For centuries the Armenians have referred to themselves as Armenian Christians (*Hay K'ristoniaty*), thinking of the expression "Armenian Christian" as being a pleonasm. Their religious leaders have been for the most part intensely patriotic Armenians, dedicated to serving their people. For the vast majority of Armenians, their Christianity has been for centuries past integral to their sense of their own ethnic identity. The question (the answer to which I do not know) is: How early in the history of the Armenian people did this integration take place? The answer is important for making reasonable conjectures about how much at home David the Invincible could have been after returning to Armenia as a Hellenistic philosopher trained in the Alexandrian schools. If the integration had already occurred during David's lifetime, then fifth-century Armenia was feudal in its social structure, thoroughly Christianized, and the Armenian people were strongly under the influence of the Church of Armenia and its priestly hierarchy. I shall proceed on the assumption (which I grant is questionable) that the above is a fairly accurate description of Armenia during David's lifetime.

As Christians submitting to the authority of Paul, the Armenians had to believe four propositions that summarize the theology of St. Paul, as stated in the Epistles: (1) (Greek) rationalism in its original and Hellenistic manifestations is pride and folly. Paul holds that wisdom is faith, and faith transcends reason. The fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, and the divinity of Jesus, the one and only redeemer, are for Paul beyond rational demonstration: they are understood by faith. (2) The Christian ideal is to become as much like Christ as God's grace and the abilities of man make possible. There is no salvation by reason, only by faith. (3) Theology, not philosophy, teaches wisdom. Philosophical theology and theology based on faith are distinct and incompatible. Philosophical theology is pride and folly. It purports to prove the existence of God and to define his nature. Paul's theology of faith begins with the unquestioned (and, for faith, unquestionable) assumption that

God exists. For Paul, theology is superior to philosophy, and only a theology of faith is a true theology. (4) Morality derives its authority from the theology of faith. If there is no God, there is no good and evil, and no right and wrong. These four doctrinal positions are core assumptions of orthodox Pauline Christianity. The Fathers of the Armenian Church would have needed to be unusually uneducated or unusually stupid not to know that their religion committed them to all four of these doctrinal positions.

We shall see that the author of the *Definitions of Philosophy* implicitly or explicitly denied all four of these doctrinal principles. One might infer, therefore, that if my hypothesis about the religious climate in Armenia during David's lifetime is correct, then the man who wrote the *Definitions* must have been less than welcome in the eyes of the religious authorities of Armenia and must have been an exile from his own people. This inference is supported by what is believed to be a fact, that David spent his twilight years in some sort of forced or voluntary isolation in or near the Georgian border.

The story is not that simple, however. Armenians call David "the Invincible." They look upon him as the most illustrious philosopher of Armenian origin; and he was canonized by the Church of Armenia. There are those who doubt that he was Armenian. I have no competence to take sides on that issue. I shall assume that those scholars who are prone to believe that he was may be right. It is safe to believe, I think, that the author of the *Definitions* studied, wrote, and taught philosophy in Alexandria and visited Constantinople and Athens sometime during the last half of the fifth century and the first half of the sixth. He then returned to his native land, where there appeared Armenian translations from the original Greek, sometimes in abbreviated form, of his major philosophical works, including the *Definitions of Philosophy*, commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, and portions of Aristotle's *Analytics*.

David is believed to have been an influential figure in Armenia. But if he died in exile, he must have had enemies. Was he forced to become an exile because of religious unorthodoxy? The picture is complicated by the fact that sometime after his death he was canonized. It is simply astonishing that the author of the *Definitions* and the rest of the technical philosophical corpus attributed to David should have become a Christian saint. Was he sanctified because, in addition to the strictly philosophical and non-Christian works, he also wrote or spoke in a devout way? What services did he render to the Church to warrant canonization? Is it conceivable that the author of the *Definitions* and the other strictly philosophical works could have been an Armenian Christian worthy of canonization? In an essay included in this volume, Hagop

Nersoyan states that it is, and argues that the "Encomium of the Holy Cross of God" attributed to David the philosopher is indeed written by David. I find it impossible to believe that the author of the *Definitions* could have written such a work as a serious expression of his own convictions. The conceptual framework of the "Encomium" is incompatible with the thrust of the *Definitions*. In my opinion, if David did author the "Encomium," then he was either being expedient, as Galileo was in his recantation, or he was a multiple personality, or he was not intelligent enough to see the incompatibility. The last is out of the question. The author of the *Definitions* is much too good a logician for it to be true. If he did write the "Encomium," then in all probability he was being politic. But this clashes with the impression that a reader of the *Definitions* is likely to form, namely, that the author of that work was an outspoken and honest man. It is hard to believe that he would proclaim beliefs that he *could not* have held consistently with his deepest philosophical convictions. Nevertheless, the Armenians bestowed on David the title of "Invincible," presumably because he was "invincible" against heretics, and not because he was undefeated in technical philosophical debate in Alexandria, Constantinople, or Athens. Exactly what did he contribute toward the "defeat" of the heretics? Such things as the encomium on the Cross? Was he thought to be invincible for the same reason that he was proclaimed a saint of the Church? At present there seems to be no way of knowing. My own inclination is to believe that the religious encomium attributed to David is spurious.

I now turn to the *Definitions of Philosophy*. I have no desire whatever to subject David's *Definitions of Philosophy* to critical scrutiny with a view to assessing the philosophical value of his work for professional philosophers of the twentieth century. That, I believe, would be an unprofitable undertaking. I say this because in my opinion David the philosopher is not an original thinker. His ideas are derived from Plato, Aristotle, and Pythagoras. If we are interested in the validity of the ideas, we must examine the sources on all fundamentals, because David accepts as unquestionably authoritative basic ideas the defense of which is in the original sources. David's own arguments are wholly derivative. Besides, there are passages in the *Definitions* in which David misrepresents the ideas of his philosophical authorities. One must return to the original sources to see things clearly.

Instead of evaluating David's *Definitions* as an original piece of writing, I shall try to exercise as much empathy as I can muster to appreciate David's work and David himself as one of his sympathetic contemporaries might have done. There are not many like Plato who write for

all time. My aim is to appreciate David as a philosopher who wrote for his time.

On reading *Definitions of Philosophy*, I formed the decided opinion that David is a genuine philosopher, that is, he is not a dilettante, but a trained, practicing, professional philosopher. He is removed from Plato by a thousand years, but Plato is one of his chief inspirations. Aristotle and Pythagoras are his other heroes. I admire his taste. Pythagoras had some priorities and interests that look quaint to us, as had Sir Isaac Newton. But everyone agrees that Newton was a great intellect; so was Pythagoras. The intellectual enemies David chooses are also in good taste. He is fighting Pyrrhonic skepticism and Heraclitean relativism and misology.

A reading of *Definitions of Philosophy* provides me with no clues at all as to how much of a Christian David was, or that he was a Christian at all. The Hellenistic philosophers are famous for having struggled to reconcile Greek rationalism, particularly that of Plato and Aristotle, and the religious and theological doctrines of Christianity. I see no evidence of such an attempt in the *Definitions of Philosophy*. The plan is straightforward: David sets out to prove that philosophy is the most important activity of man because without it no virtue and no moral improvements are possible, and virtue and moral improvement are the most important ends of man. In order to establish this main point, David proposes to explain what philosophy is. He assumes, as did Plato, that we cannot understand the effects of a thing without understanding the nature of that thing. What a thing is is given in its definition by *genus* and *differentia*. David starts with Aristotle's definition of philosophy as the art of arts and the science of sciences. He devotes much space to the defense of this definition. The gist of it is that philosophy supplies the ultimate principles of all the arts and sciences. The definition is one expression of philosophy's superiority, in this sense, to all the arts and sciences. Although philosophy itself is an art and a science, it alone understands its own principles.

Armed with Aristotle's definition, David proceeds to argue that the whole nature of philosophy is provided in six, and exactly six, definitions. Each one of them speaks about a different essential feature of philosophy, and together they tell the whole story about what constitutes philosophy. Aristotle's definition emphasizes the fact that philosophy is superior to all the other arts and sciences. Another definition of philosophy is imbedded in the etymology of the word that is the name of philosophy. The word is φιλοσοφία in Greek, "love of wisdom," the literal Armenian translation is *imastasirut'iwn*. The name of philosophy

describes one essential aspect of its nature. The other four definitions of philosophy exist because, as Aristotle said, philosophy is an art and a science. Now, says David, every art and every science has a subject¹ (*ent'akay*) and a purpose (*katarumn*). And each of these, in turn, divides into two: a proximate subject (*hup ent'akay*) and a distant subject (*heri ent'akay*); a proximate purpose (*hup katarumn*) and a distant purpose (*heri katarumn*) (p. 52).² Defined by its proximate subject, philosophy is the science of essences as such; defined by its distant subject, philosophy is the science of things human and divine; defined by its proximate purpose, philosophy is thinking about death; and, defined by its distant purpose, philosophy is man's imitation of God to the best of man's ability.

Thus, philosophy has exactly six mutually complementary definitions. One reason why there are exactly six definitions is that the nature of philosophy as love of wisdom and as superior to all the other arts and sciences provides two definitions, and the other four definitions come from dividing philosophy according to its proximate and distant subjects and purposes. Another reason is neo-Pythagorean. David agrees with the Pythagoreans that numbers can be perfect, imperfect, or superperfect. Six is the first of the perfect numbers, for its factors ($1/2 \times 6$, $1/3 \times 6$, $1/6 \times 6$) add up to 6, the number itself. Eight is an imperfect number because its factors ($1/2 \times 8$, $1/4 \times 8$, $1/8 \times 8$) add up to 7, which is less than 8. Twelve is superperfect because its factors add up to 16, more than the number itself (p. 54). Because 6 is the first perfect number, it must be the number of the definitions of the most perfect of the arts and sciences. This is a bit of Pythagorean number mysticism, which seems quaint and whimsical to us now. David appears to be entirely serious about it.

All four of the doctrinal principles of orthodox Christianity, as the Armenian Church must have understood them, are explicitly or implicitly contradicted by David's account of the nature of philosophy. David is arguing strictly in the manner of classical Greek rationalism. There is no appeal to religious authority or faith: the supreme authority is reason. This is a denial of the Pauline principle that faith transcends reason and that faith alone puts man in touch with the most ultimate and most important realities.

¹This is ambiguous. Sometimes it means subject matter, as the human body is to medicine, sometimes it means the material necessary for the craft, as wood is for building ships. This ambiguity exists in Plato, *Republic*, Bk. I, 431-433.

²All page references are to the edition by S. S. Arevshatyan, *Dawit' Anghaght', Sah-mank' Imastasirut'ean* [David Anghaght', *Definitions of Philosophy*] (Erevan, 1960).

David also implicitly denies that the moral ideal is to imitate Christ to the best of man's ability under the grace of God. For David, the moral ideal is to become a philosopher and to live the life of a philosopher. According to one of its definitions, philosophy is love of wisdom. But what is wisdom? It is the knowledge of essences as such. These include moral as well as nonmoral essences. Only the philosopher understands what is number, what is matter, what is mind. These are nonmoral, theoretical essences. There are, besides, moral essences: justice, virtue, courage, temperance, and wisdom (in the sense of knowledge of good and evil). These essences, too, only the philosopher understands. It is clear that Christ is not a philosopher according to David's definitions. The moral ideal of imitating Christ and the moral ideal of living the life of a philosopher are different ideals. Explicit in David's doctrine is that the criteria by which men are to identify the true teachers of virtue are rational criteria. It follows that anyone, including Christ, must be judged by them and must not be accepted on faith alone.

David's philosophy is also incompatible with the methodology of orthodox Christian theology. David's theology is rationalistic, Paul's is not. There is a superficial resemblance between David's remark that the existence of the invisible creator is evidenced by the creation, and Paul's similar remark that God is manifest in His creation. The resemblance is only superficial, however, because David believes that God's existence can be inferred from what we see; Paul does not infer. He *sees* the world as being the work of God and cannot conceive of the possibility of a world that is not created by God. For David, God is an explanation; for Paul, God is an unquestioned assumption. In short, David's theology is a philosophical theology. The theology of Armenian Christianity is a theology of faith; its orthodoxy is Pauline.

Finally, there is an irreconcilable conflict between the orthodox Christian principle that morality derives its authority from the theology of faith and David's thoroughly rationalistic theory of morality. For David, the highest reaches of the human potential are achieved by philosophers, not by saints or seers. It is the philosophers who are like God, in that they approximate most closely the divine attributes of knowledge, goodness, and power. It is they who are fit to teach how to become more virtuous to those who are lacking in virtue.

The definition of philosophy as thinking about death is particularly relevant here. David's inspiration is Plato's *Phaedo*, in which Plato says that the philosopher welcomes death, for death is nothing but the release of the immortal soul from the mortal body. The soul lives best when it is not encumbered by a body. David puts a different interpretation on Plato's formula that the philosopher is one who thinks on death. He

says that the death in question is the restraint or elimination of the evils that are rooted in bodily desires. The desirability of eliminating these evils is unquestionably an important part of Plato's moral teaching. These evils are, indeed, eliminated in death, if death is the life of the soul apart from the body. David simply confuses Plato's conception of death with a necessary consequence of death, so conceived. The result is a radical misrepresentation of the theory of death in the *Phaedo*. David misrepresents it as being a strictly moral and not at all a metaphysical theory. Be that as it may, it is clear that for David morality derives its authority not from a theology of faith but from reason alone.

If my assumptions and interpretations are basically correct, then it is easy to see that David inevitably would have been *persona non grata* in the eyes of the Armenian Church hierarchy, much as Spinoza was in the eyes of the Jewish community in Amsterdam. For, according to David, it is not the representatives of religions who are among men most like God, it is the philosophers. Again, it is not priests but philosophers who are the true teachers of virtue: "As God takes care of all, so the accomplished philosopher takes care of incompleated souls by imparting to them complete knowledge" (p. 40). And, lastly, the highest calling of man is not theology but philosophy. Theology is a part of philosophy (together with mathematics and natural science). Theology is the study of the highest reality, but being a part of philosophy, its method must be philosophical.

In David's *Definitions of Philosophy* I find no concessions to Christian orthodoxy. David is an uncompromising rationalist, a tough-minded thinker who believes that men have cognitive powers, ranging all the way from sense perception to pure intellection (p. 108), and that with these powers men are capable of learning whatever it is humanly possible to learn about things human and divine. Faith, authority, mystery have no place in David's view of human nature and destiny.

In his Introduction to the 1960 edition of *Definitions of Philosophy* S. S. Arevshatyan says that the *Definitions* and other technical writings by David were extensively used in Armenian centers of learning during David's lifetime. I am fascinated by this assertion. I can hardly believe it. If Arevshatyan is right, fifth- and sixth-century Armenia could not have been as thoroughly Christianized as some historians imply. Who is right? I should like to know. At the very least, Armenia could not have been a homogenized theocratic Christian nation.

David "the Invincible" was not only a learned and thoughtful professional philosopher, he was also a man of passion and strong conviction. He believed that there is such a thing as truth, and that there is a truth to be known about matters of importance to human beings. He believed in

philosophy as the only final authority on what is importantly true, and he believed that reason is the power by which men philosophize. Reading his treatise on the *Definitions of Philosophy* convinces me of all this and more. I believe that David was uncompromisingly honest. He was, moreover, a sophisticated cosmopolitan intellectual. He learned most of what he valued from Hellenistic teachers. I do not know how patriotic he was about Armenia. But it is evident that he had sincere and deep loyalties to things that transcend nations and particular times and places. He was interested in things that are important for all men. He was a true philosopher. That does not mean that he was right, even some of the time. But it does mean that he gave his life's blood to thinking as hard as he knew how about what he thought were first and last things, and he thought about them in a manner that he believed to be proper for thinking about such things.

Plato in David's *Prolegomena Philosophiae*

ABRAHAM TERIAN

The *Prolegomena philosophiae*¹ is a defense of philosophy against Pyrrhonian skepticism and its dictum that all knowledge, including the testimony of the senses, is uncertain. David considers this to be not only a threat to philosophy but also a denial of it, so he argues for the viability and permanence of philosophy. Unlike the pedantic commentaries by the later Neoplatonists of the sixth century, to which David is a contributor in his own right,² the *Prolegomena* as a philosophical treatise marks

¹For the Greek text, entitled *Tà prolegόμενα τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπὸ φωνῆς Δαβίδ*, see A. Busse, ed., *Davidis Prolegomena et in Porphyrii Isagogen commentarium, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, XVIII/2 (Berlin, 1904), hereafter Busse; for the Armenian text with a Russian translation, see S. S. Arevshatyan, ed., *Dawit' Anghaght': Sahmank' imastasirut'ean* [David the Invincible: Definitions of Philosophy] (Erevan, 1960), hereafter Arev. The Greek title (Arm. *Arajabank' imastasirut'ean*) seems to be original (cf. Busse 79.29; Arev. 158.15) and the Armenian (Gk. *Oi tēs philosophias órismoi*) derivative (cf. Busse 49.9; Arev. 112.10).

Since the submission of the present paper, an excellent English translation with a facsimile of the Armenian text in Arev. has appeared: *Definitions and Divisions of Philosophy by David the Invincible Philosopher*, trans. Bridget Kendall and Robert W. Thomson, University of Pennsylvania Armenian Texts and Studies, 5 (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1983).

²In addition to the *Prolegomena*, as the preceding note indicates, to David belongs a commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, which, like the *Prolegomena*, survives in the Greek original and in an Armenian translation published with a Russian translation by S. S. Arevshatyan, ed., *Dawit' Anghaght': Verlutsut'iwn neratsut'eann Porp'iwri* [David the Invincible: A Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*] (Erevan, 1967). To him also belongs a commentary on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, which survives in an Armenian translation (*Meknut'iwn ch'orek'tasan glkhots'n Aristotēli verlutsakan*). More recently, and perhaps

a return to the comprehensive synthesis of Plotinian Neoplatonism and deserves to be studied for its own sake. Notwithstanding its eclecticism, it leans heavily on Platonic norms: it contains twenty-one Platonic citations and even more allusions to Plato by name, compared with only ten Aristotelian citations and about as many allusions to Aristotle.

In his well-structured treatise David depends on Plato rather systematically, especially in the central part, which deals with the six definitions of philosophy. David quotes Plato at the most crucial points in his argument. Consequently, as one traces the Platonic citations in the *Prolegomena*, the entire treatise unfolds, thus enabling a contextual study of the citations and a synoptic study of the work as a whole. Since David's work survives in the Greek original, and because the Armenian translation abounds with unwarranted omissions,³ the Greek text is used primarily, with the Armenian text utilized for comparison and accounted for in the references.

In the preamble to the *Prolegomena* (Busse 1.4–2.29; Arev. 2.4–6.17) David focuses on teleology, the end or purpose toward which every creature is directed for fulfillment in a universal relationship. To affirm that the universe is composed of the sum of its parts and that in the absence of any of its parts the universe remains incomplete, David quotes *Timaeus* 41B: “*There are yet left for our consideration three kinds of mortal creatures that have not been brought into being; if these be not born, the heaven will be imperfect*” (Busse 2.17; Arev. 4.31).⁴ The creatures not yet described in the *Timaeus* are those of air, of water, and of land, without which the world, as a living creature that must embrace all kinds of lesser living creatures, is not yet complete. David singles out the presence of man as that essential part which gives completion and fullness to the whole. In fact, the very purpose or reason for man's presence is to render the universe whole. Man, furthermore, brings his contribution to the world he lives in. This contribution, at best, is in the realm of philosophy, which need not be confusing as it has been confusing to

erroneously, Elias's *Aristotelis categorias commentarium* (*Meknut'iwn storogut'eants'n Aristotēli*) has been attributed to David. It must be noted that the latest authority cited in the *Prolegomena* is Olympiodorus the Younger (Busse 16.3, 31.34, 64.32; Arev. 38.13, 72.32; the third reference is missing in the Armenian translation: Busse 64.28–65.3 should follow Arev. 134.15), who flourished at Alexandria as head of the Neoplatonic School and died after 564–565. He could have been David's teacher, since David refers to him alone as “the philosopher.”

³The omissions range from a word to three pages; e.g., Busse 50.3–53.15 should follow Arev. 112.25.

⁴“For our consideration,” literally, “for us.” The Platonic quotations from the *Prolegomena* are given in italics throughout the present paper.

some—even as Aristotle admits in *Physica* 193a7: “Such confusion, however, is not unknown; it is like a man born blind arguing about colors” (Busse 2.25; Arev. 6.12). Consequently, David goes on to state his purpose in life, his reason for writing the *Prolegomena*. He sees himself as one who is called to clarify confusions regarding philosophy and to elucidate that which ought to be known.

As a cautious philosopher, David begins by stating his method and challenges skepticism with well-established norms of philosophical inquiry. He quotes Aristotle's four questions posited in *Analytica posteriora* 89b23: “Whether it exists, what it is, how it is, and what it is for” (Busse 1.13; Arev. 2.18).⁵ He then stresses the relationship between philosophy and knowledge and provides four propositions or statements (dealt with separately in the sequel) whereby philosophy is defined in terms of knowledge: (1) philosophy as knowledge pertaining to changeless things; (2) philosophy as knowledge and hence recollection; (3) philosophy as knowledge pertaining to sense-perceptible qualities, whether theoretical or practical; and (4) philosophy as knowledge and therefore an art (Busse 2.31–8.20; Arev. 6.21–20.6). He digresses to discuss whether philosophy is knowledge of things in general or of things in particular. He seems to favor its pertaining to things in general without ruling out its pertinence for the particular, such as God.

Important for our consideration are the reminiscences of Plato's theory of knowledge as found in the *Meno*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Theaetetus*, and to some extent in the *Parmenides* and the *Timaeus*. Thus it is not surprising to find in conjunction with the second statement, on philosophy/knowledge as recollection, a citation from the *Meno* (81C): “Virtuous souls not only have an awareness of what may follow but do anticipate them and have previous knowledge of things which have occurred beforehand” (Busse 4.32; Arev. 12.16). David stops short of quoting Plato's maxim in the lines that follow (81D), “Research and learning are wholly recollection,” which is based on the theory of rebirth and assumes the immortality of the soul and its recall of previous knowledge. Likewise, in conjunction with the third statement, on philosophy/knowledge and sense perception, David cites *Timaeus* 47A: “The Creator bestowed sight and hearing upon us in order that through them we may be directed to philosophical inquiry” (Busse 5.2; Arev. 12.22). There follows a long and elaborate defense of this proposition and the

⁵The sequence followed by David, (1) εἰ ἔστι, (2) τί ἔστι, (3) ὁποῖόν τί ἔστι, (4) διὰ τί ἔστι, is more logical than that in the *Analytica posteriora*, where the order is (3) τὸ ὅτι, (4) τὸ διότι, (1) εἰ ἔστι, (2) τί ἔστι. Whereas the Greek has οἱ Ἀριστοτελικοὶ θεσμοί, the Armenian translation has *ork' asen* (“those who say”).

subdivisions of theoretical and practical knowledge,⁶ with several allusions to Plato (Busse 5.10, 21, 26; Arev. 14.4, 19, 25)⁷ and Aristotle (Busse 5.30, 6.8; Arev. 14.31).⁸

David intensifies his attack on Pyrrhonism (Busse 8.22–11.14; Arev. 20.9–26.18) because it questions Plato's theory of apprehension (Busse 8.28; Arev. 20.17)⁹ and Aristotle's assertion in the *Protrepticus* (Busse 9.2; Arev. 20.22) that the act of philosophizing is in itself an affirmation of the existence of philosophy.¹⁰ Thus it is important for David, the defender of philosophy, to reiterate some of the probing questions posited in the preamble (Busse 9.13; Arev. 22.5) and to insist on certain guidelines without which one could be misled easily. So he quotes *Phaedrus* 237B: "There is only one way, dear boy, for those who are to take counsel wisely: to know what the inquiry is about, or it is sure to be utterly futile" (Busse 9.20; Arev. 22.14).¹¹ He enhances his argument in terms of Plato's method of division¹² and challenges opponents by quoting *Sophist* 235C: "For the method of dividing boasts of escape to no one" (Busse 9.29; Arev. 22.25) and *Philebus* 16C: "The [method of] dividing was granted to us by Prometheus together with a gleaming fire" (Busse 9.32; Arev. 22.30). However, David wonders whether the discussion of division should give way to a discussion of definition.¹³ He concludes that it should, since the method of defining is more appropriate when dealing with the singular and that of dividing when dealing with

⁶For a detailed and lengthy discussion of theoretical and practical knowledge, see below, Busse 54.28–79.29; Arev. 114.17–158.15.

⁷Cf. Busse 57.19, 74.6; Arev. 120.18, 148.16.

⁸Cf. Busse 57.22; Arev. 120.24; Busse 6.8, which is an allusion to *Physica* 259a18 or *Metaphysica* 1073a28, is omitted in the Armenian translation (Busse 6.5–20 should fall in Arev. 16.6).

⁹The word here used is κατάληψις (Arm. *hasumn*). Plato's theory of knowledge is obviously contemplated.

¹⁰Fragment 6 of the lost *Protrepticus* (ed. I. Düring), a popular exhortation to the philosophic life, based partly on the sophistic *protrepticus* which Plato gives in the *Euthydemus*. Cicero wrote his *protrepticus Hortensius* after the model of Aristotle, as also Iamblichus with his *Protrepticus*.

¹¹For "inquiry" (σκέψις, Arm. *mtatsut'iwn*) Plato's text has βουλή, "counsel."

¹²A branch of dialectic amply discussed in the *Sophist*. For the place of διαίρεσις (Arm. *bazhanumn*) in Neoplatonism, see, e.g., Ammonius, *In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum librum I commentarium* 7.31 (ed. M. Wallies); Iamblichus, *De communi mathematica scientia* 20 (ed. N. Festa).

¹³The term ὁρισμός (Arm. *sahmanadrut'iwn*) is frequent in Socratic ethics and Aristotelian logic. For its place in Neoplatonism, see, e.g., Ammonius, *In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum librum I commentarium* 7.32 (ed. M. Wallies); Syrianus, *In Methaphysica commentaria* 12.12 (ed. H. Rabe); Olympiodorus, *In Aristotelis Meteora commentaria* 275.22 (ed. W. Stüve); Elias, *In Porphyrii Isagogen commentaria* 3.28 (ed. A. Busse).

the plural, and since the singular precedes the plural; therefore definition should precede any further discussion of division.¹⁴

At this juncture there is a turning point in the literary structure of the *Prolegomena*, for David now concentrates on the central part of his work, namely, the definitions of philosophy (Busse 11.5–14; Arev. 26.9–18). He begins by asking the following syllogistic questions which he answers in the sequel (Busse 11.16–26.28; Arev. 26.21–62.23): (1) What is definition? (2) How does definition differ from defining, description, and descriptive definition?¹⁵ (3) What is the origin of the word “definition”? (4) How is it developed? (5) What is complete definition and what is incomplete definition (what is bad definition and what is good definition)? (6) How many definitions of philosophy are there? (7) Why are there so many definitions of philosophy and no more or less? (8) What is their order? (9) Who coined these definitions?

In answer to the sixth question above, David provides the following six definitions of philosophy (Busse 20.26–31; Arev. 50.3–15), the order and authors of which he establishes in his responses to the eighth and ninth questions (Busse 23.4–26.28; Arev. 56.5–62.23): Philosophy is (A) knowledge about beings, whereby they are beings;¹⁶ (B) knowledge about divine and human matters; (C) concern about death; (D) likeness to God insofar as it is possible for man; (E) art of arts and science of sciences; and (F) love of wisdom. He attributes A, B, and F to Pythagoras, on the authority of Nicomachus (Busse 26.10; Arev. 60.29). C and D he ascribes to Plato, on the basis of *Phaedo* 64A: “Other people are likely not to be aware that those who pursue philosophy aright forget themselves and others, and are concerned about nothing else but dying and being dead” (Busse 26.16; Arev. 62.4), and *Theaetetus* 176A: “Seeing that it is impossible, Theodorus, that evils should be done away with, and they cannot have their place among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth, therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can.

¹⁴David devotes the last third of his treatise to this subject, Busse 54.28–79.29; Arev. 114.17–158.15.

¹⁵On differentiating between the definitory (ὀριστικός, Arm. *sahmanadrakan*) and the descriptive (ὀνομαστικός, Arm. *storagrakan*) in Neoplatonism, see, e.g., Porphyrius, *In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium* 64.16 (ed. A. Busse); Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium* 22.16 (ed. C. Kalbfleisch); Asclepius, *In Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libros A–Z commentaria* 385.12 (ed. M. Hayduck); Olympiodorus, *In Categorias commentarium* 44.1 (ed. A. Busse).

¹⁶Literally, “the beings” in both instances. The definite article here is extremely important to David. He stresses it repeatedly in his comment on this definition (Busse 26.30–29.11; Arev. 62.26–66.17).

What then is this escape? To become like God in so far as it is possible for man. To become like God is to become holy and righteous and wise" (Busse 26.19; Arev. 62.10). Lastly, he assigns definition *E* to Aristotle on the basis of the *Metaphysica*, apparently alluding to 982a4 (Busse 26.27; Arev. 62.20). In the preceding discussions on the order of the definitions, however, he assigns the same statement to Plato's *Phaedo*, apparently alluding to 61A (Busse 25.21).¹⁷

The central part of the *Prolegomena* comprises a lengthy commentary on the six definitions (Busse 26.30–49.6; Arev. 62.26–112.6).¹⁸ Except for his comment on definition *B*, that philosophy is knowledge about divine and human matters, David quotes other Platonic passages as additional "proof texts" for each of these definitions. Thus, in commenting on definition *A*, that philosophy is knowledge about beings, he quotes *Phaedo* 60C: "*God joined the heads of things together, from above and from beneath: from above in accordance with the creative power inherent in creation and from beneath in accordance with matter*" (Busse 27.25).¹⁹ In commenting on definition *C*, that philosophy is concern about death, he quotes *Phaedo* 64A once more (Busse 29.14; Arev. 66.19) and adds 67B: "*That which is impure cannot attain the divinely pure*" (Busse 29.25; Arev. 68.2); and 62B: "*As though we men are in a kind of prison and no one must free himself or run away from it*" (Busse 29.33; Arev. 68.12). He then repeats the last quotation and adds that no one should break loose from his confinement until he is let free, meaning, as in the *Phaedo*, that no one should put an end to his life, but that one should wait patiently for natural death (Busse 34.4; Arev. 78.15). Likewise, in commenting on definition *D*, that philosophy is likeness to God insofar as it is possible for man, he repeats the quotation from *Theaetetus* 176A (Busse 37.3; Arev. 84.35) and adds *Leges* 653A: "*One would be fortunate even in old age to have wisdom along with intelligence*" (Busse 36.22; Arev. 84.19).²⁰ In commenting on definition *E*, that philosophy is the art of arts and the science of sciences, he quotes a Socratic question, *Gorgias* 449A: "*In what art should we say you are skilled?*," to which Gorgias answers "*rhetoric*"—contrary to Socrates' estimation of philosophy as the true art. David then refers to Plato's

¹⁷Omitted in the Armenian translation; Busse 25.2–24 should fall in Arev. 60.15.

¹⁸On definition *A*, see Busse 26.30–28.21, Arev. 62.26–64.29; on *B*, Busse 28.22–29.11, Arev. 64.30–66.16; on *C*, Busse 29.13–34.12, Arev. 66.19–78.23; on *D*, Busse 34.14–39.13, Arev. 78.26–90.33; on *E*, Busse 39.15–45.25, Arev. 92.3–106.9; and on *F*, Busse 45.27–49.6, Arev. 106.12–112.6.

¹⁹Omitted in the Armenian translation; Busse 27.25–28 should follow Arev. 64.9.

²⁰Σοφία τε καὶ φρόνησις (Arm. *imastasirut'iwn ew khohemuł'iwn*); in the text of Plato, φρόνησις only.

calling the creative man "*a man with art*" in *Sophist* 219A (Busse 43.5; Arev. 100.21).²¹ As for definition *F*, that philosophy is love of wisdom, David reflects on it as an activity of the mind by itself and adds *Timaeus* 47B: "*Such a thing, Theodorus, has neither been generated by men nor bestowed by God*" (Busse 48.11; Arev. 110.13), a statement repeated at the end of the *Prolegomena* (Busse 78.28; Arev. 156.27).

In his comment on the last of the six definitions David goes on to argue that there are four processes of thought occurring between the five powers of cognition and culminating in philosophical activity: between sense perception and impression, experience; between impression and judgment, inquiry; between judgment and thought, skill; between thought and mind, knowledge (Busse 47.24–48.9; Arev. 110.1–6).²² He thus treats the processes of thought as distinct from the powers of cognition and ascribes knowledge not so much to the apprehension by the mind as to the activity of the mind itself. It may be noted that David is again following Plato, who perceives the fifth power of cognition, the mind, as capable of not only reflecting upon data received from the lower types of cognition by the commerce between bodily organs and objects, but also gaining its acquaintance with forms through its own instrumentality;²³ even the lower types of cognition involve the mind in an inward debate with itself when it comes to perceiving, imagining, judging, and thinking.²⁴

Moreover, David sums up his discussion of the six definitions by stating that there are four kinds of definitions: *A* and *B*, philosophy as knowledge about beings and about divine and human matters, are "implications"; *C* and *D*, philosophy as concern about death and likeness to God, are "realizations"; *E*, philosophy as art and science, is "projection"; and *F*, philosophy as love of wisdom, is "etymology" (Busse 48.16–23; Arev. 110.19–26).²⁵ We may observe that there are two sets of fours preceding the discussion of the six definitions of philosophy: the four questions of philosophical inquiry and the four propositions or statements whereby philosophy is defined in terms of knowledge

²¹Τεχνίτην (Arm. *aruestawor*).

²²Several of the Greek lines are omitted in the Armenian translation. The five powers of cognition are: αἰσθήσις, φαντασία, δόξα, διάνοια, νοῦς (Arm. *zgayut'iwn, erewakayut'iwn, kartsik', tramakhohut'iwn, mitk'*). The four processes of thought are: ἐμπειρία, ἵστορία, τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη (Arm. *hmtut'iwn, nerhmtut'iwn, arhest, makats'ut'iwn*).

²³*Theaetetus* 184B–186E.

²⁴*Ibid.* 187A–201C; cf. *Sophist* 263D–264D.

²⁵The four *differentia* (διαφοραί, Arm. *zanazanut'iwnk'*) are: ὑποκείμενον, τέλος, ὑπεροχή, ἐτυμολογία (Arm. *ent'akay, katarumn, arawelut'iwn, stugabanut'iwn*). The διαφοραί here differ from Aristotle's division by διαφοραί terminating in definition; cf. *Topica* VI, 143a29–145b23.

(Busse 1.13, 2.31–8.20; Arev. 2.18, 6.21–20.6); and two sets of fours at the end of the discussion of the six definitions: the four processes of thought and the four kinds of definitions.

Like the later Neoplatonists, David digresses into arithmology and deals with the symbolism of odd and even numbers (Busse 49.8–54.26; Arev. 112.9–114.14). This digression, however, is not unrelated to the preceding discussion, for in Platonism numbers are conceived in the mind and not perceived by the senses.²⁶

The last third of the treatise is devoted to the Platonic method of division, applied to the genus philosophy and its species theoretical and practical knowledge (Busse 54.28–79.29; Arev. 114.17–158.15). Here David expands on the method which was briefly announced earlier (Busse 10.26; Arev. 24.23) and begins by defining division in terms of its logical components, further division and subdivision (Busse 54.28–57.7; Arev. 114.17–120.4).²⁷ He gives three reasons to justify the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical species: (1) philosophy, like a living creature, coexists with us in these two realms; (2) like God, philosophy has theoretical and practical powers; and (3) like the human soul, philosophy has these two dimensions. The theoretical in turn is subdivided, according to Plato, into two: the natural sciences and theology; and, according to Aristotle, into three: the natural sciences, the mathematical sciences, and theology (Busse 57.9–60.8; Arev. 120.7–124.29). While David is fond of Plato's two-part division and enthusiastically quotes *Epinomis* 992A: "*This is the way, these the studies, whether easy or difficult, this the path which is not permissible to neglect*" (Busse 59.13),²⁸ he seems to prefer Aristotle's three-part division because it encompasses the whole range of existences. However, he dwells upon the various disciplines constituting the mathematical sciences only, discussing them under five headings: (1) the four branches of learning: mathematics, music, geometry, and astronomy; (2) the areas they cover; (3) their order; (4) their discoverers; and (5) their cognates (Busse 60.10–65.9; Arev. 126.3–134.23).

After a digression to explain the method of division (Busse 65.11–73.32; Arev. 134.26–148.10), David resorts to subdividing the practical. Here he prefers Plato's division of the practical into two parts: legislative and jurisdictive, over Aristotle's three parts: ethical, administrative,

²⁶Plato, *Theaetetus* 195E.

²⁷Διαιρέσις, ἐπιδιαιρέσις, ὑποδιαιρέσις (Arm. *bazhanumn*, *makabazhanumn*, *storbazhanumn*).

²⁸The text of Plato has: τῶπος for ὁδός, "way"; "easy or difficult" in reversed order; πορευτέον for ἵτεον, "path"; omitted in the Armenian translation (Busse 59.13–17 should fall in Arev. 124.19).

and political (Busse 74.2–75.31; Arev. 148.12–152.9). His preference rests on the fact that the Platonic subdivisions include the Aristotelian and are more logical sequentially (Busse 75.33–76.28; Arev. 152.11–31). Having sung the praises of philosophy, calling it the light and adornment of the soul, David concludes with a summary of philosophical understanding derived from the method of division and quotes *Timaeus* 47B once more to emphasize the noetic origin of philosophy: “*Such a thing, Theodorus, has neither been generated by men nor bestowed by God*” (Busse 78.28, cf. 48.11; Arev. 156.27, cf. 110.13).

Although David stands within a tradition in Neoplatonism started by Porphyry that is sympathetic toward Aristotle and has much in common with the later Neoplatonists, there can be no question about his overbearing reliance on Plato in the *Prolegomena*. In his wish to command order in an area where he saw great disorder, David follows Plato for the most part in the art of definition and inference. He constantly resorts to dialectic, insisting on consistency through the various stages of reasoning. There is no complexity of concepts in his work, and the few structures of his thought that cannot be placed within Platonism are discernible within Pythagoreanism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. Yet, judging from the *Prolegomena*, David is not so much an eclectic philosopher or a historian of philosophy as he is a *homo multarum literarum* who is philosophizing in his own right and is concerned with obtaining what light he can, and that not from any quarter. As a matter of fact, he supports the construction he puts upon the doctrines of other philosophers with blocks of Platonic “proof texts.”

The Armenian Version of David's *Definitions of Philosophy*

ROBERT W. THOMSON

This paper has a double theme. On the one hand, I shall concentrate on a single book written by David Anhaght¹, the *Definitions of Philosophy*. It was written in Greek and translated into classical Armenian, whether by David himself or someone else is unknown.¹ My interest will center on the Armenian rendering and the changes the translator made when he adapted the original for his Armenian readers. On the other hand, I shall also try to bring out some of the more general themes in Armenian literature and scholarship to which this translation of David's *Definitions* bears witness. In other words, I hope to illustrate by specific examples taken from this one text some general characteristics of early Armenian literary culture.

The figure of David himself is very shadowy and obscure. Details of his career do not enter the Armenian historical record until after the year 1000, for Stephen of Tarōn (Asoghik) is the first historian to put into coherent form traditions about David and other prominent Armenian scholars and historians.² The most noteworthy aspect of Stephen's account is that he associates David with Moses Khorenats'i, making him

¹The Greek text was published by A. Busse, ed., *Davidis Prolegomena et in Porphyrii Isagogen Commentarium, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, XVIII/2 (Berlin, 1904), pp. 1-79. The Armenian text was published by S. S. Arevshatyan, ed., *Dawit' Anhaght', Sahmank' Imastasirut'ean* (Erevan, 1960), reprinted in S. S. Arevshatyan, ed., *Dawit' Anhaght', Erkasirut'iwnk' P'ilisop'ayakank'* (Erevan, 1980).

²Step'anos Tarōnets'i, *Patmut'iwn Tiezerakan* (St. Petersburg, 1885), Book, II, ch. 2, p. 20.

one of the pupils of that renowned historian. To the same circle, according to Stephen, also belonged Eghishē and other figures who are as elusive as David the Invincible Philosopher. The important point is that these very significant authors, whose works are among the finest and most enduring of Armenian classics, are associated with Mashtots^c *in person*. The desire to see a tangible rather than a spiritual link with the founder of Armenian literature has bedeviled the dating of Moses, Eghishē, and David from the time of Stephen to the present.

A more elaborate account of David's career than that given by Asoghik was published by F. C. Conybeare from a colophon of a manuscript he saw at Ejmiatsin.³ The manuscript is now in Jerusalem (no. 1303 of the collection at the Armenian Patriarchate); it was written between 1297 and 1307. Not only does the colophon bring David to Constantinople as a companion of Moses Khorenatsⁱ and others, but David is said to have been invited to occupy the chair of philosophy in Athens by Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzen, the famous fourth-century theologians. Here one is reminded of the eleventh-century fictitious *Life* of Cyril of Jerusalem, which brings another Armenian, the patriarch Nersēs, into contact with the two Gregories.⁴ But such fantastic elaborations do not concern us here.

David—that is, the author of commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories* and *Analytics*, Porphyry's *Introduction*, and of the original text *Definitions of Philosophy*⁵—belonged to the school of Olympiodorus.⁶ There are several direct references to Olympiodorus in the *Definitons*. This is picked up later by Gregory Magistros, who in his *Letter 21*, describing the books of philosophy that he knew existed in Armenian, notes the "Book of Olympiodorus that David mentions." Olympiodorus was born at the beginning of the sixth century, was a professor in Alexandria by the year 541, and was still teaching in 565. He was a pagan who lectured on the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle as interpreted in the Neoplatonic tradition. The sixth-century date makes it difficult to entertain seriously the idea recently proposed in Erevan, that David was one of a

³F. C. Conybeare, *A Collation with the Ancient Armenian Versions of the Greek Text of Aristotle's Categories*, *Anecdota Oxoniensia* I, 6 (Oxford, 1982), pp. x-xii.

⁴E. Bihain, "Une vie arménienne de saint Cyrille de Jérusalem," *Le Muséon*, 76 (1963), 319-348.

⁵For a recent bibliography see S. S. Arevshatyan, *Davit^c Anghat^c, Matenagitakan Ts^cank* (Erevan, 1980).

⁶R. Vancourt, *Les derniers commentateurs Alexandrins d'Aristote: L'école d'Olympiodore, Etienne d'Alexandrie* (Lille, 1941).

⁷Grigor Magistros, *T^cghit^cerē*, ed. K. Kostaneants^c (Alexandropol, 1910), p. 66.

consortium of scholars who together composed the corpus of Neoplatonic Christian texts ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite.⁸ Probabilities of a consortium aside, that corpus was already in existence by the early sixth century.

It is not at all surprising that the pupils of Olympiodorus should have included an Armenian. For even before Mashtots^c had deliberately sent his pupils abroad to study and make translations, Armenians had been frequenting the universities of the great cities of the eastern Mediterranean. Constantinople was to become the prime focus of scholarly research for Christian Armenians; but we also know of many Armenians who studied in Antioch in the fourth century,⁹ and in Beirut in the fifth;¹⁰ and the lure of Alexandria is echoed by Anania Shirakatsⁱ and Moses Khorenatsⁱ. Antioch was famous for rhetoric, Beirut for law, and Alexandria for philosophy. The texts used in those universities were studied by Armenians and some were translated into the Armenian language. The technical nature of their subject matter—grammar, logic, and other more scientific topics—led to a more literal style of translation than that used in the earliest period of Armenian literature.¹¹ But the linguistic problem is not our concern here. What we should emphasize is that Armenians played a role in the intellectual life of the Eastern Roman empire, and that they brought to Armenian scholarship in its formative stage a wide range of scholarly disciplines that went beyond the more strictly ecclesiastical interests of Mashtots^c and his immediate circle of pupils.

By the time David was studying and writing in Alexandria, more Armenians had become familiar with various aspects of Greek culture through translations or through original books written in Armenian, such as the work of Eznik, than had had the opportunity to study abroad themselves. Nonetheless, when David's *Definitions of Philosophy* was translated into Armenian, the translator realized that many of its allusions to things well known in Alexandria would not necessarily be immediately comprehensible to the readership in Armenia, where the cultural background was significantly different. So he introduced a

⁸S. S. Arevshatyan, "David^c Anhaght^ē ev hin Hayastani p'ilisop'ayakan Mitk^ē," *Patma-Banasirakan Handes* (1980), part 1, pp. 21–39.

⁹P. Petit, *Les étudiants de Libanius* (Paris, 1957).

¹⁰Zacharias Rhetor, *Vita Severi*, ed. M. Kugener, *Patrologia Orientalis* II, 1 (Paris, 1904), p. 57.

¹¹A bibliography of earlier Armenian scholarship on this so-called Hellenizing School will be found in A. N. Muradyan, *Hunaban dprots^ē* (Erevan, 1971). See also H. Lewy, Introduction to *The Pseudo-Philonian De Jona, Studies and Documentis*, 7 (London, 1936).

number of changes in order to make the book easier to understand. The changes do not involve the basic ideas of David's philosophy, but some are interesting in that they draw attention to Armenian themes.

Let us begin with some of the minor variations. For example, in chapter 20 David discusses images made in wax: The wax cannot take the imprint of a different image unless that of the first image is destroyed. David uses Hector as an example of a person whose image might be made in wax; but the Armenian text reads "Tigran," a figure who would come to the Armenian mind more readily than the Greek hero.¹² It is worth noting that other works by David were similarly altered in their Armenian versions. Thus, in the translation of his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, Helen is rendered as "Tigranuhi." And elsewhere Vardan is introduced as an example of bravery. More amusingly, the example of Socrates as a philosopher becomes, in Armenian, "David."¹³

Many other allusions to classical lore that would have been familiar to a Greek audience are either omitted or explained. For example, Alcibiades is usually expunged,¹⁴ and references to gymnastics, not a typically Armenian sport, are omitted.¹⁵ Epicureans or Pythagoreans, however, are explicitly named on occasion, when the reference would not be obvious to an Armenian,¹⁶ as is also Homer when the Greek merely reads "the poet."¹⁷ The *Theaetetus* of Plato is defined as "a dialogue."¹⁸ When David refers to Argives and Boeotians, the Armenian translator adds: "and all the other Greeks,"¹⁹ for these two peoples would not be familiar to an Armenian reader. And to a list of natural disasters the Armenian adds "earthquake."²⁰

Actual mistakes in rendering the Greek are very rare. There are only two clear examples. One is in a quotation from the poet Theognis and involves reading a rough breathing in place of a smooth breathing: κατ' ἡλιβάτων is rendered by *yaregnakokh*,²¹ that is, the Armenian stem *-kokh* correctly renders *-βατ-*, but ἡλι- was read instead of ἥλι-, so "sun" in the Armenian takes the place of "high." The other mistake is

¹²Greek, p. 62²⁰; Armenian, p. 130³⁴. References are to Busse's and Arevshatyan's editions of David's *Definitions*; see n. 1 above.

¹³For changes in the Armenian version of Aristotle's *Categories* see A. Vardanian, "Hay Tarrner Aristotēli Storogut'eants' t'argmanut'ean mēj," *Handes Amsorya*, 34 (1920), 292-295. For the use of Vardan see Conybeare, p. vi (see n. 3 above).

¹⁴Greek, p. 7⁸, 15⁸. But not on p. 136 of the Armenian.

¹⁵Greek, p. 19³⁵.

¹⁶Armenian, pp. 18³³, 96¹⁵.

¹⁷Greek, p. 14³⁵, 31¹⁰; Armenian, pp. 34³⁴, 72⁷.

¹⁸Greek, p. 37³; Armenian, p. 86¹.

¹⁹Greek, p. 75¹; Armenian, p. 150²⁰.

²⁰Greek, p. 33²²; Armenian, p. 76³⁰.

²¹Greek, p. 32²²; Armenian, p. 74²².

reading "Plato" for "Plotinus" on two occasions.²² The second time, three of the five manuscripts used for the Armenian edition have garbled renderings of Plotinus (Platinios, Platonios, Planios). This indicates that the translator probably wrote Plotinus on that occasion, but the name was totally unfamiliar to later scribes.

In addition to being able to distinguish Plotinus from Plato, the translator was clearly familiar with the actual writings of the latter. For when David quotes the *Timaeus* in chapter 1, the Armenian adds that the demiurge is here addressing "the spiritual powers," though they are not mentioned in the Greek text.²³

But these changes are not particularly significant. Let us turn to adaptations that are more complex. For example, in the first chapter David deals with the problem of giving names to things that have no real existence. Some philosophers had claimed that if something can be named it must exist. But David gives three examples of Greek words that describe nonexistent things: the *τραγέλαφος* (goat-stag—a fantastic animal often mentioned in classical Greek literature), *σκινδαψός* (which can refer to a stringed musical instrument but more generally stands for a meaningless word) and *βλίτυρι* (the twang of a harp string and hence a meaningless sound). The Armenian renders the "goat-stag" more or less literally by *eghjernak^{agh}* "horned goat." But in place of the other two Greek words the translator has put *aralēz*, the mythical creature of Armenian lore that supposedly restored life by licking.²⁴ (The most famous example comes in the story of Ara and Semiramis, as reported by Moses Khorenats'i. Alas, the Assyrian queen's sorcery was ineffectual and Semiramis was cheated of her desired Armenian hero.)²⁵ The word *aralez* is variously spelled in Armenian sources. Faustos Buzand (V, 35) refers to the *arlezk^c*. Moses Khorenats'i (I, 15) does not actually name the creature, but by referring to *Ara* and using the verb *lizel* he implies a form *aralēz*, as in David. Eznik writes both *arlez* and *aralēz*.²⁶ More significant from our point of view is the fact that Eznik uses this word of

²²Greek, pp. 30³¹, 59¹⁷; Armenian, pp. 70²², 124¹⁹. Similarly at p. 9²² of the Greek (Armenian, p. 22¹⁴) the Armenian text reads "Phaedo" for "Phaedrus," but three manuscripts have the correct title.

²³Armenian, p. 2¹⁷.

²⁴Greek, p. 1¹⁷; Armenian, p. 2²².

²⁵Moses Khorenats'i, *Patmut'iwn Hayots^c* (Tbilisi, 1913) I, 15.

²⁶Eznik, §§122, 124. The references are to the edition and translation by L. Mariès, *Eznik de Koghbe, De Deo, Patrologia Orientalis*, vol. 28, fasc. 3 and 4 (Paris, 1959); they correspond to pp. 98 and 100 of the Venice 1826 edition. There are further references to these creatures in Eghishē, *Questions et réponses sur le Genèse*, ed. N. Akinian (Vienna, 1928), p. 18, and in N. Adontz, "Le Questionnaire de Saint Grégoire," *Revue de l'Orient chrétien*, 25 (1925/26), 319. See also the *Primary History*, text in *Patmut'iwn Sebēosi*, ed. G. V. Abgaryan (Erevan, 1979), p. 51.

“names that do not refer to persons (*anuanḱ^c arants^c andzants^c*).” Did the Armenian translator of David have this passage in mind when he added the reference to the *aralēzk^c* as an example of things that can be named but have no real existence?

A much stranger variation occurs in chapter 12 where David cites the natural attributes of certain animals: the dove is prudent, the lion brave, the fox sagacious, the stork just. Here the Armenian text renders “fox” by “camel.”²⁷ It is not very likely that the Armenian *aghuēs* (fox) has been corrupted in the entire manuscript tradition to *ught* (camel). But there is no suggestion in Armenian fables (for example, in those attributed to Vardan or in the Armenian version of the *Physiologus*) that the camel is renowned for its sagacity. More in keeping with that animal’s character is the epithet “vindictive” found in the *Hexaemeron* by Basil of Caesarea, the Armenian version of which was widely read and influential.²⁸

In chapter 20, David, discussing number and proportion, refers to music and mentions as examples of musical instruments κύμβαλοι (cymbals) and αὐλοί (flutes). But the Armenian text has *p^candrunḱ^c* (stringed instruments), *p^coghḱ^c* (trumpets), and *tsntsghayḱ^c* (cymbals).²⁹ The first, *p^candirḱ* in the singular, is a particularly important instrument in Armenian life, used to accompany the singer of traditional tales (e.g., Moses Khorenats’i, I, 6, 24, 31). It was also a feature in the pagan funeral practices against which the Armenian clergy protested so violently. Thus Faustos Buzand (V, 31) contrasts the calm, Christian behavior with which the dead were buried during the pontificate of Nersēs I (tears, psalms, lighted candles), with the wild habits after Nersēs’s death: “They buried them dancing their laments with trumpets (*p^cogh*) and lyres (*p^candirḱ*) and flutes (*vin*), cutting their arms and tearing their faces, men and women dancing together in filthy lasciviousness and clapping their hands.” Conversely, cymbals are associated with biblical themes, and trumpets even more so. But since in the Armenian Old Testament “lyre” is rendered by *k^cnar* and the word *p^candirḱ* never appears, the Armenian translator of David’s *Definitions* was probably not thinking of biblical parallels when he rendered “cymbals and flutes” by the three Armenian terms *p^candrunḱ^c*, *p^coghḱ^c*, and *tsntsghayḱ^c*.

It is difficult to imagine any non-Christian writing in, or making translations into, Armenian. The Christian nature of early Armenian litera-

²⁷Greek, p. 397; Armenian, p. 90²⁶.

²⁸Basil, *Hexaemeron*, 71A. On the Armenian version see K. M. Muradyan, *Barsegh Kesarats’in ev nra ‘Vets’oryan’ hay matenagrut’yan mej* (Erevan, 1976).

²⁹Greek, p. 64²⁰; Armenian, p. 134⁷.

ture is all pervasive. Of course, Christian writers had interests beyond what we might call Christian texts, for some writers of pagan antiquity were read and translated. But in view of the numerous variations in the Armenian rendering of David's *Definitions*, it is noteworthy that little effort was made to infuse Christian ideas into the text. At the very end, when David summarizes the purposes of philosophy, the Armenian translator expands a little to say: "God granted philosophy."³⁰ And when the Greek text speaks of the control of one's desires, the Armenian translator says: "so that we should not receive any false knowledge from our reflection nor work any evil deed."³¹ Earlier, in chapter 3, the Armenian text slightly expands the Greek to include a reference to God as creator.³² And in chapter 6 the nymphs of classical mythology are rendered by "angels and demons."³³ But there are no explicit or implicit references to Christianity as such.

In general the Armenian text of David's *Definitions* abbreviates the original, especially in the second half, which is more of an adaptation than a translation of the Greek. But there are a few additions of some length, not just of an explanatory word or phrase. For example, in chapter 20 David, having cited Orpheus, makes a reference to the power of music over animals and men. At the end of that section the Armenian translator adds: "just as some tell the tale (*vipasaneal*) about Alexander: that when he was feasting, the musician played a martial tune, and he straightway armed himself and went out to the attack; then when the musician played melodies of jollity, he returned to join the guests."³⁴ This story does not occur in the Armenian version of the *Alexander Romance*, where the only reference to the power of music over Alexander (when the bard Ismenias tried to turn him to pity) indicates that Alexander was not beguiled.³⁵ Nor do references to Orpheus in the works of rhetoric available in Armenian mention this tale. The translator of David's text was thus himself familiar with Greek traditions beyond what was available in Armenian texts—as we have already noted with regard to Plato.

Greek was not the only literature with which Armenians were familiar. Syriac had been used in the Armenian Church before the time of Mash-tots^c, and translations of Afrahat, and more especially of Ephrem, had

³⁰Greek, p. 79²⁴; Armenian, p. 158¹⁰.

³¹Greek, p. 79²⁶⁻²⁸; Armenian, p. 158¹³⁻¹⁴.

³²Greek, p. 8¹⁵; Armenian, p. 18³⁵.

³³Greek, p. 16²; Armenian, p. 38¹².

³⁴Armenian, p. 134¹⁶⁻²³.

³⁵*Patmut'iwn Aghek'sandri Makedonats'woy* (Venice, 1842), §131.

exerted a profound influence on early Armenian Christian literature. Furthermore, numerous works of Jewish origin were translated into Armenian and had a wide vogue. This helps explain another addition in the Armenian version of David's *Definitions*.

Chapter 14 of the Armenian is a very abbreviated rendering of chapters 16 and 17 in the Greek and omits most of the complicated discussion concerning numbers. At the very end of the chapter the translator adds some comments about the number seven: "Children born in the seventh month have a better chance of survival, in the seventh month children produce their first teeth, and in the seventh year they change them."³⁶ This has parallels in the curious speculations in Anania Shirakats'i, who notes that the child conceived on the seventh day will be a son; children born in the seventh month will be healthy; in the seventh year the mental aptitudes are advanced enough for children to start school; and at twice times seven the reproductive powers are formed.³⁷ This is not the place to investigate the number symbolism found in Armenian whose origins are to be sought in Christian interpretations of Jewish traditions.³⁸ What is interesting from our point of view is that the translator did not think such notions incompatible with the philosophical theme of David's *Definitions*. But then, neither were these speculations ignored by Philo, whose works in Armenian translation had a profound influence on numerous Armenian writers.

In the preceding remarks attention has been focused on how an Armenian translator wrought certain changes in his text in order to make it more meaningful for an Armenian audience. Some works of a more technical nature than David's *Definitions of Philosophy* required even greater adaptations when translated into Armenian. Such, for example, was the case with the *Ars Grammatica* of Dionysius Thrax; not only were references to classical motifs omitted, but the grammatical examples were adapted and expanded to fit the structure of the Armenian language.³⁹

One could also point to historical works written in other languages, but adapted for an Armenian readership. Both the Georgian chronicles known in Armenian as *Juanshēr* (of which the Georgian *Juanshēr* is only a part) and the Syriac history by the patriarch Michael were translated

³⁶Armenian, p. 114¹¹⁻¹⁴.

³⁷Anania Shirakats'i, *Matenagrut'yunē*, ed. A. G. Abrahamyan (Erevan, 1944), p. 245.

³⁸See R. W. Thomson, "Number Symbolism and Patristic Exegesis in Some Early Armenian Writers," *Handes Amsorya*, 90 (1976) 117-138.

³⁹The Greek and Armenian texts are juxtaposed in N. Adontz, *Dionysii Frakiiskii i Armyanski Tolkovateli*, Bibliotheca Armeno-Georgica 4 (St. Petersburg, 1915); French translation, *Denys de Thrace et les commentateurs arméniens* (Louvain, 1970).

into Armenian. But not only are the translations shorter than the original, the translators also introduce new Armenian material into their adaptations.⁴⁰ Then there are translations which have been doctored for a tendentious purpose. This occurs most frequently in theological texts in which the authority of earlier writers is claimed for later dogmatic positions. There is nothing peculiarly Armenian about this very general phenomenon; but I might mention in passing that by a series of subtle changes in the Armenian texts Athanasius of Alexandria was transformed from an anti-Arian champion to an opponent of Chalcedon—which council was held about seventy years after his death.⁴¹ However, this is taking us away from our theme; for there is no suggestion that the Armenian adaptation of David's *Definitions of Philosophy* was made with any ulterior motive save that of simplification.

Sometimes the Armenian translations of technical works such as this, made in the so-called "Hellenizing" style, are condemned for their slavishness to the original texts and for lacking the literary polish of earlier translations, such as that of the Bible (the "queen of versions," as it has been named). I do not think that many would deny that the effort to render technical texts in Armenian was sometimes taken to extremes. But it was necessary to create a specialized vocabulary, totally new in Armenian, and precise verbal equivalence was considered vital in works of logic or rhetoric. In the hands of inexpert translators the results were often ungainly, sometimes incomprehensible, and occasionally ludicrous. For example, the Armenian rendering of the texts ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite, mentioned earlier, abounds with obscurities which can be explained by the fact that the translator (in this case, Stephen of Siwnik^c) looked at syllables separately and not at whole phrases.⁴²

But although there were excesses, I wish to conclude by suggesting that a blanket verdict of slavishness is unjustified. In the case of David's *Definitions* there was a clear desire on the part of the translator to make his text more meaningful for the Armenian reader than a perfectly literal rendering would have been. Such freedom, such willingness to adapt in a creative fashion, is a sign of vitality; it evinces an intellectual awareness of the problems involved. This also comes out in the Armenian rendering of Basil's *Hexaemeron*, to which I referred earlier when discussing

⁴⁰*Hamaṛōt Patmut'iwn Vrats' ěntsayeal Juanshēri Patmch'i* (Venice, 1884); *Zhamanakagrut'iwn Tearn Mikhayēli Asorwots' Patriark'i* (Jerusalem, 1871).

⁴¹R. W. Thomson, "The Transformation of Athanasius in Armenian Theology," *Le Muséon*, 78 (1965), 47–69.

⁴²R. W. Thomson, "The Armenian Version of Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita," *Acta Jutlandica*, 57 (1982), 115–123.

the camel. Here the translator has frequently expanded the original in order to make the arguments clearer to his Armenian readers. So the great influence of David's works on later Armenian thinkers is not only explained by the fact that he was a significant expositor of the philosophy of late antiquity. I suggest that the sympathetic adaptation of his works into Armenian played a large role in the emergence of David as "the Invincible Philosopher."

Universals in David, Boethius, and al-Farabi's Summary of Porphyry's *Isagoge**

HAIG KHATCHADOURIAN

In this paper I shall provide a critical exposition of the fundamentals of David's views concerning universals, as they occur in Lectures One through Six of his *Commentary* on Porphyry's *Isagoge*¹ or *Introduction* to Aristotle's *Categories*.² I shall next present the views of another commentator on the *Isagoge*, Boethius. Finally, I shall briefly present the Islamic philosopher al-Farabi's reformulation of the concept of a universal in his summary or paraphrase, so-called, of Porphyry's *Isagoge*.³ The comparison of the ideas of the three commentator-philosophers, partly or wholly occasioned by Porphyry's landmark work, should be instructive and illuminating.

*I wish to thank the Armenian General Benevolent Union—Alex Manoogian Cultural Fund for a research grant that enabled me to have the Greek text of Lectures One through Eight of David's *Prolegomena* translated into English. Without it this paper would not have been possible. I also wish to thank Professor Monti for his painstaking translation of the Greek text.

¹*Verlutsut'iwn "Neratsut'eann" Porp*h*ewri*. These lectures were translated, for the purposes of this paper, by Professor Richard Monti of the Classics Department of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, from the Greek text of the *Prolegomena*, ed. A. Busse, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, XVIII/2 (Berlin, 1904).

²*Isagoge*, translation, introduction, and notes by Edward W. Warren (Toronto, 1975); hereafter Warren, *Isagoge*.

³"Al-Farabi's *Eisagoge*," translation and notes by D. M. Dunlop, *The Islamic Quarterly*, 3, no. 1 (April 1956), 117-138; hereafter Dunlop, *Eisagoge*.

1. *David*

In Lecture One of the *Commentary* David starts off his discussion of Porphyry's five predicables by observing the reason why philosophy posited (David says "invented") universals. The reason, he explains, is that particular things are always changeable and "do not partake of any stability." For universals (e.g., man in general) "are always the same"; and "philosophy imitating nature," invented universals because "philosophy is concerned with things which are always the same" (p. 97).⁴ Particular things are said to be "singly and also to be individual." They are said to be singly "since each of them can be taken by itself," and they are said to be individual because they are "not divided into things which are complete"; that is, "when divided they do not preserve their own particular form" (pp. 97-98 and ff.). He likens the division of an individual into its parts—for example, Socrates into hands, feet and a head—to the division of a genus into species and the division of a species into individuals. However, he argues more cogently that "man in general" (species) is "not a whole, but a universal. For the whole is one thing, and the universal is another. The universal is observed to be uniform [i.e., to have the same form] in each of its species and individuals, e.g., the universal animal [genus] is observed to be uniform in each of its species" (p. 98). Being different from a whole, a universal can (and does) preserve "its own peculiar form." However, David uses the unfortunate phrase "[is observed] to the same degree" in talking of the relation of the universal to "its" individuals, thus: ". . . in every one of its individuals the universal is observed to the same degree"; whereas "the whole is not observed to the same degree in every one of its parts." He explains: "For Socrates is not observed to be in a hand alone or in his head alone but in all his parts together. For neither is Socrates' hand Socrates, nor is his head Socrates, but all his parts taken together" (p. 98). But clearly a universal (e.g., man in general) cannot be in Socrates alone or in Plato alone, etc. (cf. Plato's *Parmenides*), any more than Socrates can be in his hand alone. Yet the relation between man in general and the individuals that instantiate it is also quite different from the relation of identity between Socrates and "all his parts taken together." Clearly, the contrast that David seems to be trying to bring out lies in the fact that whereas Socrates is in all his parts *taken together*, that is, in all the parts in relation, this is not true of universals. Man in general is "in" each human being singly and individually, not in some kind of relation or another. Still, it makes no sense to speak of a universal as being (observed to be) in the same or different degrees in different particulars.

⁴ Parenthetical references are to the Busse edition of David's *Prolegomena*.

David next considers Porphyry's five predicables (which he appears to accept without hesitation), and starts off by saying that whereas genus, species, and difference are essential (i.e., constitute the essences of things), property and accident are not, although property is sometimes essential; how, he does not explain (p. 99). But genus is logically prior to difference "since genus encompasses in itself differences"; and "difference comes before species since difference is more general than species" (p. 99). Again, "species comes before property because species is essential only but property is not essential only . . ." (p. 99). He adds that property is "convertible with species," that is, if something is a man, it is also able to laugh, and conversely. Accident, however, is not convertible with species. David does not inquire as to why species should be included at all among the predicables; since, for one thing, species can be defined in terms of genus and difference. Like Porphyry before him, he is unaware of the difficulties engendered by the former's substitution of *species* for *definition* in the list of Aristotle's predicables. For as William and Martha Kneale write in *The Development of Logic*:

Aristotle [in formulating the doctrine of the predicables] was talking of the relation of a predicate to another general term. In . . . the *Eisagoge* . . . Porphyry added *species* as one of the heads of classification requiring explanation. If this innovation is taken to imply that the distinction of predicables can be used in connexion with an individual subject, it is unfortunate, since nothing is essential or accidental to an individual as such. Here, however, we have the origin of the medieval doctrine of the *quincque voces* (species, genus, differentia, property, and accident).⁵

In Lecture Two, in which he discusses division, definition, and analysis, David notes that the fundamental terms (i.e., the five predicables) are universals. Analysis, however, belongs not only to universals but also to particulars (p. 104).

In Lecture Four David restates the question of the ontological status of the predicables, which Porphyry mentions at the outset of his *Isagoge* only to sidestep it in a famous (and according to David, much criticized) passage. Porphyry raises three fundamental questions: "(1) whether genera or *species* exist in themselves or reside in mere concepts alone; (2) whether, if they exist, they are corporeal or incorporeal; and (3) whether they exist apart or in sense objects and in dependence on them."⁶ David rephrases (1) less precisely as the question of "whether they [genera or *species*] reside in a concept of whether they really exist." He asks: "But what is 'reside' in a concept or really exist?" and replies:

⁵*The Development of Logic* (Oxford, 1962), p. 187.

⁶Warren, *Isagoge*, pp. 27-28.

That resides in a concept which is born when we think of it and which is destroyed when we forget it. . . . But we say that really exists which nature creates and knows, that which our thought neither maintains in existence by making calculations about it nor destroying or forgetting it, as for example man and dog are creations of nature. Whether or not someone thinks about these things, their essence is neither destroyed nor maintained in existence. (pp. 108–109)

He then mentions a “dispute among the ancients” as to whether or not species and genus exist; he cites Antisthenes as holding that neither genus nor species (objectively) exists. For example, David writes: “He says in fact, ‘I see a man, but I do not see human nature’ ” (p. 109). He immediately criticizes such talk, calling it silly, since not all things that exist (e.g., divine things) are sensible things. Similarly, neither a “rational nor an irrational soul, nor does a physical soul exist [,] insofar as they are not subject to sense.” Above all, the senses are deceptive. He then lists some common examples of visual illusions in its support. With that, and having made short shrift of Antisthenes’ claim by saying “Now then having shown that Antisthenes was wrong in doing away with universals” (unaware of having committed a non sequitur in jumping from “[certain] non-sensible things exists” to “universals exist”), he proposes to set down “how they exist, first of all by teaching these things via definition” (p. 109). A universal, he states, is that which in regard to its form is one in number,⁷ but shared by many things, and adds: “We said ‘one in number’ insofar as it is some one thing. But since matter too is some one thing,⁸ we added the phrase ‘in regard to its form.’ For even if matter is some one thing, nevertheless, it is not one thing in regard to its form” (p. 109). If we interpret “form” as “essence” the distinction between the oneness of a universal and the oneness of matter holds; though certain questions arise. For David appears to be claiming that, for example, whereas the universal “man is general” is identical in nature in all human beings, the matter of each human being is different in nature, not just numerically. If so, he must explain in what lies this essential diversity in the latter. The (Aristotelian)

⁷David’s statement makes sense if we interpret “form” to mean “essence” or “nature”—which is, after all, what “form” means for both Plato and Aristotle. “A universal is that which in regard to its essence or nature is one in number, but shared by many things” may mean that a universal (a) has one nature rather than two or more natures, and (b) is numerically one (for each class or kind or particulars).

⁸Numerical and qualitative (“formal” or “essential”) identity are (once again?) confused here. “Matter” is presumably “some one thing” qualitatively speaking. But is that true within the Aristotelian scheme, or any other scheme which conceives of particulars as a unity of matter and form?

answer that David may have had in mind but which he does not provide is that the accidental qualities of particular human beings provide this differentiation, hence individuate them. A more intriguing point is his next remark: "But as to the fact that matter is not universal nor is it particular, we shall learn about this fully when we get to physical studies" (p. 109). One may ask how matter can be neither universal nor particular, unless it be Plato's "pure matter." Yet is not "pure matter" also "one thing in regard to its form (essence)"? Actually, even this cannot be properly maintained in relation to pure matter, since Plato conceives of it as lacking in all determination, as the element of nonbeing. The upshot is that David appears to be confusing two different senses of "matter." In fact, he seems to be indiscriminately mixing Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of matter.

David provides no real answer to the crucial question—on which, according to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Plato badly floundered, but on which Aristotle himself is not much more enlightening—as to "how, while being some one thing, it [a universal] is observed in many things." His answer (on p. 110), besides being vague, essentially begs the issue by merely using such words as "sharing" and "have a share in" (shades of Plato's "participation" and "copying"). For precisely in what sense or way does a set of particulars "share" or "have a share" in a universal? Moreover, throughout his putative explanation David simply assumes that if certain particulars share "in a similar thing" as against "in the same thing," that ultimately boils down to sharing "in the same (or in one) thing," namely, a universal! That is, he rejects without argument the existence of ultimate similarities, irreducible to common features. For example, he says: If the many "share in a similar thing, they have a share either in some one thing or in many things. And if in some one thing, we have the object of our investigation [i.e. the universal]. But if in many things, we search once again and the many things have a share in something, either in many things or in some one thing" (p. 110). In the former case we have a recurrence of the same two logical alternatives; and so "the same investigation continues until you get to the point where the many things terminate in some one thing or the *investigation proceeds infinitely*" (p. 110, italics added). But he does not pursue the possible implications of the latter. Instead, he categorically states: "For the many things have a share in some one thing."

*In a later passage he speaks of "formless matter" (Plato's "pure matter") as incorporeal. But if by "matter" in the present passage he means "pure (formless) matter" rather than the "informed" matter of particular objects, the puzzle is why he holds that matter is not universal albeit incorporeal. That it cannot be particular is more easily explained. For it cannot be particular if it is to be shared by all material things in existence.

In Lecture Five we are told that "the ideas in Plato," which are incorporeal, exist by themselves and have their own substance, are separable from matter (i.e., exist *ante re*), while other incorporeal things are "separable [from matter] in one way and inseparable in another, like geometrical figures and mathematical" (p. 110). This passage confirms Philip Merlan's view that for David (*Prolegomena*, p. 57, l. 9–p. 58, l. 25) ". . . intelligibilia subsist and are thought, without matter; geometricals exist only in matter but are considered by us as immaterial; sensibilia exist in matter and are considered by us together with their matter."¹⁰ This means that David is not, in Merlan's phrase, a "multiple realist,"¹¹ unlike, for example, Iamblichus and Proclus, two leading Neoplatonists, who held that mathematical as well as intelligibilia are self-subsistent. Nevertheless, according to these two philosophers as well as David, Merlan maintains, intelligibilia are ontologically above mathematical, and the latter are above sensibilia, the subject-matter of physics.¹² Merlan also notes: "What is particularly interesting to see, is that David and Ps. Galenus give full credit for this [the preceding] tripartition to Aristotle, opposing him to Plato who, according to Ps. Galenus, assumed only two divisions of knowledge. Here, indeed, the Platonic root of tripartition is not only forgotten; it is denied."¹³ This notwithstanding, the fact remains that Plato held that mathematical as well as intelligibilia are self-subsistent. Merlan adds: "In their denial of the subsistence of mathematical, Alexander, Ammonius, Ps. Galenus [and we may add, David] are Aristotelian."¹⁴ In saying that David adopted the Aristotelian tripartition, Merlan claims for David "the clear insight into the duality of principles underlying the tripartition [viz. that for Aristotle, physics and mathematics have no claims to highest wisdom, confining that to the theology, the third sphere of being]. . . ."¹⁵

I mentioned earlier that David attempts to defend the view that universals are objectively real by maintaining that they are incorporeal. In Lecture Five he returns to the same thesis and presents six arguments to refute the Stoics, who he claims "said that everything which is is corporeal, and clearly also that genera and species are corporeal" (p. 111). Briefly, these arguments are:¹⁶ (1) "body [a corporeal or physical thing]

¹⁰Philip Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* (The Hague, 1953), p. 70.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 70.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶In the lectures under discussion David concentrates on the question of the ontological status, etc., of genera and species. But he explicitly states that the other Porphyrean predicables are also universals. To that extent what he maintains concerning genera and

is never the same in a greater thing and in a smaller thing" (e.g., the size of an elephant's head and an ant's head). Consequently, genera and species are (must be) incorporeal, if (since) genus and species are the same in larger and in smaller things. For there are no degrees of being alive in different things, that is, no degrees of the presence of the genus "living creature." A corollary is that relations are also incorporeal (pp. 111-112). (2) "Body can never be shared completely as a complete thing by everything. . . . Now genus and species are observed to be complete as complete things in everything. For humanity is observed to be complete as a complete thing in me . . . , and similarly in Socrates and Alcibiades and Plato" (p. 112). (3) "If . . . when attributed to Socrates, genus and species . . . add nothing," in contrast for example, to the pouring (addition) of the measure of one cup into another cup (p. 112). Further, genera and species, unlike physical objects, do not grow, diminish or change. A corollary is that qualities too are incorporeal. For whiteness or blackness or other qualities cause no addition when they are attributed to Socrates and to Alcibiades. (4) Genus and species are observed to be "in many things at the same time"; but this is untrue of objects. For example, an ivory bone in your shoulder blade is not the same as the ivory bone in Orestes' shoulder blade. Interestingly, David adds that "formless matter"—undoubtedly Plato's "pure matter"—is also incorporeal, "existing at the same time in all things or encompassing all things." This stands to reason; since for anything to be corporeal, it must have matter. But matter itself cannot be meaningfully said to have matter.¹⁷ (5) Genera and species "preserve their own form [nature, essence] when they are divided into Plato, Socrates, and everybody else." This is untrue of physical things, for example: "If there is a pound and it is divided into many parts, it doesn't ever preserve the same form as it had when it was of its original size" (p. 113). (David's confusion of quantitative division and the logical "division" of a genus into species, etc., in this alleged contrast, is obvious.) Finally, (6) if every body is made up of matter and form (εἶδος) and if genus and species are corporeal, species too would be made up of matter and form. But this is ridiculous. "For no one says that species [i.e., γένος] is composed of form (i.e., γένος)" (p. 113).

In holding that objects consist of matter and form, David clearly follows Aristotle's metaphysics in yet another way than we have hitherto noted.

In Lecture Six David returns to the question of the ontological status

species also applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to them. On p. 112 he also says that *relations* are incorporeal.

¹⁷But the idea that it is therefore incorporeal also faces difficulties.

of universals and provides a more detailed answer to it than he had so far done. Together with Lectures Seven and Eight (but see my reservations concerning the latter two), Lecture Six constitutes the heart of David's account of the mode of existence of universals in Lectures One through Eight. The most significant addition to what he had already told us about universals is that, although subsisting *ante re* as Plato held, they are not separate, self-subsistent entities, *contra* Plato. Rather, they exist in God's mind, as His ideas. The first inkling we have of this view is at the beginning of Lecture Six, where David interprets Porphyry's phrase "before many things" in relation to the "fundamentals" (i.e., the predicables) as "*that which exists in the knowledge of God or which takes its cause from God's creation*"¹⁸ (p. 113, italics added). The added Aristotelian elements are seen, first, in ". . . at every point we have used the term 'many things' for the sake of the universal terms. For these terms since they are universal need many things"; and second, in repeating that universals also exist in our thought, as "true thought, which recognizes in an accurate way nature's creations," and not as "mere concepts," such as the concept of a stag-goat (p. 114). (Cf. also Lecture Eight, p. 119, where he again distinguishes the two types of concepts, involving the distinction between existing in reality and existing in mere concept.) The distinction David draws here corresponds to Descartes's later distinction between "adventitious" and "fictitious" ideas, respectively. In Descartes's terminology, David is saying that universals exist in our thought as adventitious, not as fictitious ideas, since they have reference to something objectively real. That is, universals exist in physical things, *in re*, as well as in concept. Thus he rejects conceptualism as well as nominalism.

In the following subsection David attempts to evaluate the "reputed discord" between Aristotle and Plato concerning universals, and then treats the subject himself. He presents a certain interpretation of Plato, which he seems to accept though he does not explicitly say so, and then rejects an interpretation of Aristotle in which Aristotle is said to reject the existence of universals "before the many" (p. 114). Plato's interpretation, as David describes it, is in effect that universals exist both *ante re*, *in re*, and *post rem*.

David appears to ascribe the putative divergence between Plato and

¹⁸Note that here he speaks of "God's creation," that is, he attributes creation to God; and so we can safely assume that he is thinking of the Christian (namely, his) conception of God. For as we shall see, he rightly refrains from attributing to Aristotle the idea of God's creation of nature.

Aristotle to the "no small variance in Platonic doctrines" (p. 115). He states the views of three groups of Platonists concerning the notion "before many." Some Platonists, he says, stated that the notion "before the many" is valid insofar as "with God everything is created by reason." By this he appears to mean that they held that universals exist eternally in God's mind, as His ideas; and that they were the archetypes or models He used in creating the universe. For he contrasts this first view with the view of those Platonists who, he says, claim that there are "certain self-substantial ideas" which "do not have reason but which do have sense and in the image of which God creates everything." They therefore existed before the world's creation ("before we were born"). If, as it appears, "has reasons" means "object of reason" or "intelligible," hence "incorporeal," and so by "has sense" he means "corporeal," the latter two groups disagree as to whether or not universals are incorporeal. David says that Aristotle too "seemed not to accept the notion 'before many'"—which is, of course, true; but then he gives the following incorrect reasons. First, that according to Aristotle, saying that God "needs sense" (matter) makes him weak (imperfect); and most important, that if universals are corporeal, we would perceive them. Second, that for Aristotle it is a serious error to hold that the ideas are self-substantial but are incorporeal and that God creates in their image. For that suggests that ideas are models and "these models came before God's creations," that is, that they are co-eternal with God. For Aristotle, according to David, this view is paradoxical. In fact, of course, it is no more paradoxical for Aristotle than it is for Plato, since the idea of creation *ex nihilo* is absent from their philosophy. On the other hand, it is "paradoxical" for anyone, such as David himself, who holds the Christian conception of God. Indeed, it is in direct conflict with the Christian view of God as the sole eternal, uncreated being, which holds that save for Him nothing existed before He created the universe *ex nihilo*. In this "interpretation" of Aristotle, we see the "Christianization" of the pagan philosopher. The same process of transformation is evident in David's treatment of Plato. Plato's Demiurge and Aristotle's Prime Mover are transformed into the Christian God—or, at least, into the God of theism. Whether David is only reporting on this transformation or whether he is obliquely presenting his own Christian reinterpretation of Plato and Aristotle is not absolutely evident from the text alone; but the fact is that he said earlier that he will treat the subject himself after speaking about the reputed discord between Aristotle and Plato, and it may be safe to assume that he is stating his own views. (It must be remembered that the process of Christianizing Greek philosophy

and Hellenizing Christianity had started centuries before. St. Augustine was, of course, the greatest Latin Church Father who did so, in "reading" Plotinus to some extent, and with important reservations, into Christian theology.¹⁹) What is evident from the text is that, since he believes that universals exist in some fashion "before many," David can only *consistently* do so, as a Christian, by holding that they exist eternally in God's mind, as His ideas; not independently of Him, as self-subsistent entities. David is noncommittal on this, in the typical Alexandrian Neoplatonist's fashion of the day. But since he is fully aware of the incompatibility of the Christian conception of God with the Platonic view that universals are self-subsistent, we can perhaps presume that he subscribes to the preceding views, which he attributes to Aristotle. If so, S. S. Arevshatyan is right in maintaining, in the introduction to his Russian translation of David's *Prolegomena*, that David held that "universals pre-exist in the divine mind, which creates nature."²⁰ Yet this interpretation does not fit in well with David's explicit statement, in Lecture Seven, that "they [universals] do not exist in mere concepts, . . . but they exist in reality, and they do not exist by themselves, but in our thought" (p. 117, italics added). Not only is there no mention here of their existing in God's thought: the implication of the statement (especially of "but in our thought") appears to be that they do *not* exist anywhere except in physical things and in our thoughts, as concepts.

In Lecture Six David continues his putative exposition of Aristotle's metaphysics. He says that Aristotle holds that God's creation "takes place with reason," which seems to mean that he thinks that Aristotle holds that universals are in God's mind, since he adds: "*But further he accepts not only the notion 'before the many' and 'in dependence on the many,' but also the notion 'in the many' "* (italics added). For he had previously said that Aristotle rejects the view that the ideas are self-

¹⁹See Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* (New York, 1940), and *Being and Some Philosophers* (2d ed.; Toronto, 1952), *passim*.

²⁰*Prolegomena* (Erevan, 1976), p. XXVIII. Arevshatyan gives p. 89 of the Armenian text of the *Prolegomena* as a reference; but I find no clear support for it there. Earlier in the introduction (p. XXI) he cites p. 45 of the same work for the view that "universals originate from God's creation" (are created by God): this is patently inconsistent with the preceding. Checking that reference reveals that on pp. 44 and 46b David speaks of "the many" as originating from God's creation. That view is perfectly consistent with the view that universals preexist in God's mind: since "the many" undoubtedly refers to the corporeal, sensible things in this world.

For Arevshatyan's above account of David's views, as well as with help with other parts of the Introduction and parts of the Russian translation of the Armenian text, I am indebted to Professor Katerina Filips of the Slavic Department at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

subsistent. This, together with the view that God *created* the world, appears to yield the desired conclusion. The trouble is that David is fully aware that Aristotle does *not* hold the latter view. How then does he think that for the Stagirite the Ideas exist in God's mind? The passage immediately following supplies the answer. For he claims that in the *Metaphysics* the Stagirite says that "such things [universals] at first are with God, but later in matter," just as the general's plan is first in himself but later on "things turn out in accordance with this plan either in camp or in the city" (p. 115). He adds: "For at first God knows these things and later nature activates them." David thinks that this explains Aristotle's (alleged) statement that "nature engages in activity without reason." For Aristotle wanted to demonstrate that "nature doesn't know these things, but it activates them without God's being aware of it" (p. 116). This is significant because David is, once again, Christianizing Aristotle, thereby resolving, to his satisfaction at least, a major difficulty in Aristotle's conception of God's relation to the world. I mean that in Aristotle's view God does not and cannot know the world ("nature"), since it is Self-Thinking Thought. However, the solution which David ascribes to Aristotle clearly will not do. He supposes that for Aristotle God knows the many, the world, by virtue of the ideas (universals) which are, allegedly for him, their plans or archetypes. But in what way could it be so, since the world is independent of God, that is, since (1) God does not use the Ideas to create the many—the many are not created by Him; and (2) nature activates the many "without reason" (i.e., without a plan), and without knowing the Ideas, the plan?

It would be interesting to compare the solution of the problem David attributes to Aristotle, and especially David's own Christian solution—if he indeed holds that universals preexist in God's mind—with the solution of St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. But I shall not go into that here. I may observe, however, that what I called "David's solution"—which at the same time constitutes, in a way, a compromise resolution of the "ancient quarrel" between Aristotle and Plato concerning universals—is already found in Plotinus, and under his influence, in St. Augustine.²¹ Concerning the former, D. A. Rees says:

The realm of the Intellect [the second of the three divine hypostases, or natures, which are, in descending order, the One, Intellect, and Soul] is the realm of Being, and Intellect contains the system of Intelligibles within itself—here Plotinus diverges from Plato, who had set thought and its objects in contrast, and follows the Middle Platonic tradition seen in Albinus. . . . The intelligible world itself is seen not as static but as instinct with life. Soul derives from

²¹Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, *passim*.

Intellect and looks toward it, and itself in turn gives rise to the world of nature. . . .²²

Finally, Lectures Seven and Eight (pp. 116–126) do not substantially add to our understanding of David's views concerning universals, and so I shall not speak about them here. In fact, there appear to be troubling differences, perhaps inconsistencies, between some of the things stated there and statements in the first Six Lectures, which call for study and explanation. For example, it would be instructive to see whether the Armenian text contains the same divergences or inconsistencies. But I shall leave these things to the future.

2. *Boethius*

In the introduction to his translation of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, E. W. Warren states that Boethius, whose translation of the *Isagoge* and two commentaries on it were instrumental in "the transmission of logical theory to the later middle ages,"²³ "chose to comment on the deeper questions mentioned in Porphyry's opening section and so stimulated interest in the signification of terms and problems of meaning. The ensuing controversy was a major debate during the middle ages, and the issue remains fundamental in philosophy."²⁴ The clause "stimulated interest in the signification of terms and problems of meaning" is significant, since as we shall see, the ninth–tenth century Islamic philosopher al-Farabi's "summary" or "paraphrase" of the *Isagoge* poses and throughout considers the central problems in the *Isagoge* in terms of what he calls "universal meanings." Warren believes that Boethius's position is essentially the Aristotelian one:

Boethius professes to follow Alexander of Aphrodisias; and, as is generally agreed, the solution is more a statement of an Aristotelian position than anything else, since grave questions remain untouched. Boethius asserts that the mind collects a *similitudo* or likeness ("A likeness in nothing else but a kind of unity of quality," E.S. [*Editionis Secundae Commenta Boethii*] p. 228, 20)

²²"Platonism and the Platonic Tradition," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (New York, 1967), vol. 6, p. 337. Concerning Augustine, Rees speaks of "his theory of Ideas and eternal truths as subsisting in the mind of God. . . ." (p. 338). Although I have not seen any mention of Augustine in the Lectures I am considering, it would be worthwhile to attempt to ascertain whether David knew of Augustine's writings.

²³Warren, *Isagoge*, p. 15. See also Eleonore Stump's introduction to her English translation of *Boethius's De topicis differentiis* (Ithaca, 1978), p. 15, where she says that Boethius's "discussion of the ontological status of predicables seems to have sparked the long medieval controversy over universals."

²⁴Warren, *Isagoge*, p. 15.

from singular things and thinks a universal. Thus, generic and specific contents "subsist in connection with sensible things but are understood without bodies" [E.S. p. 166, 22-23]. What is involved epistemologically and metaphysically in collection is untreated. There is no reason to regard this solution as that of Boethius since he consciously follows a Peripatetic line of argument and the commentary treats of an introduction to Aristotle: "therefore, we have followed Aristotle's opinion quite carefully, not because we approved of it especially, but because our book is written with Aristotle's book in mind, his *Praedicamenta (Categories)*."²⁵

The preceding quotations from Boethius clearly support Warren's—following Boethius's own—view that they are a restatement of the essentials of Aristotle's position, namely, his view that the form of an object (the potential universal) is actualized in the mind (the passive intellect) as the class concept of that kind of object (species) by a process of mental abstraction from particulars sharing that form (essence). And the idea that "specific and generic content" (Warren) "subsist in connection with sensible things," though suffering from the vagueness of "in connection with," expresses, by the contrast it draws between "subsist in connection with sensible things" and "but are understood without bodies," Aristotle's view that universals do not have objective existence outside particulars. It is noteworthy, however, that Boethius is merely concerned to state the Aristotelian position, and does not indicate whether or not he agrees with it.

William and Martha Kneale express a view similar to Warren's:

According to his [Boethius's] doctrine universals subsist in corporeal things, but are themselves incorporeal and separable in thought from corporeal things; for a *species* or a *genus* is just a similarity which may be collected by the mind from various individuals, e.g. the *similitudo humanitatis* which may be collected *ex singulis hominibus*. Thus, he tells us, is the view of Aristotle, which we may accept for the purposes of the main inquiry, without presuming to decide definitely against Plato's view that universals are not only thinkable apart from bodies but capable also of existing in separation.²⁶

In fact, Warren points out that "... in the second commentary a Platonic view of the predicables occasionally emerges, i.e., therefore *species* also subsist before individuals (P. [Pacius] 316, 22-23)."²⁷ Eleonore Stump, in her book, *Boethius's De topicis differentiis*, thinks that Boethius "seems to take a conceptualist view of the predicables, intermediate between realism and nominalism (cf. *In Isagogen*, ed. Brandt,

²⁵Ibid., p. 22.

²⁶*The Development of Logic*, pp. 196-197.

²⁷Warren, *Isagoge*, pp. 22-23.

p. 159.10 ff.; PL 82B 3 ff.).”²⁸ She thinks that in Boethius’s work “‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ and words relating to the predicables . . . generally . . . have to do not with linguistic entities but with the entities or characteristics signified by the expressions that constitute the grammatical subject or predicate of a sentence. . . .”²⁹ This enables these nonlinguistic entities to be (mere) concepts—hence conceptualism.³⁰ But the example she cites seems to support not conceptualism but a form of realism. She says: “For example, Boethius and Porphyry both say that if a differentia is destroyed or ceases to be, then its corresponding species is also destroyed, but not vice versa; if a species is destroyed, the corresponding differentia remains (Boethius, *In Isagogen*, ed. Brandt, pp. 328.21–329.3; PL 151 B6–12; Porphyry, *Isagoge, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (CAG) IV, pt. i, p. 18.21–23).”³¹ The destruction of the species with the destruction of a differentia or its ceasing to be can suggest that both species and differentia exist only as concepts. If the concept of a particular differentia ceases to be, the concept of the corresponding species would cease to be, since the latter concept is logically dependent on the concepts of (a) the proximate genus, and (b) its differentiae, distinguishing that species from the other species of that genus. The converse, however, is false. For example, the concept *rational* is logically independent of the concept *man*, and so is not affected by the latter’s ceasing to be. On the other hand, the idea that a species *can* be destroyed or cease to be, though in line with its being a mere concept—hence in line with conceptualism—is also compatible with its being an Aristotelian form. For an Aristotelian, the extinction of a particular species of animal, say the dinosaur, entails the destruction of the form or essence of that class of things (here dinosaurs) since the form exists *in re* (here in the individual dinosaurs) and not *ante re*. It may, however, continue to exist in our thought as a concept, if we were already in possession of the concept when the species becomes extinct. That concept can, however, *cease to be*, which would happen if and when no human mind³² continues to entertain it. Note that the conceptualist cannot deny this and assert that once a concept is formed it cannot cease to be, on pain of abandoning his position for extreme realism, since the only way in which

²⁸Stump, p. 248, n. 4.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Provided that concepts are thought to be “defined” in terms of one or more putative *common and peculiar* features.

³¹Stump, p. 248, n. 4.

³²I say “human mind” since I wish to exclude God’s mind. A conceptualist can obviously maintain that some concepts are indestructible, namely, those that may be supposed to exist eternally in God’s mind, as God’s ideas.

concepts can be truly regarded as indestructible is by supposing "them" to subsist as Platonic Forms or as quasi-Platonic Forms, or, perhaps, as the ideas of God. (Cf. our discussion of David concerning the latter.) In other words, it is a necessary consequence of conceptualism that concepts are identical with *ideas* in a *psychological* sense of the word. In that sense an idea exists only insofar as some conscious being, preeminently a human being, actually thinks about the thing(s) of which that idea is the idea, or "has the idea in his mind." And "has the idea in his mind" means that he can recollect it, either in the usual circumstances in which recollection occurs, or by some special method of recalling.

The (possible) attribution of conceptualism to Boethius is clearly not inconsistent with his statements or Aristotelian realism, if in the latter case we see him, as he himself says, as presenting the Aristotelian view to his readers. The same, to my mind, applies to Porphyry. The possibility that Porphyry is a conceptualist rather than a Platonic or even Aristotelian realist should be significant in relation to David's thought.³³

3. *Al-Farabi*

Al-Farabi's "summary" of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, or "paraphrase," as it is called by D. M. Dunlop, who translated it and published it in English, with an introduction, was written several centuries after David's *Prolegomena* (al-Farabi died in 950), in a quite different philosophical and cultural climate and with a different philosophical-theological orientation than David's. It would therefore be expected to diverge from it as well as from Porphyry's *Isagoge*. Moreover, we are told that al-Farabi may have used in the present text a translation into Arabic of the *Isagoge* by Abu 'Uthman Sa'id b. Ya'qub al-Dimashqi (fl. 914). If, as is likely, al-Farabi had only a translation to work with, that fact alone can account for at least some of the divergences or differences in al-Farabi's "restatement" of Porphyry's ideas.

Al-Farabi's statement of the purpose of Porphyry's *Isagoge* is essentially the same as the latter's statement of it, but more precise. Instead of pointing out, as Porphyry does, the importance of knowledge of the five predicables for an understanding of Aristotle's categories and the like, al-Farabi states that the purpose of the book is the enumeration of the

³³The thesis that Porphyry and Boethius seem to be conceptualists is historically interesting because, for one thing, historians of philosophy commonly suppose that there are very few *bona fide* conceptualists in medieval philosophy. For instance, A. D. Woozley, in the article "Universals," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (New York, 1967), vol. 8, pp. 194-206, states that conceptualism is primarily associated with Locke, Berkeley, and Hume—all modern philosophers.

parts and divisions of all judgments, categorical and hypothetical. But the divergences between the two texts appear soon thereafter. Perhaps the most striking and most important for our purposes is al-Farabi's explication of the predicables in terms of meaning: "the meanings signified by the expressions" that, as we would now say, convey or express the concepts *genus*, *species*, *differentia*, *property*, and *accident*. For example, he says: "Discourse on the kinds of simple universal meanings, as enumerated by many of the ancients, are five: genus, species, differentia, property, and accident."³⁴ Earlier on the same page he distinguishes two kinds of what he calls "universal meanings which are taken as parts of categorical judgments": (a) "simple and signified by simple expressions"; and (b) "composite and signified by composite expressions whose composition is restrictive and conditional, not declaratory, as when we say 'the white man' and 'the rational animal.'"³⁵ Again, speaking of genus and species, he says: "The universals which are predicated of one individual vary in generality and speciality, as 'man' and 'animal' predicated of Zaid. For 'man' is more special than 'animal.'"³⁶ Indeed, the use of the term "meaning" (*ma'na*) or the concept of meaning pervades his description and analysis throughout the work. This is in contrast to Porphyry, who never once mentions the word "meaning," let alone explicate any of his basic concepts in terms of meaning; likewise with David's discussion of the predicables in Lectures One through Eight of his *Prolegomena*.

The move I have described, whatever its historical significance in relation to al-Farabi's philosophy and the thought of his successors, is significant from a systematic philosophical point of view. It reformulates the traditional problem of universals in terms of the question of how general or class names mean, and so places it squarely at the center of a general theory of meaning and hence of philosophy of language. This is one of the important ways in which late medieval and modern, but especially contemporary philosophers approach the problem of universals. In fact, Plato's Theory of Forms is thought to provide a certain type of theory of linguistic meaning. In presenting what they call the twofold objection of Aristotle to Plato's Theory of Forms, William and Martha Kneale write: "In the first place, it seems to him [Aristotle] to be an oversimplified theory of meaning. Plato is apparently committed to

³⁴Dunlop, *Eisagoge*, p. 128. Dunlop notes (p. 117, n. 4) that the text of this translation has been recently published by A. F. al-Ahwani, as *Isagoge, Traduit par Abu Osman al-Dimichki* (Cairo, 1371/1952), p. 109 (manuscript note by al-Hasan b. Suwar on the unique MS. No. 2346 of the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris).

³⁵Dunlop, *Eisagoge*, p. 128.

³⁶Ibid.

the thesis that every term has a single signification, namely its appropriate Form, and Aristotle tries to refute him, [e.g. in the *Nicomachean Ethics*] by adducing terms which may be applied in all the categories and therefore cannot, according to him, have a single meaning or definition."³⁷

Plato's theory of linguistic meaning is a special form of the referential theory in that sense. The referential theory is described by William Alston, in his book *Philosophy of Language*, as identifying "... the meaning of an expression with that to which it refers or with the referential connection. . . ."³⁸ Plato's theory maintains that the entity to which an expression refers is a subsistent universal. Thus on that account the meaning of the word "man" is the universal (or Form) Man; the meaning of "red" is the universal (or Form) Red(ness). The referential theory, despite its widespread acceptance over a long period of time, is mistaken, even in its more sophisticated modern form, which regards meaning as the referential relation and does not take the referent to be a Platonic (or even an Aristotelian) universal.³⁹

³⁷*The Development of Logic*, p. 29.

³⁸(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), p. 11.

³⁹For telling criticisms of both types of referential theory, see Alston, *Philosophy of Language*, pp. 13-22.

The Cross of God: The Religious Philosophy of David the Invincible

HAGOP J. NERSOYAN

The Soviet Armenian philosopher Henry Gabrielyan devotes thirty pages of the first volume of his *History of Armenian Philosophical Thought* to the question of just who David the Invincible was. In the end he justifies his examination and analysis of David's opus among the works of classical Armenian writers on the basis of an affinity between the culture David "created" and the intellectual milieu where this became possible. Gabrielyan considers the possibility of David's being of Greek origin and finds it unlikely. He affirms that the philosopher's thought is tied to the Armenian reality of the sixth century A.D. and reflects the concerns of the people of that period. Gabrielyan also suggests that we simply do not have sufficient information to pass in this matter from opinion to knowledge, or from conjecture to certainty.¹

Conjectures as to David's identity do indeed abound, yet I cannot resist the temptation of adding to them one of my own. My own conjecture will not, to be sure, settle the issue. But it is certainly a neat conjecture and, it is hoped, plausible. I will be advancing it in due course not, primarily, as a contribution to philology, but by way of justifying the presentation at this symposium of a paper on "Dawt'i Anhaght' P'ilisop'ayi Nerboghean i Surb Khach'n Astuats'ēnk'al," which can be translated with fair accuracy as "An Encomium of the Holy Cross of

¹*Hay P'ilisop'ayakan Mtk'i Patmut'yun* [History of Armenian Philosophical Thought], Vol. I (Erevan, 1956), pp. 344 ff.

God by David, the Invincible Philosopher.” The complex implications of the adjective *astuatsēnkal* will be seen as we proceed. Of the two parts of this paper the first will attempt to show that David, to whose works this symposium is dedicated, may well have written the “Encomium” under consideration. In the second part I will concentrate on the religious-metaphysical claims of the “Encomium.”

I

The text that I propose to consider was published by the Armenian Mekhitarists in Venice in 1833. It consists of a letter to David, a reply attributed to him, and the “Encomium.” The letter, signed by Catholicos Giwt, recognizes David’s acumen in matters of doctrine, describes him as one who has found the treasure of heavenly blessings, and requests that he make a reply to alarming claims made by heretics. David accepts the challenge with unsettling misgivings. If this correspondence is authentic, the “Encomium” must have been written shortly before 478, the probable date of Giwt’s death. The two letters and the “Encomium” are introduced by a preface; there is also a note appended to David’s letter.²

The preface portrays David as one fully versed in the sciences, both theoretical and practical. He is said to be from the village of Heret^c in the province of Hark^c, a disciple of Sahak and Mesrop, and a nephew of Moses the Grammarian. He was, we are told, one of the sixty students who, because of their intelligence, pleasant voice, and many virtues were chosen after the invention of the Armenian alphabet to travel to Alexandria, Athens, and elsewhere, to study philosophy and rhetoric and to do translations. Upon their return the students found the sociopolitical conditions in Armenia much deteriorated. There was one Catholicos, John Mandakuni, on the Persian side. On the Greek side the incumbent was Giwt.

The note appended to David’s reply to Giwt specifies that the correspondence took place during the tenure of Vahan, the governor (*marzpan*) of Armenia and commander (*stratelat*) of the Armenian armed forces. We know that Vahan died shortly after 500. The note makes a point of saying of its specification of the time of the correspondence that it is not hearsay but that it is according to the testimony of those who have looked into the matter and know (*p^cordzoghk^c ew gitoghk^c*). There is also a vehement denial that the “Encomium” was written (or

²*Koriwn Vardapeti, Mambrē Vertsanoghi ew Dawit^c Anahagtⁱ i Matenagrutⁱwnk^c* [The Works of Koriwn Vardapet, Mambrē Vertsanogh, and David Anahagt^c] (Venice, 1833), pp. 99–119.

delivered or spoken) for any reason other than the one advanced by Giwt, or that it was authored in Athens or Byzantium or Jerusalem upon the return of the true Cross from its captivity in Persia.³

The references to the return of the Cross from Persia, which took place in 628, indicates, of course, that the note appended to David's letter was written much later than the letter itself. The note also contains a reference to Magnes as a son of Vardan (Mamikonian). Now it is generally known that Vardan had no such son and that the erroneous information to that effect can be traced to the historian Asoghik, who died early in the eleventh century.⁴ We may conclude that at least five centuries after the "Encomium" there were controversies as to where and when it was written, but the belief that it was written by David the Philosopher was still unshaken. Indeed, a very large number of scholars, including the well-known literary historian and philologist Manuk Abeghian,⁵ accept the view that David, or the author of *Definitions of Philosophy* and the commentaries on Aristotle and Porphyry, wrote the "Encomium." However, present-day Armenian Soviet scholars seem to reject that identification. The entry "Davit⁶ Anahaght⁷" in the third volume of the *Soviet Armenian Encyclopaedia* speaks of the "tradition" according to which David "composed many songs for the Armenian Church." It also specifies that of the many works attributed to David four are certainly by him: *Definitions of Philosophy*, *Commentary on Porphyry's "Isagoge," Interpretation of Aristotle's "Categories,"* and *Interpretation of Aristotle's "Analytics."*

The reluctance to admit that the same man wrote these philosophical works and the "Encomium" is understandable, for the differences between them are many. The styles are obviously different. The philosophical works, on the one hand, are written in a sober, controlled, professional style. Each topic is introduced, then arguments are advanced

³The warning that David's "Encomium" was not written upon the return of the Cross from Persia is perhaps of more than casual interest. David's is not the only encomium in Armenian classical literature. We have, notably, an encomium written by T'ëodoros K'rt'enawor, which has reached us under exactly the same title as that of David. Moreover, David and T'ëodoros use, perhaps routinely, some of the same imagery borrowed from the Bible. T'ëodoros was a student of Mat'usagha and was known, like David, as "the Invincible Philosopher." Also like David, Mat'usagha was involved in the passionately debated Christological controversies and defended, as one would expect, the Armenian position. T'ëodoros was a contemporary of Heraclius, and he may have written his encomium on the occasion of the return of the Cross. The point of the aforementioned warning may thus be to have the reader avoid a confusion between the work of David and that of T'ëodoros.

⁴Cf. Maghak'ia Örmanian, *Azgapatum* [National History], Vol. I (Istanbul, 1913), section 303.

⁵Manuk Abeghyan, *Erker* [Works], Vol. III (Erevan, 1968), p. 553.

in favor of the claims made, then the reader is told clearly that we are now moving on to a new issue. The "Encomium," on the other hand, is poetry, relatively free of constraints, expressive only of a single driving idea; it is an avalanche of biblical imagery, a display of enthusiastic religious commitment. Here inferential thinking often gives way to captivating associations that do not neglect the phonetic effect of the sentences that state them, for example: "Blessed are you, Holy Wood! For while the first tree which, with its beautiful and sweet fruit, became the occasion of our death, deceiving the Virgin sprung from Adam, Adam born of the Virgin, tasting bitterness through you, made life flow out among humans."

David is contrasting Mary to Eve, Christ to Adam, the new to the old, and even as he makes the pivotal statement that the deceptively attractive fruit of the Tree of Eden led to perdition while the bitterness of the Cross leads to abundant life, he does not lose sight of the musical quality of Armenian. Indeed, this is apparent throughout the text, as those who read it in the original will readily observe.

The differences between the philosophical works and the "Encomium" are more than stylistic. As far as I know there is not a single reference to the Scriptures in the philosophical works. The author of these works may of course have been a Christian, but the reader has no way of knowing it. The author of the "Encomium" is, as we see, a devout Christian, most eager to proclaim his faith as well as his agreement with the biblical claims, properly understood. Perhaps more importantly, there is a difference between the philosophical works and the "Encomium" in the methodology of establishing the truth of propositions, to which I must return. We may also note that the philosophical works deal largely with metaphilosophy and method, whereas the "Encomium" makes a substantial claim.

Yet it seems to me that the same person could very well have written both the philosophical works and the "Encomium." We all know people who are good philosophers, good theologians, and good poets at the same time, capable of adapting their style to what they wish to say or create. Boethius comes to mind because he was a contemporary of David's and may have studied in Athens, and himself wrote commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, as well as on Aristotle's *Categories* and *Analytics*. In his *Consolation of Philosophy* rhyme and prose alternate, but even the prose is poetic in tone. Reading the *Consolation* one would not know that Boethius is a Christian, yet he also wrote noteworthy treatises on the Holy Trinity. More to the point is that one of his works is entitled *One Person and Two Natures in Christ*.

That David's philosophical works were not written for a preponderantly Armenian audience is to me quite evident. We may assume that he wrote or noted them down in Greek during his studies and research abroad. He may have written them in Greek in Alexandria or Constantinople, much as an Armenian professor working in Indiana or Wisconsin would write in English on topics quite unrelated to his own ethnic background. David may then have turned his texts into Armenian to teach from them in Armenia. Our ignorance of the details of his life leaves room to speculate that he stayed abroad for long periods of time, or often enough to write the philosophical works which are attributed to him with sufficient certainty. But if it were asked, "Why didn't David thoroughly 'Armenianize' his works" (as distinct from translate with emendations), the answer would be, "Because in his time nationalism was nonexistent and Greek scholarship—or the closest possible faithfulness to the Greek masters—was, at least in part of Armenia, a mark of academic distinction." We may continue to conjecture that when David became aware, upon his return to Armenia or during his sojourn there, that there were efforts, politically motivated, to downgrade Greek culture and that Alexandrian Christology was in danger of giving way to rival claims, he wrote the "Encomium" and other related works in Armenian for his Armenian audience. That David filled a deep felt need in doing so can be seen from the sigh of relief with which he seems to have been met. And one may note in favor of our view that although the philosophical works and the "Encomium" do not treat the same subjects and are not on the same level of meticulous attention to cogency and detail, the conceptions that underlie them are far from incompatible. Let me give one important example. David says in the *Definitions* that "It must be realized that the point of doing philosophy is this: to adorn and add glitter to the human soul, and translate it from a life that is material and befogged to one that is divine and immaterial."⁶ Compare this to the following passage in the "Encomium": "For this sign is the means of our being taken from death to life—to life not of the indigent and earthly sort, but of the sort which is endless, and ineffable, and inaccessible. . . . And as we bow down, let us put aside all thoughts that are heavy and darken the mind. Lightened by the soul's clear vision, having become worthy of the holy, heavenly mystery, let us raise ourselves to higher things."

⁶*Dawit' Anhaght', Sahmank' Imastasirut'ean* [Definitions of Philosophy], Annotated critical edition with Russian translation, with an Introduction in Russian by S. S. Arevshatyan (Erevan, 1960), p. 156.

Both passages refer to a beautifying or cleansing of the soul, a desire for freedom from the realm of the heavy and the obscure, a looking forward to transposition to the heavenly and divine. It is as if the same author were saying, with Augustine of Hippo, for example, that philosophy clears the way, but the Cross carries the worshipper to his or her destination. It is the "Encomium," moreover, which is the fruit of a decidedly Neoplatonic frame of mind, as I shall show presently.

Because of conflicting data about David's time, the exact dates of his birth and death will probably never be known, and I for one see no reason for regretting the lack of that information. It does not really matter whether any portion of his life coincided with Giwt's. What truly matters, at least from a philosophical-theological standpoint, is of course whether the things David has to say are of notable originality and/or significance. To evaluate their significance it is sufficient to establish the period in which he lived with approximate accuracy. The likely assumption that David flourished sometime in the sixth century is confirmed by the content of the "Encomium," for that period was marked by violent controversies over the nature or natures of Christ, or rather by the prolongation of those controversies in the eastern parts of the Empire. It is almost certainly as the answerer of questions regarding Christology that David became an intellectual champion in Armenia, which means that the title "Invincible" was bestowed upon him less as a philosopher than as a defender of orthodoxy. It is true that in his philosophical works he argues expertly against such views as Pyrrhonism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism. But these were run-of-the-mill academic issues. One argued routinely against these positions then, as one argues against Descartes and Hume today. The issue that aroused passionate interest, that touched people even in their secular well-being, was the formulation of the relationship between the humanity and the divinity of Christ. Ancient historians who mention David's "invincibility" do so in connection with his *theological* acumen.⁷ Hence one could even say, quite reasonably, that if the man who wrote the "Encomium" is not the same man who wrote the *Definitions* and the commentaries, then David the Invincible is the man who wrote the "Encomium."

The preface mentioned earlier states that David took up the defense of the Armenian theological position in compliance with Giwt's request when three men from the Syrian sphere of influence wandered into Armenia and proceeded to argue against Alexandrian positions. The three men were Constantine, Peter, and Theodore, from the province of

⁷Cf. Gabrielyan, *Hay P'ilisop'ayakan Mtk'i Patmut'yun*, p. 345.

Antioch. They are described as self-flagellating, barefooted, abstinence-flaunting hypocrites, with knees and foreheads roughened like the skin of a camel, who went about saying that Mary is not the Mother, and the Cross is not the Cross, of God. This is, as anyone can realize, a formidable challenge. Its logical axe threatens the very *raison d'être* of Christianity. We have no evidence that the three itinerants were denying the divinity of Christ. But they were denying the very possibility of salvation. For if, on the one hand, He who died on the Cross is a mere man, how could His sacrifice affect anyone's eternal destiny? On the other hand, how can God be said to have been crucified? Or, how indeed can the Cross be the Cross of God?

The issue is by no means peculiar to David's time and place. Concern with salvation is ever present. It is rooted in the human condition itself. The question is not whether people desire salvation, but rather, how is salvation to be conceived or visualized? How *is* man saved? People whom Schleiermacher would call "cultured despisers of Christianity" may opt to look at the question that challenged David from positivistic perspectives and declare it senseless, but they will not have spoken the last word. There are other respectable thinkers who find positivism or humanism reductionistic. Karl Rahner, for example, one of the leading thinkers of this century, sees "the history of salvation and revelation as coextensive with the whole of world history," and detects no particular difficulty "in conceiving [of that history] as the history of self-transcendence into the life of God. In its ultimate and highest phase," Rahner goes on to say, "this self-transcendence is identical with an absolute self-communication of God. Which signifies the same process as seen from God's side." We shall see that David makes the same fundamental claim from within *his* conceptual framework.

II

I have sufficiently detailed the circumstances of the composition of the "Encomium" and have suggested reasons to believe that it is the work of the same man who wrote the *Definitions, Commentary, and Interpretations*, the differences between the two sets of works notwithstanding. I have alluded to the existential import of the "Encomium" and to its enduring significance. I now move on to David's central thesis and to his argument in favor of that thesis.

¹*Foundations of Christian Faith*, trans. W. V. Dych (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), pp. 142, 198.

David was faced with the impossible-looking task of showing that the Cross can be the Cross *of God*. With this in mind we can see that the references to Paul in the Giwt-David correspondence are not fortuitous. Centuries before the intellectual leaders of Antioch had raised rationalistic objections to the central tenets of Christianity, Paul had observed that these tenets fail to make logical sense, in a certain sense of "logical," and that they are offensive to the religious sensitivities of persons who think of God as immaterial, infinitely majestic, and Wholly Other. It was David's paradoxical responsibility to place on rationally acceptable grounds Paul's own claim—as read by the Church—that the Cross is the Cross of God.

Folded into the entire "Encomium" is the initial assumption that one understands how the Cross can be, and is, the Cross of God by acquiring the wisdom of moving from given religiously significant ideas that are conceived spatiotemporally to ideas that are not so conceived. The visible Zion, for example, must be viewed as an instrumentality, something of an occasion that opens the mind to the *intelligible* Holy Mountain. The principle can be expanded to mean, in view of some of David's other statements, that the as yet unregenerate world, including as it does the human psyche, is built in such a way as to receive the Christ. It is a "waiting" world, as a building built in a certain way "waits" to be consecrated in order to become a church. The effects of receiving the Christ, or of fulfillment, are for man the understanding of reality and self-understanding, as well as security and guidance in the vicissitudes of mortal existence.

It is to be observed that David is skillfully avoiding the sort of argumentation that can only lead to an impasse. If we initially divide the Christ into two distinct entities, the human and the divine, we condemn ourselves to an insoluble conceptual problem in the matter of His also being the crucified Savior. David takes as his starting point the concrete, massive religious experience of mankind: the narratives of the Scriptures show a yearning for salvation and the divine response to that yearning. If one reads the "Encomium" with deliberate detachment, that is, with the self-imposed intention of not being carried away by its poetic impact, one gathers that for David salvation has two aspects: cognitively, it is a state of affairs wherein, seeing the sensible, one can look beyond it and see the intelligible. This is very much a philosopher's salvation; it is, moreover, the salvation of a philosopher who happens to be a follower of Plato. First of all, there seems to be the conviction, in the background, that knowledge itself is possible only through the power of God. We recall, and David surely knew, what the psalmist declares: "In the light

of Thy face do we see light”⁹—a conviction that has affinities with the role that the Good plays in Plato, and that Augustine made the centerpiece of his epistemology. Second, David views salvation as the removal of pain and the conquest of death. Sin is of course mentioned in the “Encomium,” but it does not receive considerable emphasis. Had not God intervened in the world, that is, made Himself present here, we would be living in the shadows of the Old Dispensation, that is, in ignorance and frustration.

The experience of human yearning and divine response, of darkness and illumination, pain and bliss, death and life, is signified by the Cross, while the condition of making that experience one’s own is obedience, that is, emptying oneself of oneself and opening oneself to the divine presence; it is self-giving for adoption by God as the precondition of true freedom.

David the Philosopher does not present these views in a didactic, philosophical style, for he is also profoundly devout. He puts himself forth as the living witness of the truth of his claims. He *addresses* the very Cross he is writing *about*. The impact of the “Encomium” is no doubt due partly to the fact that the author is not lecturing the reader, who is merely a witness observing a witness to the truth and saving power of the Cross. One is reminded of Anselm, who presented the most tantalizing argument in favor of God’s existence in a prayer addressed to God.

Nearly one half of the “Encomium” is a series of paragraphs that come to the reader as waves from the depths of David’s soul, each beginning with the salutation “Blessed are you. . . .” The object not merely of veneration, but indeed of worship, is the Wood, for the intelligible Wood is not to be separated from the reality of Christ himself. (Where the King James Version has “tree,” as in the expression “tree of life” which occurs in the Book of Revelation, the Armenian translates the original Greek literally as *p^hayt*, “wood. This is an important detail as we shall see in a moment. David first (i.e., first in logical order) knows of the self-giving, ever-present love of God. The Wood of life *then* becomes an object of worship as placed within that cognitive context, and as the tangible, historical expression of that love. An analogy may clarify his meaning: When one knows, respects, is committed to the United States, one has no difficulty in pledging allegiance to its flag. That is because the respect for the flag falls within the context of that (prior) commitment. Similarly, a true view of the world as the object of

⁹Psalm XXV in the Classical Armenian Version.

God's self-giving love justifies our worship of the Wood of life. We do not start out looking at the Cross as two pieces of lumber fastened together, and *then* add to it a divine dimension.

David, who explicitly says in his *Commentary on Porphyry's "Isagoge"* that an argument is either deductive or defective, and therefore moves from the general to the particular,¹⁰ places the Crucifixion within a God-dependent reality in order to understand it. Part of this reality is the human soul yearning for salvation as the one thing necessary, along with the fact that the yearning is indeed satisfied. Not only is there "ultimate concern," to use a phrase made fashionable by Paul Tillich, but there is the experience of that concern being *met*. David's clearly implied claim (and another mark of his Neoplatonism) is that the reality in which man has his existence is not unidimensional, for he who does or has the yearning cannot also *satisfy* the yearning—hence the necessity of positing the divine dimension. The Cross shows the human-divine encounter in a bidimensional reality. It is also the condition by means of which humanity elevates itself and is taken *up* by the divine. It was therefore only natural for David to address the Wood and Him who was nailed on it as if they were together a single entity. The Cross, and He who was crucified thereon, constitute the selfsame intelligible being worthy of worship. David does not offer a definition of *worship*, but we may say in this context—and perhaps in all contexts—that worship is an attitude toward, and a recognition of, the object of worship as a being through whom alienation is eternally overcome.

David describes the Cross as "God-adorned, Christ-crowned, holy." It is important to note that the Wood does not acquire religious value as a mere appendage to the Christ. Christ and the Wood, like God and the material world, do not exist side by side; they do not simply adjoin each other, they interpenetrate. The material world partakes of the benefits of salvation. The Wood is the Wood of life. It is the intelligible Ark (of Noah) and, perhaps more significantly, the intelligible Ladder (of Jacob). Among the many other associations David makes, the Ark and the Ladder are of particular relevance to his philosophy: The Ark took the sinless (i.e., the souls that found refuge in it) *up* from the stormy sea. So thorough is David's identification of the Cross with the One crucified thereon that he likens the window of the Ark to the opening on the Lord's side, while the cleansed, rational human soul is said to have returned to the Ark with God's promise of adoption, as the dove did with the olive leaf. There

¹⁰See *Dawit' Anghat', Verlutsut'wn "Neratsut'eann" Porp'iwri* [Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*], annotated critical edition with Russian translation, with an introduction by S. S. Arevshatyan (Erevan, 1976), p. 18.

are other examples of David's understanding of the Cross and Crucified as constituting a single intelligible element in reality, but the image of the Ladder best incorporates into David's Christian framework the Plotinian view of the movements from, and to, the One. "The One" for David is God, the true being, in whom are present all the powers. God is not like snow, for example, which has only the one power to make cold, or fire, which has the one power to burn. It follows, says David, that God also loves man with a veritable and unmixed love. To paraphrase: He who has all the perfections has, by definition, the perfection of limitless love. The further theological implications of the Ladder simile are brought out in an eschatological vision which makes David aware that the obedience *to* the Father of Him who is consubstantial *with* the Father is also obedience to the Father of the Son of Man, that is, of Him who is consubstantial with man. The reader or hearer is given to understand, in a compact statement, that since God is all in all, obedience must be the dominant concept in terms of which to understand the Crucifixion of Christ, this intelligible event which is not a mere event among others, but in which is telescoped, as it were, our cosmic drama. The knowledgeable, committed observer, then, knows that the very truth of the Cross, the reconciliation it works between humanity and divinity, makes of it an instrument of rightful "boasting" and not of shame. A thing that can be seen at once in heaven and on earth can only be a thing of glory.

David's strategy now pays off. The argument is that the fragmentation at the heart of a human-divine reality, of which the human yearning for salvation is the expression, is healed through a free human obedience to God's loving power. The Cross is the instrument of this reconciliation; it is the bridge. But since the reconciliation could not be worked without God, and the Cross is what worked the reconciliation, the Cross *is* the Cross of God.

Religious-metaphysical views are sometimes like dresses: One keeps them because one cannot bring oneself to discard them, and they become fashionable again. Metaphysical worldviews that keep resurfacing—that have therefore not vanished in the first place—must be doing so because of some element of truth in them. By way of showing the contemporary relevance of David's views, I shall quote from a survey of recent Christology by F. S. Fiorenza, professor of theology at Catholic University, Washington. I have already referred to K. Rahner. Fiorenza points out that

... he [Rahner] first develops by a transcendental analysis (the analysis of a priori structures of human subjectivity) the notion of the need for an absolute Savior. He then searches history and discovers a correlation between this notion of absolute Savior with the historical event of Jesus of Nazareth. . . .

However [the] method is transcendental rather than historical because the concrete details of Jesus' life, ministry, and death are not taken as starting points, but are interpreted as the historical manifestation of the hoped for Savior.

Commenting on the Christology of another prominent contemporary thinker, Hans Urs von Balthasar, as set forth in his *Mysterium Paschale*, Fiorenza says that it starts out with God's free self-emptying: "[A] descending love is played off against an ascending human spirit." Von Balthasar, moreover, "equates . . . his own position with Cyril. . . . He focuses on obedience so that his christology has been described as the explication of the filial obedience of Christ." Fiorenza further points out that in modern Christology "divinity was interpreted primarily in relation to its own self-communication and self-presence in Jesus, whereas human nature was understood in relation to its capacity for infinitude." He notes that "existential theology interpreted human experience as an experience of finitude and limit and at the same time as the human openness to transcendence." These remarks are preceded by the observation that much of contemporary Christology is indebted to German Idealism.¹¹ It is evident from this survey that much of what is in contemporary Christology can be detected in David's "Encomium." Of particular interest also is Von Balthasar's acknowledgment that his views flow from those of Cyril, a major Alexandrian divine whose influence on Armenian religious-metaphysical thought, including that of David, is well known.

Even more noteworthy than the above is a volume by another well-known contemporary theologian, Jürgen Moltmann, entitled *The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology*. Moltmann states:

God suffered in the suffering of Jesus, God died on the cross of Christ, says Christian faith, so that we might live and rise again in his future. . . . The crucified Christ must be thought of as the origin of creation and the embodiment of the eschatology of being. In the cross of his Son, God took upon himself not only death, so that man might be able to die comforted with the certainty that even death could not separate him from God, but still more, in order to make the crucified Christ the ground of his new creation, in which death itself

¹¹"Christology After Vatican II," *The Ecumenist*, 18, no. 6 (September–October 1980), 81. An incidental remark is perhaps called for here. Fiorenza writes that "*Chalcedon* became a symbol of the God-world relationship and a paradigm of the God-human relationship" (p. 84, italics added). His summary of contemporary Christology leads the reader to muse that Ephesus is that symbol and paradigm. It is Ephesus, not Chalcedon, that reflects Cyril's views.

is swallowed up in the victory of life and there will be "no sorrow, no crying, and no tears."¹²

The statement sums up Moltmann's thesis. David would have signed it.

We saw that it makes sense to David to say that the Cross is the Cross of God because the sensible world, that is the fragmented, hence alienating and painful world of time and space points beyond itself to an intelligible world which suffuses it with wholeness and meaning. The intelligible Cross, that is, the Cross of cosmic significance, stands in between and at the center of the totality of the signifying and the signified and joins them, brings about an interconnectedness between the two, but not smoothly. The victory over death requires divine intervention and human response. There is ultimate reconciliation between God and man. For David that reconciliation appears to be characterized by conflict-ridden dynamism which may be the reason why he keeps using images of violent force, fire, and blood. Thus if it is the case, as we just saw, that the most dominant of recent Christological views are to be traced to German Idealism, then David and Hegel must have been kindred spirits.

While the visible Crucifixion or the Golgotha is the pointer to an eternal dynamism, the Eucharist or *Patarag* bespeaks of its continuation until the end of time. David's reference to the *Patarag* is exquisitely poetic. As he considers it, his mind—with its remarkably detailed knowledge of the Bible—moves to Isaiah's seraph with the live coal in his hand, which he had removed from the altar with tongs. The point, of course, is that the bread of communion dipped in wine, as effective in the world of spirit as fire is in the world of matter, must be received with equal caution and reverence.

The sacrifice of Christ was an event of awesome power. It is everlasting and radiates into all reality, on all of its levels, rational and non-rational, living and inorganic. It has no beginning, no end: "For He who was pleased to dwell in it did not depart from it but dwelt, dwells and will dwell there." And again: "Since He who was here is here, and here He will be unto the ages of ages."

But if the event was eternal and of such omnipresent power, why was it not perceived by all men and women at all times? We may give the answer on David's behalf without going into all the intricate relationships between time and eternity: The natural faculty of cognition does not reach the future. It can know only past and present occurrences and

¹²(New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 216 and 217.

logical or definitional relations. Yet select seers of the Old Dispensation knew the Cross in a way, for they did refer to it, albeit obscurely. The New Testament is the record not of what is novel in time, but of what is new eternally. Hence David's interpretations are not, to his own mind, original insights. It would be more accurate to look upon them as readings, in the sense of looking at a word and reading off a meaning already in it. He, along with others of his time, wrote *commentaries* for the same reason. An implication in the writing of a commentary, as distinct from a philosophical treatise, is that truth cannot be invented. One simply gets to know it by reading the recognized masters—or prophets—of the past, while being careful not to be misled by counterfeits.¹³ We may further observe in this respect that in David's time philosophy was not one science among others. In particular, the frontiers between philosophy and theology were not clearly drawn, if drawn at all. The grounds on which David, like other Neoplatonists, is eager to reconcile Plato and Aristotle is that these philosophers were recognized (in a sense, canonically admitted) masters, and if truth is one, then they *must* be saying the same thing. For the same reason there can be no divergences between Plato and Aristotle on one side, and the Bible on the other. Moreover, for a Platonist there can hardly be a distinction between natural and revealed knowledge. Recollected knowledge is for all intents and purposes revealed knowledge, especially if we take recollection (*memoria*) in the wide meaning in which Augustine took it in Book X of his *Confessions*. We must therefore look at David with some indulgence when at one point he makes a series of credal statements and then uses them as evidence of the proposition that the Cross is the Cross of God. Nor does he seem to be aware in the case of the Old Testament narratives that you cannot first choose to read a statement in a certain way and then use the same statement as proof of what you have read into it. Again, an attenuating circumstance is that in David's time this was accepted hermeneutical procedure.

In order to establish his claim David also uses typology. One familiar with the Old Testament knows, for example, that Abraham sacrificed a ram caught in a thicket and hanging on a wild plum tree (*sabek*) in Isaac's stead and thus saved Isaac. David substitutes "lamb" for the "ram" of his text (the Armenian version of the Septuagint) and reads the story as the "type" (*ōrinak*) of the salvation from death of all the offspring of Adam. Zion, as already mentioned, is another prefiguration. David puts it imaginatively: He who looks at the Church from the perspective of Zion is as one who is in an observatory looking at the

¹³*Dawit' Anhaght', Verlutsut'iwn*, p. 4.

Holy, Intelligible Mountain. David's strategy is, as we have seen, to place the intelligible Cross within the proper religious-metaphysical framework so as to make sense of the proposition that the Cross is the Cross of God. His typology is in line with that strategy.

Finally, David has recourse to language, which is perhaps to be expected of one who seeks to make sense of the Cross of God on the basis of the massive human experience of yearning for, and finding, salvation. Homonymy, which is a subject of study in his philosophical works, is for him a thing of considerable wonder. Thus the generic (*serakan*) use of "wood" may include reference, say, to cyperus; in its formal, perhaps "morphic" (*dzewakan*) use the reference is to wood shaped in a certain way, namely as a cross, an instrument of execution. But the intelligible referent of "wood" takes the speaker beyond language itself, for language only expresses spatiotemporal experience. It is the Godcross, the instrument of life. This at least is what I understand David to be saying: ". . . and the intelligible, beyond discourse; cross of God, which is [an] instrument of life." David tells us that the very use of "wood," as he analyzes it, is a thing to marvel at. It is indeed an arresting circumstance in his view that the self-same word should refer to an object that is at once an instrument of execution and of vivification, whose shape should direct the gaze toward death while its power points to life. From within the tradition of Alexandrian hermeneutics David goes on to suggest that the Cross shares with wood (as the lumber with which the instrument of death was made) its nature, but not its genus; and it shares its life-giving power but not its nature with wood (as tree). Through his analysis of the word "wood" David once more places the Cross within and at the center of a cosmic framework. Through it contradictions are resolved and the good triumphs.

The "Encomium" of David is of course not the only work in this genre. Homilies on, and panegyrics of, the Cross have been written throughout the history of Christian literature everywhere. David's work is indebted no doubt to those written before it. Yet it is, in its original way, a compelling work. In it are combined philosophy and poetry, theory and experience. The text is difficult on the whole, but there are passages that flow rather easily. To my knowledge David's "Encomium" is translated into English for the first time for the specific purpose of including it in the present volume. The translation gives forcibly a less than full, but perhaps adequate taste of the style. The last paragraphs also show the place that the Cross occupies deep in the psyche of this very Armenian man.

“An Encomium of the Holy Cross of God” by David the Invincible Philosopher

The translators of this work from the original Classical Armenian have tried to remain scrupulously faithful to David's meaning. At the same time they have sought to avoid a stilted English text. In a first draft some English locutions that were necessary additions to render the meaning of the original were placed in brackets. The brackets were subsequently removed inasmuch as the added words indicated an integral part of what David wanted to say. The translators also hesitated between “wood” and “tree” as the translation of *p'ayt*. “Wood” was preferred because there can be no doubt that *p'ayt* in David's mind was the equivalent of the Greek ξύλον, particularly in the expression *p'ayt kenats*^c, although in English the latter is rendered as “tree of life.” The reader will readily see that in some passages the translation of *p'ayt* as “tree” would have been awkward.

The full title of the text used for this translation is “Dawt'i Anhaght' P'ilisop'ayi Nerboghean i Surb Khach'n Astuatsēnkal.” An important word here is *astuatsēnkal*, which usually means “accepted or received by God.” But in view of David's metaphysics (assuming he had anything to do with the title as formulated), *astuatsēnkal* may also refer to the Cross that “receives” not a mere man, but God.

Nearly all the scriptural references were determined by the Reverend Arten Ashjian. Hagop J. Nersoyan wrote the commentaries.

Exalt the Lord our God, bow down to the holy stool at His feet, proclaims the prophet.¹ And I proclaiming the same, publish these words,

¹Ps 99:5.

setting them forth under the guidance of the Spirit. That holy and honorable man is saying, even as he counsels the people of Israel, that God Himself should be exalted. Having already foreseen the everlasting presence of these graces, he likens the type or prefiguration of truth, that is, Mount Zion, to the support of God's feet. That being the case, I, though unworthy, can nevertheless not be blamed for following with these words in the paths of evidence.²

For the discourse that is before us is no mere type or prefiguration. It is truth given under the guise of type. It does not signify footstool only, but also church and altar and see. This holy thing is evidently a support at the feet of God, and simultaneously a watchtower from which to observe the holy, intelligible mountain. This being the manner in which those in the evident truth, that is, the children of the holy and perfect faith, interpret Zion, we raise our voice and advise that it be bowed

²David engages in the allegorical interpretation of Scripture throughout the "Encomium" making on occasion brilliant, arresting associations. Allegorical interpretation, already practiced by St. Paul (as in Gal 4:24 and 1 Cor 9:9), became widespread at a time when Christian apologists were eager to convince rationalistically inclined, highly literate individuals of the soundness of Scripture. When the literal sense of a passage offends natural reason, the initial reaction is to *choose* between what reason dictates and Scripture asserts. But the Christian, Neoplatonist apologists of Alexandria, Origen in particular, could not admit that there are two ultimate truths. Truth is one, and Plato and Moses, the philosopher and the lawgiver and prophet, must be advocating *it*. With allegorical interpretation one can adapt Scripture to reason, reason to Scripture, and abide by the dictates of reason while remaining obedient to revealed truth. Within this framework both the philosophers and the prophets pave the way for the understanding of the Incarnation.

But the allegorical method does more than reconcile reason and Revelation. For David, as well as for Christian apologists, the statement "truth is one" would be an empty abstraction. Or rather, truth is one, they would claim, precisely because God is one. There can be no discrepancy between the Word of God and what human reason perceives as true. This premise brings up the further necessity of reconciling the Old and the New Testaments, which can be done by looking upon the Hebrew Bible not as the *Old Testament*, but as the *Old Testament*, that is, as the prefiguration of the truth, while truth is definitely revealed in and by Christ, in his deeds and words as recorded and understood in the canonical literature of the New Dispensation.

An implication of the allegorical method is that all of Scripture is relevant at all times. The dated literal meaning can always be seen under a new light to illumine human experience. Origen likened the literal meaning of scriptural passages to the *flesh* of Scripture. From the flesh the intelligent reader ascends to the *soul* of Scripture, and thence to the spiritual law. Origen wrote in the Preface to his *De Principiis*: "And by word of Christ we do not mean those only which he spoke when he became man and tabernacled in the flesh, for before that time, Christ, the Word of God, was in Moses and the prophets." It is from this perspective that the eternity of the Word justifies allegorical interpretation.

Allegorical interpretation may well degenerate into flights of fancy. David intimates that the Revealer will also give the grace necessary for a sound interpretation of what He reveals. David views himself as an unworthy and cautious receiver of that grace.

down to. For this is the worship of those who praise God truly. This is the true counsel. Come, O ye lovers of God, let us bow down to the thrice desirable and Christ-adorned holy sign.

For this sign is the means of our being taken from death to life—to life not of the indigent and earthly sort, but of the sort which is endless, and ineffable, and inaccessible,³ and which exceeds the angelic blessings, as is said in the Gospel.⁴ All bodily and other needs in the world that do not serve greed will be met through it. It is the cause of our salvation from such diseases as are set to corrupt the spirit.

Now, how can we give sufficient thanks to Him who gives us blessings of this sort in such abundance? Yet let us humble ourselves and bow down with songs of praise to the limit of our power. And as we bow down, let us put aside all thoughts that are heavy and darken the mind. Lightened by the soul's clear vision, having become worthy of the holy, heavenly mystery, let us raise ourselves up to higher things.

For that to which we draw near is not a small something, visible only to the eye, an object of attention that deserves no more than wonderment. With, and in it is hidden that which is great and miraculous—the awesome power that elicits wonder and admiration. For the power thereof is indeed not simple but twofold: Although a plant of the earth, homonymously called "wood" and visible to us as wood, it is, in its capacity as an intelligible object, that whose power is the support at once of the earth itself and of all the heavens. Multifaceted purity is needed by one who is willing to come near unto it. It is said of the truly purest being of heaven, as well as of souls, that they turn their gaze away from it; seraphs draw near unto it with faces covered with wings.⁵ How great, then, is the meritorious purity required of unworthy men made of clay!⁶

But it seems to me a thing not of little wonder that nouns should be

³I.e., inaccessible by natural means.

⁴The allusion is probably to Lk 20:36.

⁵Cf. Is. 6:2

⁶This paragraph is to be understood as follows: Suppose you see a four-armed wooden object and, wondering, you ask, what is it? Someone tells you it is a cross. If you now associate the word "cross" with the *visual* (or remembered, or imagined) experience of a cross, you still do not *know* what a cross is. The point David is making here is that any physical object designated as "cross," including the one on which Jesus was crucified, is the sensible (or sense) symbol of a fact in and about reality, which fact can only be grasped by the intellect. Moreover, in order to grasp that fact, a person must be a person of a certain kind: he or she must be pure. His or her mind must not be characterized by elements that obscure his/her understanding. Just as a dog, for example, cannot see color, so an impure individual cannot see the intelligible cross with his mind's eye. To support and validate this complex thesis Isaiah comes to David's help. Scripture or faith, and knowledge, coincide.

subject to change from one meaning to another. Four manners of such change can be discerned: natural, generic, formal, and intelligible. The natural meaning of "wood" is wood of many kinds. "Wood" is here used homonymously.⁷ In its generic use "wood" denotes wood of a particular kind, such as cyperus.⁸ Formally⁹ "wood" is made to denote cross, the instrument of execution. The intelligible meaning of "wood" is beyond discourse.¹⁰ It denotes the Cross of God which is the instrument of life. And who is he who will not wonder at what is being said! The selfsame instrument of execution, an instrument of life! Its form directs the gaze to death, while its power directs it to life. For it is con-natural with the plant through which came death,¹¹ although not so according to genus. It bears power along with the life-giving, although it does not do so according to its nature.¹² The more so since, as true life joined it, the power of evil changed into that of good, just as death cedes to life, inasmuch as it is the law of all life to vivify anything with which it comes into contact.

⁷David's meaning is that the self-same word "wood" may refer, say, to mahogany in one case, to ebony in another, and to oak in yet another. Naturally, "wood" is the name of all of these and other varieties indiscriminately. This adumbrates the complex philosophical issue of realism versus nominalism, but David does not pursue the matter further.

⁸This is the generic use or meaning of "wood" or "tree," because a tree of a particular kind produces its own kind of tree.

⁹"Formally," i.e., of or relating to form or shape.

¹⁰This is a paradoxical statement: If the intelligible meaning of "wood" is beyond discourse, how is David conveying it to us? One answer is that language is tailor-made, as it were, to describe the world or our environment as physically felt or sensed. The abstract meanings of words derive from, are superimposed on, or are suggested by, their concrete meanings. David's thesis is that there is really no word to designate that to which the word, "cross," points, inasmuch as a cross is only a sensible object. He hopes that the reader will grasp it on his own, or will understand it mystically.

¹¹The reference is of course to the tree whose fruit caused Adam's Fall.

¹²The cross on which Christ was crucified belongs to the class of other wooden objects. But Christ's being nailed on it imparts to it the kind of power possessed by Him who gives life. The implication of this claim appears to be this: We must not look at the Crucifixion as composed of two distinct entities, cross plus Jesus Christ. Rather, we must look at Christ-nailed-on-the-Cross as a single fact or event. David is arguing, as we see progressively more clearly, that the Crucifixion is not to be scooped out of reality, so to speak, and looked at as a discrete event. Rather, as our intellect moves beyond what is *seen* on Calvary, we realize that the Crucifixion is a fact about reality itself, pervading all of it. The Crucifixion is a fact about Christ, and Christ himself is the active presence of God in reality. As the *theantropos* (a term coined by Origen and meaning God-man), Christ fills the distance between the ineffable God and the world. The text from which this translation is made has *ew zōrut'enakir aynm tnkoy, orov keank', t'ē w och' ēst bnur'ean*. The addition of *tnkoy* in this passage is a clear error. In fact three variants of the manuscript do not have it.

The truth of the Cross will prevail, as light does over darkness. And, O God-loving men and women, let us not be embarrassed as we say Cross of God, for that to us is the glorying of gloryings according to Paul: "O Timothy, do not consider it a shame to witness for Jesus, but share in the proclamation of the power of God that saved us. For homilies to the Cross seem foolishness to the lost, but to us who are saved they exhibit the power of God. Nor do I consider the Gospel of God a shame, for it is the power of God for the salvation of all who believe."¹³ Hence this is to us no cause for feeling inferior. On the contrary, we supremely glory in it for it is our salvation through the power of God.¹⁴ Thus the angel at the Tomb, by way of consoling the dispirited women who were reasoning humanly, spoke loudly the name of his Lord as follows, greatly boasting in God:¹⁵ "O women, are you seeking the crucified Savior? For He whom they call Jesus, rose."¹⁶ We must learn all the meanings of both science and piety from them who are above us and very close to God, acknowledging them as guides.

And of which of the divine holy powers can this be said, according to the Apostle? For he, unlike the heathens, does not ascribe to God one power only, as one would to snow which has the power to cool, or to fire which only burns. The One who alone is real has in Him as His own each and all of the powers. This is the clear and unambiguous sign of the love of God toward men, for thus does divine Scripture teach: "God revealed His love unto us, for Christ died for us who are sinners. And, as the Lord Himself confirms, God so loved all men and women as to give His only-begotten Son. And His love was shown for us in that He laid Himself down for us. Such love can no one ever have, that He lay down His life for his friends, as I myself lay myself down."¹⁷ Now He who laid Himself down indeed did so through and on the Cross. And He who gave Himself on it is still on it and does not distance Himself from it.

But then this is in fact the power of God, and this power is as was said above. For though He who was nailed on it was removed from it bodily, nevertheless the power of the nailed one is united to it even to this day. For He who pleased to dwell in it did not depart from it but dwelt, dwells, and will dwell there.¹⁸

¹³Cf. 2 Tm 1:8; Rom 1:16.

¹⁴1 Cor 1:18.

¹⁵It goes without saying that the word *boast* (*partsank'*) does not carry here any negative moral connotation at all.

¹⁶Cf. Mt 28:5-6.

¹⁷Cf. Jn 3:16; 1 Jn. 4:9; 3:16; Jn 15:13.

¹⁸In the locutions "power of God" and "power of fire" the word "power" does not have quite the same meaning. The power of fire is derivative, while God has all the powers,

Henceforth he who worthily embraces the Cross and communes with it does not do so with a mere cross, but evidently with the awesome power itself of God crucified on it.¹⁹ For He is even here, since He who was here is here, and here He will be unto the ages of ages. For if in ancient and prefigurative texts we have, "This is my repose, I will dwell in it for ever and ever, for I was pleased with it,"²⁰ how much more does it apply to the new and the true Dispensation! For he says of the mountain that God pleased to dwell on it and will dwell for ever. This affirmation is no different from the previous one. Again, the same is assumed when the subject is the chariot of God: He rose up to enslave the slaves,²¹ He whose nature is such that He needs no chariot. It seems to me that in thus interpreting the texts, where the letter conforms to the formal requirements of the proposition, that I am not forcing their meaning.²² We accordingly speak of someone seeing the many-eyed chariot. It was thus, so that its gaze may indeed be directed to all sides, inasmuch as it is said to be four-faced. Then the cross-chariot advances in four directions at once, bearing the Emmanuel who, driving it, did indeed make prisoners of the enemy. From the beginning to the end, none of the present verses strikes those who apply their minds to it as unseemly.

Now the chariot is said to be not indeed without, but with the Lord in it. The aim is to make it clear that this chariot will never be deserted, left empty of its rider, but will forever be fully occupied by Him who goes up on it. For the Church believes that the sacrifice of Him who was slain on

including, as entailed by the quantifier "all," the power of fire to burn. Every aspect of the dynamism of reality must be traced to God. This is to say that the God who gives snow its specific power to cool and fire its specific power to burn is also the God who saves. But God is eternal. His power to save is eternal—or, to put it in visual terms, Christ is on the Cross everlastingly.

¹⁹The entire "Encomium" is written to justify the phrase "of the *crucified* God," which David is using here boldly. This is one of the claims that distinguishes the Armenian Church. The Latin mind, following Aristotelian logic, could not tolerate the synthesis of the concept of God, an immaterial being, and the concept of the physical fact of a body nailed on a cross. It found the proposition "God was crucified" utterly unacceptable, rather absurd. David disagrees.

²⁰Ps 132:14

²¹Ps 68:17-19.

²²Language has rules (formal requirements) of its own and words are put together in obedience to those rules. But interpretation is more than the pointing out of the meaning of a correctly stated proposition. The logic of "chariot of God" is the same as that of "Cross of God." Indeed God, according to (Aristotelian) logic, can no more ascend and drive a chariot than be nailed on a cross. David's challenge can be reformulated as: "If you accept God's riding a chariot, why can't you accept His being crucified?" He is aware that he can be accused of undoing the Scriptural text. He is not. Unless Scripture is interpreted in this way it may, on occasion, border on absurdity. See n. 2 above.

it was everlasting and not temporary. Hence it was commanded even by the Lord that the mystery of the sacrifice be made into a daily act until His coming again.²³

For behold, the places where the nails were driven, and the lance thrust, were not healed without leaving traces. They left scars as they would on our own skins, and these scars will remain until the Resurrection.²⁴ Asks the prophet, "Why are those wounds on your hands?" He answers, "I was wounded at the house of my beloved."²⁵ Again, concerning His coming into the world it is said, "They will look at Him whom they pierced."²⁶

And what does this signify to the faithful, other than the everlastingness and everpresence of this holy sacrifice! For immortal indeed is the sacrifice, and the same is ever immortal and alive. He who truly died, the same is ever living. For He is God by²⁷ the Father, and man on earth not according to mere opinion,²⁸ and the same always God with the Father. And truly and not in misleading semblance God uncircumscribable and infinite, He was born in the Virgin's womb according to the body and was gestated to be born humanly. Hence she who gave birth is the Mother of God, and the very one who was born is God uncircumscribable and infinite. Thus we are embraced by Him in communion and are baptized in His death bodily according to the body. Therefore the Cross is the Cross of God, and He Himself, the Crucified One, God immortal, uncircumscribable and infinite. Nor can any of this be doubted.²⁹ For if He who was here sacrificed is temporary and not immortal, then His crucifixion will also be limited by time. But since this sacrifice and the Eucharist and the altar are those of the truly immortal one, the Crucifixion and the offering on the altar shall be likewise.

²³The reference is of course to the Eucharist or *Patarag*. Both Scripture and ecclesiastical practice confirm David's claim.

²⁴Our text has *i yaruts'umn* as here translated. Three variants have *i yaruts'elumn* which is clearly correct. The scars of Christ's body did not vanish after the Resurrection. Cf. Jn 20:26-27. The logic of the text also requires that it be not *i yaruts'umn*, but *i yaruts'elumn*.

²⁵Zec 13:6.

²⁶Jn 19:37.

²⁷"By" translates the Armenian word *ar*, which is the equivalent here of the Greek *πρός*.

²⁸Christ's being both God and man, in the full meaning of these words, is a matter not of opinion (*kartsik'*) but of knowledge. Opinion is of things that change. They are subject to correction. But false or uncertain knowledge is a contradiction in terms. If it is false or uncertain, it is not knowledge.

²⁹Note David's concern to abide by the hallowed credal formulation of the Church's belief. Again, the key sentence in this passage, indeed the pivot around which the whole text revolves is "Therefore the Cross is the Cross of God." See n. 18 above.

Besides, one may wonder, why else did all the elements of nature as well as all things that are not part thereof flee trembling in terror? Why were demons and all the principalities of darkness hiding away?³⁰ These conclusions are thus convincingly verified. I do not therefore believe that anyone will reason otherwise where these matters are concerned.

Henceforth the claim that the Cross is the Cross of God is a matter of faith obviously visible to the eyes of the soul.³¹ It is as if an object were clearly seen by the eyes of the body. It is as if even now the only-begotten Son of God were seen nailed on the Cross, with arms outstretched. Again, it is as if we see before our very eyes even now the soterial sprinkle of the holy blood, issuing forth in drops from the side of Him who in the life-giving economy of God renders fertile the rational earth, redeeming it through an unseen miracle. For we do not yet see all obedient unto Him,³² obedience being, as is said, through the works of those who respond to his call. Indeed his leading all things to their appointed end is to be understood as the obedience of all things to Him, hence their salvation also.³³

We speak of the salvation of all, because of the redemption of all.³⁴ This is seen in Scripture which warns us as it points out the sins of the Galatians: "Almost before your eyes was Jesus Christ shown as ascended on the Cross."³⁵ But you think differently because you do not want to follow the Cross.³⁶ For where Cross, there the Crucified; and where Cross and Crucified, there Crucifixion.

³⁰The reference is to the events connected with Christ's yielding up his spirit as told by the first three Gospels. To David's readers this must have been a compelling argument: If He who died on the Cross was a man, how is one to account for the occurrences in question?

³¹The relationship between believing and knowing is a complex one. It is possible to argue against David that if I *believe* x, then I do not *know* x. For David, for reasons whose exposition would take us too far afield, both believing and knowing are seeing with the eyes of the soul, and belief must not be confused with (personal) opinion.

³²Cf. 1 Cor 15:27.

³³To the vexing question, "What does it mean to be saved?" David's answer is, "It is to bring one's will into harmony with God's will."

³⁴Here and in the last paragraph of the "Encomium" David is clearly in agreement with early Alexandrian theology, notably with Origen's theory of *apocatastasis*. See below, n. 93.

³⁵Gal 3:1.

³⁶Between the will and the intellect the former may be determining our beliefs. Our thoughts are made to fit our self-serving idiosyncracies. It may be of interest to note here, since not to follow the Cross is equivalent to disobeying Christ, that in Neoplatonic writings the Son is to God the Father what the will is to the mind, or what the splendor or brightness of light is to light. Thus not to want to follow the Cross is equivalent to a willful, deliberate turning away from the light or enlightenment.

Now then, if he who heard through words is said to have seen the Crucifixion in faith, why cannot it, there before us, entirely visible to the eye, be likewise an object of faith? Now therefore, when we say Cross, we here mean Golgotha, and here is crucifixion, here sacrifice, and through it redemption. For the Hebrews say of the top of the hill of Golgotha that it is the place of skulls, and the burying place of the first man.³⁷ And all is there, because the summit brings into the picture the height of the Cross, and the place of skulls its form. As to the burial, this is because having been wounded by the wood, Adam subsequently fell near it and is counted among the dead. Whereupon, the heavenly Adam, arriving on earth, willed in His mercy to work the salvation of the servant buried here, carrying down the eternal justice of the Father.³⁸ With a homogenous body He dissolved here the sins that it had pleased Adam to commit, and, having similarly tasted death, He destroyed Adam's death. He thus raises what is called the summit of the highest heaven.³⁹

Thus the unholy wood,⁴⁰ the cause of sin, becomes the cause of salvation and the holy of holies. The place of skulls becomes the place where life is made, while the burial turns into the marvelous resurrection of man. And to the end that all things be saved He raised high all at once unto heaven, and unto spheres that are said to be even higher, unto the heaven of heavens, that which was the cause of sin, and having made it the seat of glory dwelt there for ever. Hence the recognition of its honor through adornment is belief in the hereafter.⁴¹

For that reason, while we, earthly creatures, show piety, those who thought of loving God, namely kings and, likewise, owners of earthly wealth, wishing to make manifest to the beholders of the Cross that the homage rendered to it is full of wonder, adorned crosses with what, yielded by land and sea, constitutes greatness of possessions: precious stones and other similar things. They thus made seemly the object of laudation. They did this in order to deepen further the yearning of those of a still childlike mind, by showing them how awesome and wonderful is the majesty of the Cross. It is indeed adorned with glory divine and of

³⁷Cf. Mt 27:33. There is no mention of Golgotha in the Old Testament.

³⁸David does not seem to be distinguishing here between God's justice and His love for man.

³⁹In early Christian literature the New Order, a universal, spiritual rebirth, was understood in terms of the cosmos as well. There would be, after the Judgment, a new physical universe. Cf. 2 Pt 3:8-13; Rv 21.1.

⁴⁰"Unholy wood" would do instead of "the unholy wood." "Wood" is evidently used here in the first of the ways specified above.

⁴¹People do not only *say* their belief. They also *act* it out.

the highest heaven. It is served and adored by the seven choirs of angels who do so as they see the presence therein of their Lord.⁴²

Behold! Cherubs of many eyes and six-winged seraphs surround God who has ascended the Cross. They sing to him continuously the trisagial song in intelligible voice.⁴³ For there is, for every invisible thing, a firm symbol, a paradigm pointing to faith. Thus God, the all-wise, caring for, and guiding man from the beginning, has seen to it that those who see the act and the object may receive the faith more easily through their effect.⁴⁴ Now in the Tabernacle of the Law the horns at the corners of the altar, which was called the mercy-seat of expiation, were sprinkled with the blood of the sacrifices of dumb animals.⁴⁵ Cherubs, looking like handiworks of man, formed a canopy over them in their honor acting in accordance with God's order.

But then, what would be the effect of such a practice on those who would say that what was said above would not serve as a firm sign? To them we have already shown in the above example the honor rendered in a manner visible to the eye.⁴⁶ So then, if in the Law honor was rendered

⁴²Throughout this paragraph David is implying of course that any man-made cross used as a religious (Christian) article represents the Cross. The adornment of a cross in the world reflects as it were the adoration of the Cross by angels in heaven.

⁴³The trisagion (or "thrice holy") was in use in the Liturgy at least as early as the fourth century. It has its origin in Is 6:3. It is a sung invocation and a prayer that became an object of violent controversy, beginning in the earlier decades of the fifth century, when the words "crucified for us" were added to it. (In 512 Emperor Anastasius—on whose side the Armenians stood dogmatically—allowed the Church in Constantinople to sing the trisagion with the controversial clause. As a result he nearly lost not only the throne, but also his head.) Churches in the eastern regions of the Empire, including the Armenian Church, had no objection to singing (as they still do) "Holy God, Holy and Mighty, Holy and Immortal *who were crucified for us*, have mercy upon us." The Latin and eventually the Greek churches found "crucified for us" objectionable partly because, they felt, it supports the views of Apollinaris, a heretic. Apollinaris's thesis was that in Christ the divine Word replaced the human mind. He maintained this in reaction to contemporary tendencies to deny the divinity of Christ altogether. His own teaching, therefore, went far enough to deny Christ's humanity. David is clearly in favor of the trisagial clause "crucified for us" without following Apollinaris. The Christological formula in the back of his mind is that of Cyril of Alexandria: "one incarnate nature of the Word."

⁴⁴David seems to be arguing, in Neoplatonistic fashion, that physical things and occurrences are not themselves objects of faith. They are, as we would say, audiovisual aids to understanding. Things and occurrences are there to be noted accurately or inaccurately. The eternal object of faith is what is revealed in time, but is not of time.

⁴⁵Cf. Ex 25:17; Lv 16:18.

⁴⁶The author has likened the four horns of the mercy-seat of expiation to the four arms of the Cross. What he has thereby shown is that the angels' forming a canopy is visible to the mind's eye ("a firm sign") and signifies the honor due to the Cross.

by the cherubs, among them⁴⁷ the spoken averments of audible discourse were believed to be divine pronouncements. And inasmuch as this altar is, for the heavenly, the Cross, it is truly confessed both by the heavenly and the earthly to be a place of atonement. The horns of this altar of the Cross were stained red with the blood of the holy, heavenly Lamb, the Son of God, flowing from the holes made by the nails in the palms of His hands. Therefore let us, we the earthly, who have been partaking of the redemption, through the Cross, with the pure and blessed souls, render to this glorified Cross of divine power, songs of praise. With our feeble words let us praise the Cross, the instrument of our salvation.⁴⁸

⁴⁷The reference is probably to those who think in cherub imagery. Angels were presumed to know the thoughts of men, for they carried human messages to God.

⁴⁸In the entire "Encomium" the drift of David's argument can be seen to be this: Every Christian confesses that Christ is the Savior. But Christ saved the world because He was crucified. In fact Christ had always (*before* as well as after the crucifixion on Golgotha) been expected or "known" as the Christ-crucified, as repeatedly shown by David in his references and allusions to the Old Testament. Now if Christ the Savior was crucified, if Christ is the Logos, and the Logos is God, then we can legitimately say that God was crucified. We must not be deluded by the supposition that the nouns in our vocabulary refer to things that are themselves distinct and essentially different. (See n. 18 above.) Had David had the benefit of later science he could have given the example of electricity, which both heats and lights. Now it is true that some things that can be said of heat cannot be said of light, that is, "heat" and "light" cannot be used interchangeably in every context. But so long as we think of both heat and light as electricity, they can be said to be the same and "basically" what is true of one is true of the other. The ancient doctrine of *communicatio idiomatum*, which Neoplatonists would have no reason to reject, follows this logic. That this way of thinking is proper also to David appears, for example, in his curious reading of Ex 17:6. The text is "and you shall strike the rock and water shall come out of it." David looks upon the water as the liquidizing of the rock. (See n. 67 below).

David has a second implied argument: He invites his hearer or reader to give his provisional consent to the proposition in question, then to look again at the language he (the reader) uses, at (scriptural) images normally found acceptable, at accepted practices, and especially at the human condition, characterized as this condition is by the feeling that, unaided, man will not reach the perfection he nevertheless aspires for. The reader must also realize that individuals can now live the peace of the future fulfillment, but only if they extend their mental horizons beyond their sensible environment, to another dimension of life, which continues and purifies life here on earth. It is David's implied claim that no sooner does one place oneself in this perspective—a perspective whose verbal expression is precisely "The Cross is the Cross of God"—than things fall into place. Not only does life become understandable, it also becomes bearable and optimistically productive, infused by concern for others and future-oriented, as is shown in his concluding paragraphs. Things acquire a form and begin to make sense. David is clearly of the opinion that this circumstance is as good an argument in his favor as any. He belongs in the Platonic-Anselmian tradition to which of course Neoplatonism belongs. That his argument should be presented in the context of a prayer or an act of worship should come as no surprise. The "Encomium" becomes an explicit prayer of praise at this point, though David's preoccupation

Blessed are you, Holy Wood, adorned by God and crowned by Christ! You alone among things both inanimate and animate, among the living and the non-living, have attained the ineffable grace and were glorified. Therefore you require voluntary veneration from the rational and reasonable beings.

Blessed are you, Holy Wood, crowned by Christ, that grew on earth, yet spreading your arms rose above the arches of the highest heavens, and brought forth and carried upon yourself the imponderable fruit! You filled the whole heaven as well as the space between the heaven and the earth. You flowered in the stock of Israel, and the whole world was filled with your fruits.⁴⁹

Blessed are you, Holy Wood, adorned by God.⁵⁰ You are more excellent than the tree standing in the middle of Eden, surrounded by the cherubs with the flaming seraph. You grew on earth close to us, freely made life bloom for us who were fallen under death, and assumed the nature of the veritable Wood of Life.⁵¹

Blessed are you, Holy Wood! For while the first tree which, with its beautiful and sweet fruit, became the occasion of our death, deceiving the Virgin sprung from Adam,⁵² Adam born of the Virgin,⁵³ tasting bitterness through you, made life flow out among humans.

Blessed are you, Holy Wood, that became for the fallen father of mankind a rod by which to rise and a staff by which to stand firm!⁵⁴ In his stead and as his spokesman the prophet, giving thanks to the Redeemer proclaims loudly: "Your rod and your staff shall comfort me."⁵⁵ The wise man,⁵⁶ also gazing upon you with the soul's eyes, said,

is still to show the complete reasonableness of his church's stance, as well as his own. (See n. 48 below.)

⁴⁹The broadly Neoplatonic theme pervades the paragraphs beginning with "Blessed are you. . . ." Reality is viewed as a continuum from lower to higher strata. It is a living, fruit-bearing reality, a sphere of expectations and fulfillment. The "crown" of this reality is the Christ. The world is waiting, as it were, to be recognized as such by the onlooker. The recognition will change the behavior of the believer. Thus salvation and obedience are the two aspects of the same conversion to the truth. The view has its root in the well-known and much debated Socratic claim that one cannot *know* the Good and *do* evil at the same time.

⁵⁰Note the alternation: "adorned by God and crowned by Christ"; "Crowned by Christ"; "adorned by God." Christ and God are interchangeably said to crown or adorn the Cross.

⁵¹Gn 2:9.

⁵²I.e., Eve.

⁵³I.e., Jesus Christ.

⁵⁴The implication is that what is true of Adam is true of every one of his descendants.

⁵⁵Ps 23:4.

⁵⁶I.e., Solomon.

"It is the tree of life for those who take refuge in it and lean on it as on the Lord in firmness."⁵⁷

Blessed are you, Wood of Life, intelligible ark, that succours souls who rely on you out of the sea that otherwise drowns! You lightly fly close to the sky, high above the heaving waves, and have the door on the side of your holy and dominical upper room open.⁵⁸ From it, instead of the dove bearing the sprig, sent as a messenger, the human soul,⁵⁹ rational and holy, is sent out, called by the voice of the Father through its side opening, as if from the intelligible ceiling of the Ark. Thereby you⁶⁰ that are symbolized by the leaf of the olive tree bring the privilege of adoption to all mankind.⁶¹

Blessed are you, Holy Wood, adorned by God, or truly plant, that through the Lamb hanged on you as on the tree of *sabek*, saved from death not only Isaac, but the entire progeny of Adam!⁶²

Blessed are you, Wood of Life, intelligible ladder for journey to heaven! On you the choirs of watchful angels constantly moved down to earth and up. The Lord is fixed on you, and when Saint James saw Him⁶³ from a distance he, seized by the awe of the marvel and truly terrified, named your location Bethel, which is the gate of heaven and house of God.⁶⁴

Blessed are you, Holy Wood! A prefiguration of your mystery was when the first-born of Israel, paradigmatic of the world's first-born of Adam, were saved by entering heaven, as it were, through the doors stained with the blood of the lambs that were immolated in Egypt when the tormenting plague struck.⁶⁵ But this deliverance is for the soul rather

⁵⁷Prv 3:18.

⁵⁸Cf. Gn 8:6. The upper room symbolizes the Church.

⁵⁹I.e., the soul of Jesus as man. This recognition is noteworthy. It protects David against the Apollinarian heresy. See n. 42 above.

⁶⁰I.e., the Cross.

⁶¹Cf. Gn 8:11; Mt 3:16-17.

⁶²Gn 22:13.

⁶³I.e., the Lord. This paragraph throws light on the first paragraph of the "Encomium." Clement of Alexandria, among the earliest and most competent of all theologians, with whose work David was certainly familiar, in his *Tutor* (*Pedagoges*) condemns the Marcionites for teaching that the God of the Old Testament is not the same as the God of the New Testament. David, within the perimeter of Clement's orthodox teaching, is saying in effect that the Lord of the Old Dispensation and the God of Christianity are the self-same God ("... *znuyn ink'n zastuats asi bardzrats'uts'anel'*"). The visually more accessible Lord of the Old Testament was an aid in conceiving the true nature of God. Hence Christ is also that Lord. Jacob, who saw him "from a distance," is thus a saint.

⁶⁴Gn 28:12-19.

⁶⁵Gn 12:17.

than the body. For indeed it is the souls that are taken away and receive mercy and the good things with which the eyes of the Lord always transfer the inheritance, and this is said to be the source of the milk and honey for the desirable and blissful life of souls.⁶⁶

Blessed are you, Holy Wood! In you and in your mystery, He who was taken out of the waters strikes the waters⁶⁷ and renders them solid as if solidifying the fluid minds of men; He strikes the hard rock of the strong heart and gives it liquidity⁶⁸ as He mollifies the hard rock as it were. And outstretching His arms during battle He gives His body your form, defeats Beliar which by its sign is called Amalek.⁶⁹

Blessed are you, Holy Wood, pillar appearing like cloud! You carry the imponderable light and the fire and thereby lead those who follow you constantly to the heavenly city and keep them enlightened.⁷⁰

Blessed are you, Holy Wood! You made sweet and pleasant and delectable the physical life of Adam by entering it, when he stood condemned to the bitter flow of this transient life. Indeed the Lord knows how to effect this, as shown by the example of Marah.⁷¹

Blessed are you, intelligible ark, golden pot⁷² filled with heavenly manna, and staff brightened with prodigious blossoms!⁷³ You raised and carried upon yourself the two tablets fitted together, the body and the soul with their five senses in which God, the ineffable Word, was perfectly typified—the one and the same holy body of the Lord made one with the Godhead.

Blessed are you, Holy Wood, intelligible rectangular tablet of stone! On you the true knowledge of God was not impressed in decalogue form by the fingers of God, but the one and the same uncircumscribed God

⁶⁶David has probably in mind current Neoplatonic interpretations of Ps 116:7: "Return, O my soul, unto thy rest." Plotinus (205–270), a most prominent Neoplatonist writer, argues, as is well known, that reality is a series of emanations or shinnings forth downward from the One, matter (*hiwlē*) being the last step. This is the way down. In a process of return the soul moves upward to the One. Only the soul can be elevated, because there is no elevation without understanding. Origen, a contemporary of Plotinus, in his work against Celsus (I, 36) writes: "... the understanding (*nous*) falling away from its status and dignity, was made or named soul; if repaired and corrected, it returns to the condition of the understanding."

⁶⁷I.e., Moses. The reference may be to the waters of the Red Sea that became "a wall unto [the children of Israel]." Moses is being made to prefigure the Savior. Ex 14:22.

⁶⁸Ex 17:5–7.

⁶⁹Ex 17:8–16.

⁷⁰Ex 13:21–22.

⁷¹Ex 15:23–25.

⁷²The allusion is to the Ark of the Covenant. Cf. Ex 16:33.

⁷³Nm 17:8.

was, in the form of the Word, divinely vouchsafed to all the earth not from Sinai, but from Zion instead.⁷⁴

Blessed are you, intelligible staff! Though dry, you nevertheless gave forth fresh foliage, to become not a royal oak but King of all, producing the unfading, heavenly flower. And not only that, but from your upper extremity appeared to spring the living source of the saving water and blood with which the whole world was generally filled.

Blessed are you, Holy Wood! Jesus, instead of Joshua, carried you by Himself as a javelin, the sign of victory over the vanquished adversary. He erected you on the fallen one, to the end that, by the time of the completion of the sun's course, the reigning sin be slain once and for all and hung on you, that are the winged one, and that the Scripture significantly calls forked.⁷⁵

Blessed are you, Holy Wood! Not Jael, but the Son of the Virgin in his stead drove you between the jaws of death, which was haughty like a horse. Its tasting was to bitterness and to death. He trampled it under His feet and killed it.⁷⁶

Blessed are you, Holy Wood! In the turbulent and torrential rapids of this life you were set as a fishing hook and pulled humans from death to life. But you were also a hook to the palate of the intelligible dragon to its perdition. With that hook the dragon was taken out like a baby fish and was bound to you, who held the line, in the manner in which the Babylonian was snatched out of Jerusalem, and finished.

Blessed are you, Holy Wood, intelligible candelabrum, more precious than all gold! You held the intelligible light on you as a burning orb, became a torch in the world, and shone as a light of sevenfold radiance.⁷⁷

⁷⁴This and the previous paragraphs put to mind the writings of Clement, who preceded Origen as the head of the School for Catechumens in Alexandria. In his *Stromata* he describes the Logos as that through which the One, or the Good, or Absolute Being, or Father, or God, or Creator enters the sphere of that—we might say—which can be talked about, namely, the created world. The Logos, incarnated in the fullness of time, is the eternal teacher, lawgiver, and savior. The incarnate Logos, Clement writes in his *Protrepticus*, raised man to the skies, transplanting mortality into immortality and translating earth to heaven. Reference to the Logos as "Light" was common in Neoplatonic literature, in keeping with the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel. Enlightener, to David, must mean one who teaches the truth, and, more importantly, one who makes the reader of Scripture understand its meaning in relation to the Logos.

⁷⁵Cf. Jos 8:18-29. The tree mentioned at 8:29 in the King James version is described in the Armenian version (translated from the Septuagint) as "of two branches."

⁷⁶Jgs 4:21.

⁷⁷Ex 37:17.

Blessed are you, Holy Wood! You became a table for the fiery bread, which the seraph needed tongs to carry.⁷⁸

Blessed are you, Holy Wood! More than the burning bush, you resembled the Virgin in marvels. She brought to the fire the endurance of the living and of the sensible, specially giving to it marvelous dryness and the characteristic of being easily spent. This is said because the substance and the strength of the superior verdure of the bush, compared to the endurance of the immaterial fire, will perhaps be rejected and give way to doubtful astonishment. But your dryness, which is highly combustible, turns out to be power. And the same unquenchable fire, as if coming out of a burning-hot intelligible crucible, pours out a crimson rivulet that flows with the holy blood mixed with fire, keeping you unburnt, and making you stand higher than miracles. For this reason she who carried that fire in her womb, the Virgin, willingly worshiped you. Because of the unbearable awesomeness of that bloody fire, all elements and the entire earth with all that is in it, and the heavens and the fiery beings in heaven, would be shattered and indeed dissolved in every way, had they not gazed at the fire of Him who bears all and is borne by the Virgin.⁷⁹ Because the moon, which is inferior to the sun and is internally of the same kind, appears to have produced blood.⁸⁰ And, although made of a debased matter, it nevertheless bears the name which, according to higher understanding, has the most honor. Yet even the sun could

⁷⁸Is 6:6.

⁷⁹Reference has already been made to the Logos. "Logos" was first used as a technical philosophical term by the pre-Socratic thinker Heraclitus, and following him, to some extent, by the Stoics. The logos-fire association has its roots in antiquity. Heraclitus viewed the world as ever-living, flaming fire, a thing that, though constantly changing, remains itself. Reality in flux does not disintegrate precisely because the Logos, its "law," holds it together as it were. Saint Paul borrows this idea (but not the word) from the Greeks when he says, speaking of Christ, that "He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together" (Col 1:17). The only writer who uses the word logos in the New Testament as if it were a technical term that his readers would readily understand is John the Evangelist. As used in the prologue to his Gospel, logos is usually translated as word (*ban* in Armenian). The "Word of the Lord" in the Old Testament constitutes the link that connects the world to God. It is the agent wherewith God's will is known and carried out. In Neoplatonism, particularly in the thought of Philo, a first-century writer well known in Armenia, the Greek and Hebrew concepts of logos and word are synthesized. St. John's use of logos represents this synthesis. It is clear that David is reading the Old Testament from the perspective of that synthesis. It is to be observed that logos, which means word, also means reason. Word, law, reason are interrelated concepts: Reason presides over the orderly, grammatical (i.e., rule-abiding) use of language. This throws further light on David's frequent use of *banawor* (rational).

⁸⁰In ancient Hebrew astronomy the periodic reddish appearance of the moon was explained as a phenomenon of bleeding. This explains the moon's "shame."

not in any way produce of itself the light of the fire while the moon puts the shadows on to hide its shame as with a veil. When truth reigns, then all apparent power that makes the greatest sound in this world shall be silenced. It will be similar to what the sun does to other things that are less bright but appear like a lightning for a while.⁸¹

O for the miracle of the animation of the Wood! But you, although a beam of dry wood from Lebanon, yet bear all: blood, fire, and light, keeping them intact and unchanged, without doing away with the fact that you are wood.

O for the miracle that the luminary that is of non-bodily generation⁸² should be as blood in heaven, while the earthly blood of you who are of bodily generation should have fire and light! The meaning of the heavenly being clearly seen in this world is that the Godhead is present in the world and men and women have their presence in heaven. The same was declared by the prophet aforetime, showing this marvel of marvels of the fire and blood moving between heaven and earth.⁸³ The prophet likened this to the whirl of smoke being dissipated in its movement against the rock and becoming rare because of the mist of humid weather, like smoke rising up to the clouds. The same smoke is taken by

⁸¹What David is saying here is the theme of various Armenian *Magnificat* hymns, while both here and in the hymns what is being said is bound to be mystifying to modern ears. There is nothing mystifying, however, if we think in the categories of David's time. What he has in mind can be rephrased as follows: As we look at the Incarnate Son of God on the Cross we do see that wounded, He bleeds unto death. But the single entity Christ-on-the-Cross is alive and immortal, just as the burning bush burns, yet is not reduced to ashes, does not pass out of existence as bush. Now the bush, in order to burn, must be dry. Wet things, to the extent to which they are wet, do not burn. By extension of our analogy the Cross had itself to be dry. This dryness was imparted by the Virgin who never menstruated. Since Christ is the Son of God, his mother did not have to be a menstruating woman. It appears that the mediating concept between dryness and power is purity. This is so in view of the opinions then current about menstruation. These opinions were held on the authority of such Old Testament passages as Lv 15:19: "And if a woman have an issue, and her issue in her flesh be blood, she shall be in her impurity seven days: and whosoever toucheth her shall be unclean until the even." In the Armenian Bible, the word that translates "impurity" in this context is *dashtan*.

"The characteristic of being easily spent" (*diwratsakhut'iwn*) must be taken to mean combustibility. The substance or strength that keeps the bush marvelously green ("the superior verdure of the bush") must not, David says, lead to doubtful astonishment. The point is that that substance or strength *naturally* prevents a plant from burning, but not in the prodigious case under consideration. Moreover, the highly combustible dryness of the Cross, the fact that it "burns" without ceasing to be what it is, is the peculiar power of Christ-on-the-Cross. The Cross is eternally aflame with the blood of the eternal Lord and Savior.

⁸²The reference is specifically to the moon.

⁸³Jl 2:30.

the wind, or as is usual, by the breeze produced in the spring and dispersed into the rare atmosphere like haze, while the dark time of day thickens people's shadows. But let us look at the marvel of this fact and speak of it further.⁸⁴

O for the miracle of the heavenly fire!⁸⁵ Merely looking from its power up above at the gushing forth of your fiery blood⁸⁶ it was quenched,⁸⁷ while you, a small dry brushwood receiving the same fire into you remained in fact unburnt.

O for the miracle of the appearance of that awesome fire! The earth quaked and trembled from its solidly built foundations, and rocks were rent in repercussion and shattered. But you, a bough of a plant and dry wood more like a sprig of grass or a stem of reed, remained unstruck and uncrushed. You are a thousand times higher than a miracle!

Blessed are you, Holy Wood, intelligible winepress! In you was crushed the heavenly bunch of grapes, sufficient for gladdening the heavenly and the earthly. While here below He⁸⁸ crushed in His ire and trod as in a winepress the enemy of our life and spilled his gall on the ground.

Blessed are you Holy Wood, intelligible bridge! For you brought men to cross over from death to life.⁸⁹

Blessed are you, Holy Wood, intelligible tablet! On you was indelibly inscribed the testament of our freedom and adoption, not in scribe's ink, and not in the form of characters traced by the finger of God, but, what is more ineffable, in the blood of even him who is joint-heir with God, His Son.

Blessed are you, Holy Wood, intelligible staff of the life-giving Holy Shepherd!⁹⁰ By you are chosen the pure lambs of the church; they are set apart, defended, and unafraid of the corruptor, the beast. They are marked on their foreheads with the sign for the coming day, and are thereby rescued from destruction by the sword of divine wrath.

Blessed are you, Holy Wood, speechless intercessor! You show to the

⁸⁴In this paragraph the author's Neoplatonic convictions become most explicit: Humanity is to Godhead as the thick, lower strata of smoke are to its upper, rarer parts. There is thus a continuity between the ineffable God, whom human discourse cannot describe, and our human condition, informed by materiality. The distance between the two is filled by Christ. *He* makes climbing up or returning to God possible.

⁸⁵The reference is to the sun.

⁸⁶The Cross and Christ are seen as a single entity.

⁸⁷Cf. Lk 23:44-45.

⁸⁸I.e., Jesus.

⁸⁹Cf. Jn 1:4.

⁹⁰The first sentence of this paragraph introduces the visible distinction between Jesus ("the Holy Shepherd") and his Cross. The rest of the paragraph is the mystical closing of that distinction. "You" is the Christ-bearing Cross.

angels the holiness of the glory of their invisible Lord. You are the glory of the Church, the boast of the apostles, vindication of the prophets, crown of martyrs, bestower of grace upon priests, canon of the faith for teachers, victory for kings, hope of valor for princes, adventure for Christian soldiers, encouragement for protagonists, fortifier of champions, succour for the endangered, refuge for the vanquished, satisfaction for the oppressed, safety for the persecuted, shelter for fugitives, pacifier for the frightened, comfort for the grieved, thankfulness for the joyous, warning for the rich, unalienable treasure for the poor, prudence for the foolish, advice to the unruly, retreat for the misguided, adornment for maidens, seal for the married, guard for babes, tutor for children, meeting place for the aged, guide for travelers, rest for the weary, haven for seafarers, return for the wayward, asylum for sufferers, care for widows, guardian for orphans, protection for the lonely, abstinence for ascetics, yearning for penitents, healing for the diseased, dread for devils, ready weapon for believers, expiatory for sinners, watchman for the sinless, means of salvation for the living, and hope of remembrance for the dead.⁹¹

Now by all and in everything are you blessed, Holy Wood. With all these titles you will proceed before the heavenly as a precursor and inviter, when the tarrying groom will appear in the final night which will be the great and manifest day in which all things created will go through fire and will be changed. In that redoubtable, brief day you will proclaim the good news of the coming of the Heavenly King. You will be viewed not as you are seen now, but as you are seen by the intellect; for then, being visible in unapproachable light, you will blaze like a lightning throwing light to the four corners of the world. You will spread your radiance raising your light from the east and will finally silence the refulgence of the luminaries. Their refulgence will fade into unreality in comparison with the reality of yours. The light of the glory of the incomprehensible will at that time be seen upon you as a reproof to unbelievers and a glorying for the faithful, as condemnation of the unholy and a praise for the doers of good.⁹²

You will invite first of all the friends of the bridegroom clad in light: the children who entered the wedding feast first, that is, those who rose in advance and flew up to heaven, the saints in Christ, along with the living. As to those who did not worship you and were wayward and slothful, for them you will stake the fire, ever burning but devoid of light. In

⁹¹Clearly, the Cross is not only a metaphysical principle, an aid to understanding reality. The Cross does or ought to permeate all of human life (individual and social) from birth to resurrection.

⁹²Cf. Acts 2:20; 2 Pt 3:12; Rom 9:28; 1 Cor 13:12.

this manner, it has been declared, will those on the right hand and those on the left be separated. At that time those who will have made themselves worthy will be crowned with purity. Conversely, those who had no concern for the salvation of their souls will want your succour. And when they attain the understanding of the obedience of the manhood of the Son, He who is consubstantial with the Father of all, and the degree of that obedience on you,⁹³ then, as a consequence, the ultimately ineffable will be comprehended, so that God will be all in all.⁹⁴ Only when all attain the consummation and reach perfection, will you be openly confessed by all, as the only vessel of redemption that has appeared to mankind in heaven as well as on earth for the gloryings of Christians and the glory of Christ.

At this point it is right that this discourse come to a halt with the glorified and precious holy sign, in Christ Jesus, our Lord, to whom glory in all ages, Amen.

⁹³I.e., the Cross.

⁹⁴1 Cor 15:28. Neither Clement nor Origen believes in eternal damnation. A sin (any sin) will be forgiven if the sinner repents and undergoes sufficient punishment therefor. It is for this reason, no doubt, that Clement writes in the *Tutor* that punishment is good. Salvation is earned through it. Origen is known for his theory of *apocatastasis*. In time all with rational understanding will be cleansed from the dregs of every sort of vice, and every cloud of wickedness will be completely swept away, the implication being that there is no everlasting hell. When such purity is restored, when, as Origen says, the end has been restored to the beginning and the termination of things compared with their commencement, God will be "all." To the purified and cleansed individual, beyond good and evil, He who alone is the one good God becomes "all," and that not in the case of a few individuals or of a considerable number, but He Himself is "all in all." David clearly agrees, although, in our text at least, he does not follow Origen further in the latter's more daring, if not overly imaginative speculations.

The Ethical Concepts in the Philosophy of David the Invincible

AVEDIS K. SANJIAN

The principal source for David the Invincible's ethical concepts is his major work, *Definitions of Philosophy*.¹ Although this work does not contain a distinct and systematic exposition of David's ethical concepts, his views on this theme can be gleaned from his discussions of philosophical definitions and theoretical and practical philosophy, as well as his theories pertaining to the comprehension of God and the nature of good and evil.²

¹For this study we have used the critical text of the Armenian version, "Sahmank' Imas-tasirut'ean" [Definitions of Philosophy], in *Davit' Anahagt', Erkasirut'iwnk' P'ilisop'aya-kank'* [Philosophical Works], critical text and introduction by S. S. Arevshatyan (Erevan, 1980), p. 29-104.

²For brief discussions of David's ethical concepts, see V. K. Ch'aloyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun: Hin ev Mijin Darer* [History of Armenian Philosophy: Ancient and Medieval Periods] (Erevan, 1975), pp. 128-129, 162-164, 168-169, 172-175; idem, "Davit' Anahagt'" [David the Invincible], in *Hay Mshakuyt'i Nshanavor Gortsich'nerë, V-XVIII Darer* [Famous Armenian Cultural Figures, Vth-XVIIIth Centuries] (Erevan, 1976), pp. 98-110; Henri Gabrielyan, *Hay P'ilisop'ayakan Mtk'i Patmut'yun* [History of Armenian Philosophical Thought], Vol. I (Erevan, 1956), pp. 339-343; idem, "Davit' Anahagt'i Ètikakan Hayats'k'nerë" [David the Invincible's Ethical Concepts], in *Davit' Anahagt'* [David the Invincible] (Erevan, 1980), pp. 31-54; S. S. Arevshatyan and N. T'ahmizyan, "Davit' Anahagt'" [David the Invincible], *Haykakan Sovetakan Hanragitaran* [Soviet Armenian Encyclopedia], Vol. III (Erevan, 1977), pp. 300-302; L. Kalashian, "Ethical Questions in the Philosophy of David the Invincible," paper presented at the conference dedicated to the 1500th anniversary of David the Invincible, Erevan, May 1980 (mimeographed).

David's *Definitions of Philosophy* is basically concerned with the elucidation of the essence, scope, and purpose of philosophy. His philosophical expositions comprise six distinct but interrelated definitions, each of which is based upon two fundamental principles, namely, the object of what is defined and the problem or purpose of what is defined.

The six definitions posited by David are: (1) "Philosophy is the knowledge (science) of beings according to which they are beings"; (2) "philosophy is knowledge of divine and human realities"; (3) "philosophy is the meditation on death"; (4) "philosophy is imitation of God, to the best of man's ability"; (5) "philosophy is the art of arts and the science of sciences"; and (6) "philosophy is the love of wisdom."³

In discussing his second definition,⁴ "Philosophy is knowledge of divine and human realities," David contends that because philosophy concerns itself with human behavior, it should not ignore the examination of the divine state, that it must follow the example set by God, and on the basis of what it can learn from Him, must endeavor to elevate human beings to a state of perfection.

In connection with his third definition,⁵ "Philosophy is the meditation on death," David asserts that the fundamental subject of philosophical concern is the attainment of human perfection, which in turn suggests that man must be prepared to comprehend the divine logos (or Word).⁶ The attainment of this objective presupposes liberation from sinful passions, which in turn would ensure the cleansing of the soul and deliverance from all afflictions.⁷ Thus, the sole problem of human perfection is contingent upon the suppression of passions and readiness to comprehend the divine Word.⁸ Similarly, David suggests, philosophy must make a distinction between its practical (or moral) and theoretical aspects. The term applicable to the first aspect is "mortification," while the term applicable to the second aspect is "death"; in other words, mortification prepares for and ensures death. David explains that those who dedicate themselves to philosophy "concern themselves with [the problem of] mortification and death," for the definition "meditation on death" encompasses both aspects.⁹

David admits that Plato's dialogue *Phaedo* is the source for his third definition. From this work David cites Socrates' statement: "Other people may well be unaware that all who actually engage in philosophy aright

³See Dawit' Anghaght', *Erkasirut'iwnk' P'ilisop'ayakank'*, pp. 52, 55.

⁴See *ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

⁵See *ibid.*, pp. 60-63.

⁶Ch'aloyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, p. 162.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

are practising nothing other than dying and being dead.”¹⁰ The basis of this assertion is to be found in the same dialogue. Plato poses the question: Should the soul “on separation from the body at once be blown apart and perish, as most men say?” And he himself responds: “Far from it . . . ; rather, the truth is far more like this: suppose it is separated in purity, while trailing nothing of the body with it, since it had no avoidable commerce with it during life, but shunned it; suppose too that it has been gathered together alone into itself, since it always cultivated this—nothing else but the right practice of philosophy, in fact, the cultivation of dying without complaint—would this not be the cultivation of death?”¹¹

Since death means the destruction of the body, it follows that “true philosophers abstain from all bodily desires, and stand firm without surrendering to them.”¹² As David points out, in Plato’s view “mortification” was never intended to suggest that man must resort to suicide. Moreover, following Plato’s *Phaedo*, David reaffirms the view that philosophy brings man closer to God, and that it is only through philosophy that man resembles God.

Amplifying his fourth definition,¹³ “Philosophy is imitation of God, to the best of man’s ability,” David affirms that likeness to God can be of four kinds: (1) when the same quality is found in all objects of the same kind; (2) when, to a larger or lesser degree, the same quality is found in objects of different kinds; (3) when different qualities of the same object are found in objects of different kind; and (4) when the image is similar to the archetype.¹⁴ In conjunction with the latter, David explains:

We say that the philosopher is like God in the same sense as when we say that Socrates’ image is the same as Socrates himself, although Socrates’ image and Socrates himself are two different things, because the one is animate and the other is an inanimate object. It is in this sense that we say that the philosopher resembles God, although God has one essence and man has another essence.¹⁵

That the philosopher resembles God, David states, stems from the definition that God and the philosopher are portrayed in the same manner, that is, they both are omnipotent, good, and wise as man. Hence, the congruence of these qualitative traits indicates the resemblance of the one unto the other, or the philosopher’s resemblance unto God.¹⁶

¹⁰Plato, *Phaedo*, trans. with notes by David Gallop (Oxford, 1975), p. 8 (64a).

¹¹Ibid., p. 30 (80d-e).

¹²Ibid., p. 32 (82c).

¹³See Dawit^c *Anhaght^c*, *Erkasirut^ciwnk^c P^cilisop^cayakank^c*, pp. 66-72.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 66-67.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 67.

¹⁶Ch^caloyan, *Hayots^c P^cilisop^cayut^cyan Patmut^cyun*, p. 163.

Yet David hastens to add that the aforementioned concept does not suggest man's reunion with God; rather, it underscores man's endeavor, through his deeds, to resemble God.¹⁷ From this concept is derived the significance of the comprehension of God's most important attributes, namely, omnipotence, goodness, and wisdom. Of particular interest is the parallel that David draws between the perfect man (that is, the philosopher) and God. He says that God is omnipotent, and He can do and He does whatever He wishes. Similarly, the perfect man's resemblance to God stems from the fact that man, also, can do whatever he wishes as man, because he never aspires to do that which is impossible for him to do. Moreover, God is good, because He cares for and desires all of mankind's welfare. Indeed, goodness is God's essence, whereas evil is supplanted by the superiority of goodness. It is the function of philosophy to render perfect the imperfect man, so that he might be able to resemble God. David points out, however, that goodness is not man's primary essence; rather, man acquires goodness. At the root of this assertion lies the possibility for the commission of evil.¹⁸ David explains the contrast metaphorically, as follows: God's goodness is similar to the sun, which is not susceptible to darkness; whereas man's capacity for goodness is similar to the air, which receives light when the sun rises and is engulfed in darkness when the sun sets.¹⁹ Moreover, God is wise, He knows all and at all times; hence His knowledge is not confined by time and space.²⁰ Man also aspires to omniscience, but his comprehension is dictated by possibility and not reality, because he knows different things at different times.²¹ Man differs from God in that, whereas God's wisdom stems from His nature, man acquires wisdom, and the more knowledge he acquires the closer he draws to God in his imitation of Him. God cares about the existing world because of His wisdom, and if wisdom exists so does philosophy; hence man's ability to resemble God is granted to him through philosophy.²²

It is evident that David's views regarding man's interrelationship with God are in accord with the Neoplatonic concept of man as the shadow of the Supreme Being, a shadow that must accompany God and be like Him in all the attributes that stem from His divine nature.²³

In the *Definitions of Philosophy* David pays special attention to the

¹⁷See Dawit' Anghat', *Erkasirut'iwnk' P'ilisop'ayakank'* p. 67.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 68.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 68-69.

²¹Ibid., p. 69.

²²Ch'aloyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, pp. 128-129.

²³Ibid., p. 129.

problem of mimesis, emphasizing that man aspires to apotheosis (or elevation to divine status) or seeks to resemble God. As God shows concern for the welfare of all humanity, so also must man be regardful of others and help them free themselves from evil in order to attain perfection. This process is conditioned by the depth of man's perception of reality. Since philosophers are better equipped to perceive essence, they are closer to God. It follows, then, that philosophers must help others to attain the state of mimesis. In David's opinion, the concept of mimesis is closely related to the idea of ascertaining the supremacy of the spiritual, of the good, and of the beautiful, which means triumph over death and attainment of immortality. In short, man must free himself from sins, which can be achieved through the assimilation and application of the principles of philosophy.²⁴

David divides philosophy into two basic types, the theoretical and the practical.²⁵ He makes the distinction on the theoretical premise that man, because of his nature, tends to contemplate two problems, namely, the objective essence and his own mode of conduct.²⁶ In David's view, the foundation of philosophy is the soul's cognitive quality, while its objective is the cognition of the world that exists independently of his consciousness. The foundations of practical philosophy also comprise the soul's other qualities, namely, valor, sound judgment, and justice, and its purposes are the freedom of humanity from moral blemishes, the leading of man's soul to goodness, and showing him the path to virtue. For David, therefore, philosophy seeks the truth in the rational and non-rational world; and in its practical aspect, it seeks goodness and applies it in the rational world.

David asserts that truth is not an end in itself; rather, by comprehending truth, theoretical philosophy aids practical philosophy "to avoid evil" and to prepare "man in his quest for resemblance to God." In other words, philosophy, through life's temptations, maintains the integrity of the soul and is also the only means whereby the soul is again merged with God.

In distinguishing and contrasting the two kinds of philosophy and the two aspects of the soul, David gives precedence to goodness over truth. He states: "Goodness is more estimable than truth, since it is broader in scope and is more substantive, because all that is true is also good, but not all that is good is also true, since we sometimes behold that untruth is also good."²⁷ To substantiate his view, David again cites Plato: "I

²⁴See Arevshatyan and T'ahmizyan, "David's Anahaght," p. 301.

²⁵See *Dawit's Anahaght, Erkasirut'iwnk' P'ilisop'ayakank'*, pp. 84-103.

²⁶See Ch'aloyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, p. 168.

²⁷See *Dawit's Anahaght, Erkasirut'iwnk' P'ilisop'ayakank'*, pp. 85-86.

call a philosopher not the man who has abundant knowledge nor the man who can speak about many things, but the man who leads an immaculate and unblemished life, because the perfect philosopher is not he who has a large store of knowledge but he who can subdue his passions."²⁸

When David employs the term "practical," he has in mind not the common man's practical deeds but his behavioral preparation for the comprehension of truth from which emanate the principles of his true conduct.²⁹ This leads David to the conclusion that "the theoretical comes first, so that the practical would be achieved through the theoretical and the rational, and so that the practical would not be nonrational and without cause."³⁰ He goes on to say: "The practical needs the theoretical so that it might manifest and formulate itself. It must not be nonrational and without cause; rather, the good must first be ascertained in its own nature through theoretical processes, and only then must the practical be given guidance."³¹

It follows from the above that according to David, theoretical philosophy is the basic point of departure and is the initial manifestation of the soul's conduct. Yet David gives primacy to man's practical deed or, as he puts it, to the practical manifestation of the soul's conduct. In the final analysis, philosophy for him is both the purpose and the result.

Let us now turn to David's views on the concept of God. To begin with, he portrays true existence as a divine and human condition, as a kind of universality and totality, within the reach both of the mind and of the sensations. Seen in its totality, true existence manifests itself in two different ways: the first, in the world of beings comprehensible to the mind, with God occupying the uppermost place; the second, in the realm of sensual comprehension or in the world of physical objects surrounding man.

According to David, the perception of God is achieved through a series of successive stages. The first is the examination of the objects in man's environment which are, substantively and rationally, material in nature. The second is the comprehension of forms, which substantively are material and rationally immaterial in nature. On the one hand, forms are material in their composition and cannot exist without matter; on the other hand, forms are abstract images independent of material objects. The third stage is the perception which, substantively and rationally,

²⁸Ibid., p. 99.

²⁹See Ch'alyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, p. 169.

³⁰See Dawit' *Anhaght', Erkasirut'iwnk' P'ilisop'ayakank'*, p. 96.

³¹Ibid.

is immaterial, such as the concepts of God, the angels, the mind, and the soul, which substantively and rationally are not material. It is not possible to perceive God or an angel or the soul in a material state. It follows, then, that there are objects which exist neither in material form nor does the human mind ascribe to them qualities of a material nature. The perception of immaterial images is the preparative for the perception of God; hence without perception of form it is impossible to comprehend the existence of God. David believes that God is the cause of the existence of all beings. He also subscribes to the cosmological proof of God's existence, as well as to the view that only by comprehending nature is it possible to comprehend its creator.³²

To better understand David's ethical concepts, we must also examine his views concerning the body and the soul. He posits that the problems and objectives dealt with in philosophy stem from the activity of the human soul, which in turn is manifested in two ways: cognitive and animal (that is, pertaining to the body). The soul's cognitive operation manifests itself through ascending stages: sensation, imagination, opinion, judgment, and reason. The soul's animal or physical manifestation develops in four conditions: will, choice, desire, and anger.³³ David asserts that whereas the soul's cognitive activity develops through theoretical philosophy, its animal activity develops through practical philosophy. The latter's manifestation is directly associated with man's conduct and with his personal, singular actions. Hence practical philosophy guides man in his pursuit of a virtuous life.³⁴

The Neoplatonic view of the soul as the divine origin in the body of man and the concept of the dualism of the body and soul are reflected in David's philosophy as well. The concepts that God united the soul with the body, that the body is the soul's dungeon, and that the soul is immortal, are of course well known; they are found in Plato, if not in the works of earlier philosophers. And these are concepts that subsequently became an integral part of Christian teachings.³⁵

Not unlike Plato, David divides the soul into three parts: the rational, the irrational or volitional, and the passionate. Each one of these, in turn, has its own virtue. In David's opinion, the virtues are four in number: prudence, valor, sound judgment, and justice. He contends that the soul's rational part is endowed with prudence, its irrational part with valor, and its passionate part with sound judgment. Insofar as justice is

³²See Arevshatyan and T'ahmizyan, "Davit' Anghaght'," p. 300.

³³See *Davit' Anghaght', Erkasirut' iwnk' P'ilisop'ayakank'*, p. 104.

³⁴See Ch'aloyan, *Hayot' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, pp. 172-173.

³⁵Ibid., p. 173.

concerned, David holds that it is shared by all parts of the soul equally and that all parts of the soul deal with each other equitably. Reason, as a part of the soul, governs its other two parts. The soul's irrational part is governed by reason and, simultaneously, it governs the soul's passionate part. It is essential to maintain a certain harmony among the soul's parts, lest their disharmony or conflict cause the destruction of the soul. Hence David attributes primary importance to justice as a special virtue: ". . . Justice is ranked higher than the other virtues, for it permeates the others and brings about harmony amongst them."³⁶

Prudence as a virtue is considered by David as the supreme principle in theoretical philosophy, while justice as a virtue is viewed as the supreme principle in practical philosophy. Thus, virtue predominates in philosophy as a whole, that is, if indeed philosophy is not equated with virtue. Apropos of this, David asserts that "indeed, virtue is blissfulness, and virtue is the mother of wisdom, for it is through virtue that we acquire philosophy."³⁷ This explains why David concludes the *Definitions of Philosophy* with a discussion of ethical problems, which occupy a significant place in the totality of his philosophical concepts.³⁸

David contends that philosophy was created to ennoble man's soul and to lead him to perfection. That is why a considerable part of his philosophical work is devoted to man and to questions pertaining to man. Following the Hellenistic traditions, he explores the problem of the spiritual and intellectual salvation of the individual. In his view, the just man is a happy man, even if he is ignored or derided; conversely, the unjust and evil man is wretched, even if he is respected and is deemed worthy of emulation.

David also underscores man's unique place in the universe. He posits that if man had not existed, everything in the universe would have been imperfect. Man is the intermediary between nature and God, he is the binding link, and the smallest likeness of the world. Man is the indivisible particle of the animal world, representing the stage in which he alone is endowed with the power of reason. In contrast to animals, the predominance of reason in man guarantees the harmony between the soul's component aspects and the virtues, which in turn leads to justice.

As we have seen, the basic premise of David's ethical concepts is the dualism of body and soul. Since the human body is the soul's temporary refuge, the sooner the soul delivers itself from this bodily refuge, the more beneficial will it be for the soul itself. Yet because God has joined

³⁶See Dawit' Anhaght', *Erkasirut'iwnk' P'ilisop'ayakank'*, p. 71.

³⁷Ibid., p. 61.

³⁸See Ch'aloyan, *Hayots' P'ilisop'ayut'yan Patmut'yun*, pp. 173-174.

the soul to the body, man must accept this state of affairs; he should always seek to subdue and destroy all corporal impulses; and he should aspire to spiritual nobility and self-perfection.

David posits that man is equally capable of good and evil deeds. The evil deed, which he says stems from the soul's nonrational aspects, is committed by man's free will and choice. Evil and all injustice result from physical passion and unjust irrationality. Only the most horrible temptations forge and ennoble man's soul and make it steadfast and fearless in combat. Hence David advocates not a slavish submission to, nor skeptical indifference towards, evil; rather, he advocates the recognition of, and triumph over, evil, be it of a personal or a general nature. The final two paragraphs of the *Definitions of Philosophy* affirm and sum up his views on the purpose of philosophy:

It must be understood that philosophy exists for the purpose of ennobling and adorning the human soul and for enabling it to move from the material and hazy life to the divine and the immaterial. . . . God has granted the gift of philosophy to adorn man's soul. It adorns the soul's intellectual capacities through theoretical philosophy, and its animal aptitudes through practical philosophy, so that we would not acquire false knowledge from vain thoughts and would not commit evil deeds.³⁹

In short, man must engage in philosophical pursuits to avoid committing evil deeds. This is the fundamental purpose of philosophy, and it is within this framework that David has formulated his ethical concepts.

In sum, as with other of his writings (e.g., his *Commentary on Porphyry's "Isagoge"*), David's ethical concepts are an interesting and sometimes ingenious blend of Hellenic, Hellenistic, and Christian ideas. They constitute a quite systematic attempt to "Christianize" pagan philosophy and to place Greek ideas within a Christian theological context.

The Greek sources of David's ethical concepts are (1) Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; and (2) Neoplatonism, particularly of the Alexandrian variety. This is seen, for instance, in his six definitions of philosophy and in his conception of God, man, and the universe; knowledge; and goodness, virtue and vice, the various virtues, and other ethical concepts. More specifically, his conception of philosophy and its purpose, with the primacy of the practical over the theoretical, is essentially Hellenistic (Neoplatonic in his case, although in Hellenistic philosophy this view is not limited to Neoplatonism). His conception of God is essentially a blend of Neoplatonic and Christian elements. The same is generally true of his conception of man, but the dualism of body and

³⁹See Dawit' Anahagt', *Erkasirut'iwnk' P'ilisop'ayakank'*, p. 104.

soul clearly goes back to Plato. (It must be remembered, however, that Plato and Aristotle are two of the three main sources of Neoplatonism, the other being Stoicism, and that Neoplatonism attempted to harmonize these three philosophies.) Again, David's conception of the virtues and the vices is a blend of Platonic-Aristotelian and Christian elements. And, finally, the ideas that the body is the prison of the soul and that the philosopher "practices death" in this life by the pursuit of wisdom (philosophy) go back to Socrates.

On David's Neoplatonism*

MILTON V. ANASTOS

In this brief epilogue I will try to determine to what extent David can be regarded as a Neoplatonist. He comes into the Neoplatonic orbit primarily because of his lengthy commentary on Porphyry's (ca. 234–301/6) *Eisagoge*.¹ As Plotinus's disciple, biographer, and editor, Porphyry was, of course, an important figure in the Neoplatonic movement. But his *Eisagoge* is an elementary introduction to the *Categories* of Aristotle and in no sense a Neoplatonic document.

Furthermore, there is no evidence in David's extant works of his having adopted, or dealt with, any of the characteristic Neoplatonic philosophical terms and concepts. To begin with, he takes no account of the triadic division of the universe or of the conception of the divine supra-essential triad of hypostases, consisting of the indefinable "One," or the "Good," the intellectual realm of mind (νοῦς), and the universal soul, which was the eternal cause of the material world. Nor does he even allude to the process of μὀνῆ (immanence), πρὀοδος (progression), and ἐπιστροφή (return to the "One"), which was a vital element of Neoplatonic metaphysics.² The technical language summarized in this paragraph constitutes the indispensable vocabulary which no one who was truly a devotee of Neoplatonism could avoid using. (I refrain from adding theurgy [the use of magic for religious purposes, especially to

*I am grateful to Mr. James Draznin and Mrs. Marina L. Preussner for valuable assistance.

¹*Davidis Prolegomena et in Porphyrii Isagogen Commentarium*, ed. A. Busse, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, 18, 2 (Berlin, 1904), hereafter Busse.

²For a brief but clear summary of the philosophy of Plotinus and the Neoplatonists,

effect union with a god or gods or to attain immortality] to this list because it was possible to be a Neoplatonist without practicing, or believing in, theurgy.)³

It is significant also that David does not cite, or rely upon, Neoplatonic writers (except for four references to Plotinus and a few unimportant citations of the names of Porphyry and Iamblichus, on which see note 7 below). His whole argument is built upon the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, and the Pythagoreans. In his treatment of ethical theory,⁴ for example, which he connects with Plato's four cardinal virtues (courage, justice, moderation, and wisdom) and the Platonic tripartite division of the soul (reason, spirit or passion, and desire or affection), he prefers to follow Plato rather than the Neoplatonists, although Plotinus,⁵ as well as Porphyry,⁶ had discussed this topic in some detail.

He does occasionally mention the names of Plotinus (four times, thrice in connection with the material commented upon below, notes 8–10), Porphyry (six times, all in the commentary on the *Eisagoge*), and Iamblichus (once). But there is no indication that he had any real acquaintance with Plotinus's *Enneads* or the works of any of the later Neoplatonists, except for Porphyry's *Eisagoge*, of course, and for the first words of the latter's biography of Plotinus, who is said to have seemed to be ashamed to exist in a body.⁷

Most interestingly, none of the texts David designates as quotations from Plotinus occurs in the *Enneads*. In the first of these (in his *Introduction to Philosophy* [Προλεγόμενα τῆς φιλοσοφίας]), admirably summarized by Professor Abraham Terian (pp. 27–35 above) on the basis of the Armenian version, he concludes a section of his conception of a happy man (εὐδαίμων) with words he attributes to Plotinus, who, he

together with an introduction to the enormous bibliography, see A. H. Armstrong, ed., *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, England, 1967). Paul Henry and Hans R. Schwyzer, eds., *Plotini Opera*, Museum Lessianum, Series Philosophica, 33–35 (Paris-Brussels, 1951–73), include bibliographical sections in all three volumes. The whole Neoplatonic system is summarized concisely by Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, ed. E. R. Dodds (2d ed.; Oxford, 1963).

³On theurgy, see Hans Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy, Mysticism, Magic, and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire*, Publications de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale, Recherches d'archéologie, de philologie et d'histoire, 13 (Cairo, 1956), n.b. 461–466; E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951), pp. 283–311; Dietrich Wachsmuth, s.v. Theurgie, *Der kleine Pauly*, 5 (Munich, 1975), 767 ff.

⁴Busse, 37.27–39.13.

⁵Ed. Henry and Schwyzer (see note 2 above), 1, 62–72 (*Enneads* 1, 2, 1–7).

⁶Ed. Erich Lamberz, *Porphyrii sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes*, 32 (Leipzig, 1975), 22.14–35.3, with an impressive annotation on sources and parallels.

⁷Busse, 234 f., Index nominum, s.vv; Busse, 91.27 f.; Henry and Schwyzer, 1, 1.1 f.

claims, was one of his chief authorities for the proposition that the man who lives a virtuous life is not affected by bodily afflictions or external circumstances. At the end of this paragraph, he says Plotinus was asked whether one who had not only suffered the grievous fate of Priam and an *Iliad* of tragedies but also was cast aside after death unburied was happy (εὐδαίμων). "Don't talk nonsense," David has Plotinus reply, "the virtue of the soul is irremovable" (ἀπαγε τῆς μικρολογίας· οὐ γὰρ ἀφαιρεῖται τις ψυχικὴν ἀρετὴν).

Plotinus would have agreed with this attitude towards misfortune. But, of this whole passage as reproduced by David there is no echo in the *Enneads* save for the word μικρολογίας. The generalization on virtuous life, as well as the reference to Priam and the *Iliad*, is attributed to Plotinus by Proclus in a manuscript now preserved in Munich. According to Proclus, however, the text after μικρολογίας reads: τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα περιττὰ ὄντα οὐδὲν συμβάλλονται τῇ ἀρετῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ("that is, that all these things, the body and its environment, being superfluous, make no contribution to the virtue of the soul").⁸

At another point in the *Introduction to Philosophy*, Plotinus is represented as saying, "Young people should be instructed in mathematics in order to accustom them to immaterial nature, since they become acquainted with it in this way." Actually, what Plotinus says is, "Instruction in mathematics must be given [to the philosopher] to accustom him to abstract thought and to belief in the immaterial." David's key phrase πρὸς συνεθισμόν τῆς ἀσωμάτου φύσεως ("to accustom [them] to immaterial nature") does not come from Plotinus, but from Proclus's commentary on Euclid or one of the commentators on Aristotle, all of whom attribute these words to Plotinus but none of whom uses the second half of David's quotation ("since they become acquainted with it in this way").⁹ Similarly, in his commentary on Porphyry's *Eisagoge*, David quotes Plotinus in support of the Aristotelian principle (*Categories* 5, 3b 24 f.) that substance (οὐσία) has no contrary. But this text is not to be found in the *Enneads*.¹⁰

⁸Busse, xxi, 30.30–31.2; Henry and Schwyzer, 1, 89.30 f., note (on *Enneads* 1, 4, 7).

⁹Busse, 59.17–19: παραδοτέον δὲ τοῖς νέοις τὰ μαθήματα πρὸς συνεθισμόν τῆς ἀσωμάτου φύσεως, δι' ὧν τὴν ἀσωμάτου φύσιν γινώσκουσιν. Henry and Schwyzer, 1, 75, note (on *Enneads* 1, 3, 3). Plotinus says, τὰ μὲν δὴ μαθήματα δοτέον πρὸς συνεθισμόν κατανόησεως καὶ πίστεως ἀσωμάτου. . . .

¹⁰Henry and Schwyzer, 3, 95, note (on *Enneads*, 6, 3, 5); cf. Busse, 149.6–8. Although Plotinus does not actually say that substance has no contrary, it might conceivably be argued that this conclusion was implied by his denial (loc. cit.) that substance is present in a subject (or substrate). But David makes the bald assertion that Plotinus "rightly says,

Even if these citations from Plotinus were more precise, none of them is decisive metaphysically or has any specifically Neoplatonic flavor. Since, moreover, two of them cannot be traced back to the *Enneads* at all, and one of them is at best a paraphrase (note 9 above), which was apparently not derived from Plotinus but from Proclus or one of the commentaries on Aristotle, it seems that David came upon them in a textbook of some sort, or perhaps in the lectures of his teacher, Olympiodorus,¹¹ or in oral discussions in which he had participated. Whatever their source, David's erroneous ascription of them to Plotinus makes it improbable that he had ever read the *Enneads* or had direct access to them. This review of David's sources suggests that he was a Platonist but hardly in the mainstream of the Neoplatonic movement—if he was a Neoplatonist at all.

This would appear to be a just appraisal of David's position in pagan philosophy. But a different conclusion might be warranted if it could be demonstrated that David was, as a Soviet Armenologist has recently argued,¹² the author of the treatises "On the Heavenly Hierarchy" and "On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy," which have long been attributed to the so-called Pseudo-Dionysius. Professor Robert Thomson (pp. 38–39) rejects this ascription. Chronologically, of course, David, who would have been about 30 or so at the generally recognized date of their composition (ca. 500),¹³ could conceivably have been the author. Clearly, should it be proved that David and the Pseudo-Dionysius were identical, David would then be revealed as an indubitable, though Christianized, Neoplatonist, with Monophysite leanings.

But, it seems to me, there are at least three objections to this hypothesis. In the first place, David's Greek is much simpler, more direct, and less sophisticated than that of the Pseudo-Dionysius. David writes like a foreigner who, having just been initiated into Greek, contents himself

substance has no contrary, insofar as it is not present in a subject" (οὐκ ἔχει ἡ οὐσία ἐναντιότητα, καθὼς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ). This would appear to mean that, apparently without having consulted the *Enneads*, David assumed he was quoting Plotinus directly, although the latter never used these words.

¹¹Cf. R. Beutler, s.v. Olympiodoros (13), *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 18, 1 (Stuttgart, 1939), 207.29 ff.

¹²Sanjian, p. 10 above, note 23.

¹³Ibid. The works of the Pseudo-Dionysius first emerged in the writings of the Monophysite Patriarch Severus of Antioch (512–518) and were cited in the Constantinopolitan synod of 532: *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ed. Eduard Schwartz, 4, 2 (Berlin, 1914), 172.5 (in the Christological discussions with the followers of Severus); see also Berthold Altaner and Alfred Stuiber, *Patrologie* (8th ed.; Freiburg im Breisgau, 1978), p. 502.

with obvious vocabulary and avoids rhetorical flourishes or fancy syntax. His style usually offers no difficulties and is easily understood. That of the Pseudo-Dionysius, on the contrary, weighted down with mystic and esoteric metaphysical language, is often heavy, convoluted, obscure, and all but incomprehensible.¹⁴ Secondly, it must be said, David operates on an exceedingly elementary plane. He eschews metaphysics entirely; and none of his definitions or subdivisions of philosophy, mathematics, etc., so far as the *Introduction to Philosophy* is concerned, goes beyond ordinary logical analysis. Thirdly, and most decisively, the Pseudo-Dionysian treatises are impregnated with elements of the philosophy of Proclus (410/12–485),¹⁵ not a trace of whose ideas can be detected in David's works.

On the other hand, however convincingly it can be argued that David

¹⁴Note, for example, that David uses a plural verb with a subject in the neuter plural: Busse, 38.16, 18–20; 41.9 f.; 70.2 f., 11 f., 13, 16 f., 23f.; 87.8 f., 16, 19 f., etc. In his period, this usage was an aberration from correct Greek, although it does occur, especially in Byzantine Greek, and is the norm in modern Greek. As for the Pseudo-Dionysius, see Piero Scazzoso, *Richerche sulla struttura del linguaggio dello Pseudo-Dionigi Areopagita*, Pubblicazioni dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Contributi, S. 3 Scienze filologiche e letteratura, 14 (Milan, 1967), 31–33.

¹⁵Of the vast literature on this subject, I cite the pioneering investigations of Josef Stiglmayr, *Das Aufkommen der Pseudo-Dionysischen Schriften und ihr Eindringen in die christliche Literatur bis zum Lateranconcil von 649, ein zweiter Beitrag zur Dionysios-Frage*, IV. Jahresbericht des öffentlichen Privatgymnasiums an der Stella matutina zu Feldkirch (Feldkirch, 1895); Hugo Koch, *Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita in seinen Beziehungen zum Neuplatonismus und Mysterienwesen*, Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur- und Dogmengeschichte, 1, 2–3 (Mainz, 1900). Among later studies, see Bernhard Brons, *Gott und die Seienden, Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von neuplatonischer Metaphysik und christlicher Tradition bei Dionysius Areopagita*, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 28 (Göttingen, 1976); Michele Schiavone, *Neoplatonismo e Cristianesimo nello Pseudo Dionigi*, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di Filosofia dell'Università di Genova, 26 (Milan, 1963); Eugenio Corsini, *Il trattato De divinis nominibus dello Pseudo-Dionigi e i commenti neoplatonici al Parmenide*, Università di Torino, Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, 13, 4 (Turin, 1962). For the latest bibliography, see Paul Rorem, *Biblical and Liturgical Symbols within the Pseudo-Dionysian Synthesis*, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, 71 (Toronto, 1984), 4–9 and passim.

Against the now traditional consensus that the Pseudo-Dionysius was heavily dependent upon Proclus, Walther Völker in his *Kontemplation und Ekstase bei Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita* (Wiesbaden, 1958) argues with great learning and skill that the Pseudo-Dionysius derived his system from the Alexandrian and Cappadocian philosophers (Philo, Clement, Basil, the Gregories, etc.), not from Proclus. But the better view is that, although he was undoubtedly acquainted with these writers, certain vital elements in the Pseudo-Dionysius system cannot be explained except by his dependence upon Proclus; see René Roques, "A propos des sources du Pseudo-Denys," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, 56 (1961), 449–464. Völker does not exclude some influence of Neoplatonism.

was not a Neoplatonist, it is perhaps significant that he gives prominence to *Theaetetus* 176ab,¹⁶ a Platonic text which enjoyed a great vogue among the Neoplatonists because it was the source of the fundamental dogma of Neoplatonism that the goal of all existence is unity with God (i.e., likeness to God: ὁμοίωσις θεῷ).¹⁷ Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus allude to it several times but usually only by reference or paraphrase and never, so far as I can see, transcribe the full text.¹⁸ Obviously, therefore, David did not copy it from them but most probably from Plato himself, whom he quotes 21 times and echoes one way or another at least 20 times more.¹⁹ Moreover, David does not go so far as Plotinus, who urges his followers not only to seek ὁμοίωσις θεῷ (likeness to God) but also to aim at ταυτότης τινὶ θεῷ (identity with some god),²⁰ and even to make the effort to advance beyond sinlessness so as to be a god (ἡ σπουδὴ οὐκ ἔξω ἁμαρτίας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεὸν εἶναι).²¹

Nevertheless, David's two quotations of *Theaetetus* 176ab, like the references he makes to Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus, indicate that he had some affinity for the Neoplatonists, even if he apparently had not read any of their works (except for the non-Neoplatonic *Eisagoge* and a few words from Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus*), or deigned to give space in his works to so much as the name of Proclus (who was by

¹⁶Busse 26.19–26, 37.2–9. In Jowett's translation, "Evils, Theodorus, can never pass away, for there must always be something which is antagonistic to good. Having no place among the gods in heaven, of necessity they hover around the mortal nature and this earthly sphere. Wherefore, we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy, just, and wise." Jowett's translation is a little free, and it should be noted that "to fly away is to become like God as far as this is possible" is in Greek: φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.

¹⁷For an excellent analysis of the sources of this famous text and a detailed summary of its use by later writers, pagan and Christian, see Hubert Merki, "Ὁμοίωσις Θεῷ, von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa, *Paradosis*, 7 (Freiburg, Switzerland, 1952), 1–64 (Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, 17–35). There is an enormous bibliography on deification and divinization, which is, however, irrelevant in this context.

¹⁸For Plotinus, see the citations in Henry and Schwyzer, 3, 455. The full text is not reproduced by Porphyry, *Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes*, or in the *Opuscula selecta*, ed. by A. Nauck, or by Proclus (*In Rem Publicam*; *In Timaeum*; *In Cratylum*; *Hypotyposis astronomicarum positionum*), etc.

¹⁹Busse, 236, list of citations. But there are many other reminiscences of *Theaetetus* 176ab, e.g., of which in a hasty search I found the following: Busse, 17.1 f.; 18.8 f.; 20.29; 22.16 f.; 23.16–19; 24.32 f.; 26.15, 19–26; 30.1 f., 5; 34.16–20; 35.18 f., 31 f.; 36.4 f.; 37.2–26; 48.20; 55.35 f., etc.

²⁰*Enneads*, 1, 2, 5; Henry and Schwyzer, 1, 68.1 f.

²¹*Enneads*, 1, 2, 6; Henry and Schwyzer, 1, 70.1–3. See the comments of Merki (n. 17 above), 20 f.

far the most important of the later Neoplatonists), or taken over the conventional Neoplatonic commonplaces (the triads, the descent from the "One," etc.; see note 2 above). Perhaps it can be said that he resembled the Neoplatonists in that, like them, though relying on Plato as the principal guide to philosophy, he found room in his system for the Pythagoreans and Aristotle.²²

²²On the relation of Neoplatonism to Aristotle and the Pythagoreans, see Eduard Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, 3, 2 (5th ed.; Leipzig, 1923), pp. 473-480.

Bibliography

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

Սիմէոն Ջուղայեցի, Գիրք տրամաբանութեան.

1728

Կ. Պոլիս. Գիրքը կը բովանդակէ նաեւ հետեւեալ բնագիրները. «Դաւթի Անյաղթ փիլիսոփայի Ներգինացւոյ Առաժք Հինգ», էջ 41-50. «Նորին Դաւթի Աթենականի Հայոց փիլիսոփայի Վասն բաժանման», էջ 50-54. «Դաւթի Անյաղթ փիլիսոփայի Ներգինացւոյ Գիրք Հակաց», էջ 254-275:

(Simēon Jughayetsi, Book of Logic. Constantinople. The book also contains the following texts: "The Five Parables by the Invincible Philosopher David Nerginatsi," pp. 41-50; "On Division by the same Armenian Philosopher David the Athenian," pp. 50-54; "Book of Definitions by the Invincible Philosopher David Nerginatsi," pp. 254-275.)

Գիրք Սահմանաց Դաւթի Անյաղթ Փիլիսոփայի եւ Աստուածաբան վարդապետի.

1731

Կ. Պոլիս:

(Book of Definitions by David, the Invincible Philosopher and Vardapet Theologian. Constantinople.)

Գիրք Պորփիրի որ կոչի Ներածութիւն, յորում պարունակին վերծանութիւնք ամենիմաստ Դաւթի Անյաղթ փիլիսոփայի եւ լուծմունք Ներածութեան Սրբոյն Գրիգորի Տաթեւացւոյ.

1793

Մադրաս:

(Porphyry's Book Called *Isagoge*, Including the Commentary by the Most Learned and Invincible Philosopher David and St. Gregory Tat'ewat's Commentary on the *Isagoge*. Madras.)

Դաւիթ Անյաղթ, Գիրք Սահմանաց.

1797 Մադրաս:

(David the Invincible. Book of Definitions. Madras.)

Կորին Աարդապետի, Մամբրէ Վերծանողի եւ Դաւթի Անյաղթի Մատենագրութիւնք.

1833 Վենետիկ. Գիրքը կը բովանդակէ նաեւ հետեւեալ բնագիրները. «Դաւթի Անյաղթ փիլիսոփայի Ներբողեան ի Սուրբ Խաչն Աստուածընկալ», էջ 103-119. «Նորին Դաւթի Եռամեծի եւ Անյաղթ փիլիսոփայի ընդդէմ առարկութեանցն չորից Պիհոռնի իմաստակի եւ սահմանք եւ տրամատութիւնք իմաստասիրութեան», էջ 120-216. «Նորին Դաւթի փիլիսոփայի Առածք Հինգ», էջ 217-222. «Նորին վասն բաժանման», էջ 223-224. «Դաւթի փիլիսոփայի Ներգինացւոյ Վերլուծութիւն Ներածութեանն Պորփիրի», էջ 251-356. «Ստորոգութիւնք Արիստոտէլի՝ Թարգմանեալ եւ մեկնեալ ի Դաւթէ», էջ 409-458. «Պէրիարմէնիաս Արիստոտէլի՝ Թարգմանեալ եւ մեկնեալ ի Դաւթէ», էջ 487-553. «Դաւթի Անյաղթ փիլիսոփայի մեկնութիւն չորեքտասան գլխոց Արիստոտէլի ի Վերլուծականն», էջ 557-598. «Յաղագս քերականին պատճառ Դաւթի փիլիսոփայի ասացեալ», էջ 599-600:

(The Works of Koriwn Vardapet, Mambrē Vertsnogh and David the Invincible. Venice. The book also contains the following texts: "Encomium of the Holy, God-receiving Cross by David the Invincible Philosopher," pp. 103-119; "Against the Four Arguments of the Sophist Pyrrho and the Definitions and Divisions of Philosophy, By David the Trismegistus and Invincible Philosopher," pp. 120-216; "The Five Parables by David the Philosopher," pp. 217-222; "By the Same David, On Division," pp. 223-224; "Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* by the Philosopher David Nerginats'i," pp. 251-356; "Aristotle's *Categories*, Translated and Interpreted by David," pp. 409-458; "Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*, Translated and Interpreted by David," pp. 487-553; "David the Invincible Philosopher's Interpretation of the Fourteen Chapters of Aristotle's *Analytics*," pp. 557-598; "Commentary on Grammar by David the Philosopher," pp. 599-600.)

Մեկնութիւն Ստորոգութեանցն Արիստոտէլի՝ ընծայեալ Էլիասի Իմաստասիրի.

1911 Ի լոյս էած Յ. Մանանդեան. Ս. Պետերբուրգ:

(Interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories*, Attributed to the Philosopher Elias. Published by H. Manandian. St. Petersburg.)

Դաւթի Անյաղթ փիլիսոփայի Մատենագրութիւնն եւ Թուղթ Գիտայ կաթողիկոսի առ Դաւիթ.

1932 2-րդ տպագր., Վենետիկ. Գիրքը կը բովանդակէ նաեւ Հետեւեալ բնագիրները. «Դաւթի Անյաղթ փիլիսոփայի Ներբողեան ի Սուրբ Խաչն Աստուածընկալ», էջ 9-25. «Նորին Դաւթի Եռամեծի եւ Անյաղթ փիլիսոփայի ընդդէմ առարկութեանցն չորից Պիհնոնի իմաստակի եւ սահմանք եւ տրամատութիւնք իմաստասիրութեան», էջ 26-122. «Նորին Դաւթի փիլիսոփայի Առածք Հինգ», էջ 123-128. «Նորին Վասն բաժանման», էջ 129-130. «Դաւթի փիլիսոփայի Ներգինացւոյ վերլուծութիւն Ներածութեանն Պորփիւրի», էջ 157-263. «Ստորոգութիւնք Արիստոտէլի՝ Թարգմանեալ եւ մեկնեալ ի Դաւթէ», էջ 317-367. «Պէրիարմէնիաս Արիստոտէլի՝ Թարգմանեալ եւ մեկնեալ ի Դաւթէ», էջ 398-465. «Դաւթի Անյաղթ փիլիսոփայի մեկնութիւն չորեքտասան զլսոց Արիստոտէլի ի Վերլուծականն», էջ 469-511. «Յաղագս քերականին պատճառ Դաւթի փիլիսոփայի ասացեալ», էջ 512-513:

(The Works of David the Invincible and Catholicos Giwt's Letter to David. 2d printing. Venice. The book contains the following texts: "Encomium of the Holy, God-receiving Cross by David the Invincible Philosopher," pp. 9-25; "Against the Four Arguments of the Sophist Pyrrho and the Definitions and Divisions of Philosophy, by David the Trismegistus and Invincible Philosopher," pp. 26-122; "The Five Parables by David the Philosopher," pp. 123-128; "By the Same David, On Division," pp. 129-130; "Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* by the Philosopher David Nerginatsi," pp. 157-263; "Aristotle's *Categories*, Translated and Interpreted by David," pp. 317-367; "Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*, Translated and Interpreted by David," pp. 398-465; "David the Invincible Philoso-

- pher's Interpretation of the Fourteen Chapters of Aristotle's *Analytics*," pp. 469-511; "Commentary on Grammar by David the Philosopher," pp. 512-513.)
- «Դաւիթ Ամյաղթ վարդապետի ասացեալ Ներբողական ի սուրբ կաթողիկէ եկեղեցի».
- 1956 Բազմավեպ (*Վենետիկ*), թ. 4-5, էջ 92-94:
(Encomium of the Holy Catholic Church, by David the Invincible Vardapet. *Bazmavep* [Venice], nos. 4-5, pp. 92-94.)
- «Ներբող աստվածընկալ սուրբ խաչի».
- 1957 Էջմիածին, *Սեպտ.*, էջ 14-15:
(Encomium of the God-receiving Holy Cross. *Ėjmiatsin*, September, pp. 14-15.)
- Դաւիթ Ամյաղթ, Սահմանի Իմաստասիրութեան.
- 1960 *Համահավաք քննական բնագիրը, Թարգմանությունը գրաբարից ռուսերեն, առաջաբանը եւ ծանոթագրությունները Ս. Ս. Արեւիչատյանի, Երեւան:*
(David the Invincible. Definitions of Philosophy. Critical text, trans. from Classical Armenian into Russian, introduction and annotations by S. S. Arevshatyan. Erevan.)
- Դաւիթ Ամյաղթ, Մեկնութիւն ի «Վերլուծականն» Արիստոտէլի.
- 1967 *Համահավաք քննական բնագիրը, Թարգմանությունը գրաբարից ռուսերեն, առաջաբանն ու ծանոթագրությունները Ս. Ս. Արեւիչատյանի. Երեւան:*
(David the Invincible. Interpretation of Aristotle's *Analytics*. Critical text, trans. from Classical Armenian into Russian, introduction and annotations by S. S. Arevshatyan. Erevan.)
- Դաւիթ Ամյաղթ, Վերլուծութիւն «Ներածութեանն» Պորփիրի.
- 1976 *Քննական բնագիրը, Թարգմանությունը գրաբարից ռուսերեն, առաջաբանն ու ծանոթագրությունները Ս. Ս. Արեւիչատյանի. Երեւան:*
(David the Invincible. Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*. Critical text, trans. from Classical Armenian into Russian, introduction and annotations by S. S. Arevshatyan. Erevan.)
- Դաւիթ Ամյաղթ, Երկասիրութիւնի Փիլիսոփայականի.
- 1980 *Համահավաք քննական բնագիրը եւ առաջաբանը Ս. Ս. Արեւիչատյանի. Երեւան:*
(David the Invincible. Philosophical Works. Critical text and introduction by S. S. Arevshatyan. Erevan.)

Դավիթ Անյաղթ, Սահմանի Իմաստասիրութեան.

1980 Նմանահանություն 1280 թ. ձեռագրի: Առաջաբանը Ս. Ս. Արեվշատյանի. Երեվան:

(David the Invincible. Definitions of Philosophy. Facsimile reproduction of Matenadaran MS. No. 1280. Introduction by S. S. Arevshatyan. Erevan.)

Դավիթ Անհաղթ, Երկեր.

1980 Աշխարհաբար թարգմանությունը, առաջաբանը եւ ծանոթագրությունները Ս. Ս. Արեվշատյանի. Երեվան:

(David the Invincible. Works. Trans. into modern Armenian, introduction and annotations by S. S. Arevshatyan. Erevan.)

Davidis Prolegomena et in Porphyrii Isagogen Commentarium

1904 Adolfus Busse, ed. *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, XVIII/2. Berlin. (Greek versions of David's *Definitions of Philosophy* and *Commentary of Porphyry's "Isagoge"*.)

Translations

David Nepobedimyi (Anakht), Opredeleniia filosofii

1960 (David the Invincible, Definitions of Philosophy). In Russian. Critical text, trans. from Classical Armenian, introduction, and commentary by S. S. Arevshatyan. Erevan.

David Nepobedimyi, Tolkovanie "Analitiki" Aristotelii

1967 (David the Invincible, Interpretation of Aristotle's *Analytics*). In Russian. Critical text, trans. from Classical Armenian, introduction, and annotations by S. S. Arevshatyan. Erevan.

David Anakht, Sochineniia

1975 (David the Invincible, Works). In Russian. Comp. and trans. from Classical Armenian, introduction, and annotations by S. S. Arevshatyan. Moscow.

David Anakht (Nepobedimyi), Analiz "Vvedeniia" Porfirii

1976 (David Anakht [the Invincible], Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*). In Russian. Critical text, trans. from Classical Armenian, introduction, and annotations by S. S. Arevshatyan. Erevan.

David Anakht, Sochineniia

1980 (David the Invincible, Works). In Russian. Comp. and

trans. from Classical Armenian, introduction, and annotations by S. S. Arevshatyan. Moscow.

David, Introducere in filozofie

- 1977 Roumanian translation of David's *Definitions of Philosophy*, introductory study, notes, and commentary by Gabriel Liiceanu. Scrittori Greci și Latini, 13. Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania.

David Niezwyuczony, Definicje filozofii

- 1971 Partial Polish translation of David's *Definitions of Philosophy* by Eugeniusz Sluskiwicz, introduction by D. Jedynak. *Meander*, no. 10, pp. 427-433.

Definitions and Divisions of Philosophy by David the Invincible Philosopher

- 1983 English translation of the Old Armenian version, with introduction and notes by Bridget Kendall and Robert W. Thomson. University of Pennsylvania, Armenian Texts and Studies, 5. Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

Armenian

Ալիշան, Ղեւոնդ (Alishan, Ghewond)

- 1873 Շնորհալի եւ պարագայ իւր. *Վենետիկ*. էջ 2, 260-265: (Shnorhali and His Family. Venice. Pp. 2, 260-265.)

Ակինեան, Ներսէս (Akinian, Nersēs)

- 1932 Դասական հայերէնը եւ Վիեննական Միֆարեան դպրոցը. *Վիեննա*: (Classical Armenian and the Viennese Mekhitarist School. Vienna.)

- 1959 Դաւիթ Հարֆացի Անյաղթ փիլիսոփայ. կեանքն ու գործերը. *Վիեննա*: (David Harkats'i, the Invincible Philosopher, His Life and Works. Vienna.)

Աճառյան, Հ. (Acharyan, H.)

- 1944 Հայոց անձնանունների բառարան. Հատոր 2. *Երեւան*. էջ 24-26: (Dictionary of Armenian Personal Names. Vol. 2. Erevan. Pp. 24-26.)

Անանեան, Պ. (Ananian, P.)

- 1956 «Դաւիթ Անյաղթի անտիպ մէկ ճառը — Քննութիւն եւ բնագիր». Բազմավէպ (*Վենետիկ*), Թ. 3, էջ 63-70. Թ. 4-5, էջ 89-95:

- (An Unpublished Discourse by David the Invincible, A Study and Text. *Bazmavep* [Venice], no. 3, pp. 63-70; nos. 4-5, pp. 89-95.)
- Ապրեսյան, Հ. (Apresyan, H.)
 1980 «Դավիթ Անհաղթի գեղագիտական հայացքները». Դավիթ Ամհաղթ, Հոգվածների ժողովածու. Երեւան. էջ 69-90:
 (David the Invincible's Aesthetic Concepts. *In* David the Invincible, Collection of Articles. Erevan. Pp. 69-90.)
- Առաքելյան, Ա. (Araḳ'elyan, A.)
 1959 Հայ ժողովրդի մտավոր մշակույթի զարգացման պատմություն. Հատոր 1. Երեւան. էջ 95, 274-278, 312-315, 531, 568-606:
 (Armenian Intellectual History. Vol. 1. Erevan. Pp. 95, 274-278, 312-315, 531, 568-606.)
- Արեվշատյան, Ս. (Arevshatyan, S.)
 1966 «Դավիթ Անհաղթ». Հայրենիքի Ձայն (Երեւան), 9 Հոկտ.:
 (David the Invincible. *Hayrenik'i Dzayn* [Erevan], October 9.)
 1969 «Դավիթ Անհաղթի ժառանգությունը նոր լուսաբանությամբ». Բանբեր Մատենադարանի, Թ. 9, էջ 7-22:
 (A New Interpretation of David the Invincible's Legacy. *Banber Matenadarani* [Erevan], no. 9, pp. 7-22.) Summaries in Russian and French.
- 1971 «Պատմության երկերի թարգմանությունը ժամանակը». Բանբեր Մատենադարանի, Թ. 10, էջ 7-20:
 (The Period of the Armenian Translation of Plato's Works. *Banber Matenadarani*, no. 10, pp. 7-20.) Summaries in Russian and French.
- 1979 «Դավիթ Անհաղթ». Գարուն (Երեւան), Թ. 11, էջ 67-73:
 (David the Invincible. *Garun* [Erevan], no. 11, pp. 67-73.)
- 1980a «Արիստոտելը եւ հայ փիլիսոփայությունը». Արիստոտելը եւ հայ փիլիսոփայությունը, Հոգվածների ժողովածու գրքի մէջ. Երեւան. էջ 11-25:
 (Aristotle and Armenian Philosophy. *In* Aristotle and Armenian Philosophy, Collection of Articles. Erevan. Pp. 11-25.) Summaries in Russian and English.
- 1980b Դավիթ Ամհաղթը՝ հին Հայաստանի ակամավոր փիլիսոփա. Երեւան:

- (David the Invincible, A Famous Ancient Armenian Philosopher. Erevan.)
- 1980c «Դավիթ Անհաղթը եւ հին Հայաստանի փիլիսոփայական միտքը». Պատմա-քանասիրական Հանդես (Երեւան), թ. 1, էջ 21-39:
- (David the Invincible and Ancient Armenian Philosophical Thought. *Patma-Banasirakan Handes* [Erevan], no. 1, pp. 21-39.) Summary in Russian.
- 1980d «Դավիթ Անհաղթը եւ նրա փիլիսոփայության պատմական նշանակությունը». Լեւոնյան Ուղիով (Երեւան), թ. 5:
- (The Historical Significance of the Philosophy of David the Invincible. *Leninyan Ughiov* [Erevan], no. 5.)
- 1980e «Դավիթ Անհաղթի գիտական սիրանքը». Գիտություն եւ Տեխնիկա (Երեւան), թ. 5:
- (David the Invincible's Scientific Achievements. *Gitutsyun ev Tekhnika* [Erevan], no. 5.)
- 1980f «Դավիթ Անհաղթի փիլիսոփայական ժառանգությունը». Դավիթ Անյաղթ, Երկասիրութիւնք Փիլիսոփայական. Երեւան. էջ 5-25:
- (The Philosophical Legacy of David the Invincible. *In David the Invincible, Philosophical Works*. Erevan. Pp. 5-25.)
- 1980g «Մեծ մտածողի հոգեւոր ժառանգությունը». Սովետական Հայաստան Ամսագիր (Երեւան), թ. 5:
- (The Spriritual Legacy of the Great Thinker. *Sovetakan Hayastan* Monthly [Erevan], no. 5.)
- Արեւիշատյան Ս., Խրլոպյան Գ., Թահմիզյան Ն. (Arevshatyan, S., Khrlopyan, G., and Tahmizyan, N.)
- 1977 «Դավիթ Անհաղթ». Հայկական Սովետական Հանրագիտարան. Հատոր 3. Երեւան. էջ 300-302:
- (David the Invincible. *Haykakan Sovetakan Hanragitaran*. Vol. 3. Erevan. Pp. 300-302.)
- Արիստոտելը եւ Հայ Փիլիսոփայությունը, Հոգվածների ժողովածու. Երեւան:
- 1980 (Aristotle and Armenian Philosophy, Collection of Articles. Erevan.)
- Արծրունի, Վ. (Artsruni, V.)
- 1944 Գլխաւոր մատենագիրների հայկական դպրութեան, Դ.-Ի. դար. Աղեքսանդրիա. էջ 27-28:
- (Major Authors in Armenian Literature, IVth-XXth Centuries. Alexandria. Pp. 27-28.)

Բենակիս, Լինոս (Benakis, Linos)

- 1981 «Դավիթ Անհաղթը Արիստոտելի բյուզանդական մեկնիչների երկերում». Պատմա-բանասիրական Հանդես, Թ. 1, էջ 46-55:

(David the Invincible in the Works of Byzantine Commentators on Aristotle. *Patma-Banasirakan Handes*, no. 1, pp. 46-55.)

Բրուտյան, Գ. (Brutyán, G.)

- 1979a «Դավիթ Անհաղթի ուսմունքը մտահանգումների մասին». Լրաբեր Հասարակական Գիտությունների (Երեվան), Թ. 10, էջ 32-59:

(David the Invincible's Teaching on Conclusions. *Lraber Hasarakakan Gitut'yunneri* [Erevan], no. 10, pp. 32-59.) Summary in Russian.

- 1979b «Դավիթ Անհաղթի ուսմունքը սահմանման եվ բաժանման մասին». Պատմա-բանասիրական Հանդես, Թ. 3, էջ 38-57. Թ. 4, էջ 3-13:

(David the Invincible's Teaching on Definition and Division. *Patma-Banasirakan Handes*, no. 3, pp. 38-57; no. 4, pp. 3-13.) Summary in Russian.

- 1980 Դավիթ Անհաղթի ուսմունքը տրամաբանության մասին. *Երեվան*:

(David the Invincible's Teaching on Logic. Erevan.)

Գաբրիելյան, Հ. (Gabrielyan, H.)

- 1956 Հայ փիլիսոփայական մտքի պատմություն. Հատոր 1, *Երեվան*. էջ 343-351, 353-391, 394-437:

(History of Armenian Philosophical Thought. Vol. 1. Erevan. Pp. 343-351, 353-391, 394-437.)

- 1976 Հայ փիլիսոփայության պատմություն, Սկզբից մինչև մեր օրերը. *Երեվան*. էջ 76-92:

(History of Armenian Philosophy, From Its Beginnings to the Present. Erevan. Pp. 76-92.)

- 1980 «Դավիթ Անհաղթի էթիկական հայացքները». Դավիթ Անհաղթ, Հոդվածների ժողովածու. *Երեվան*. էջ 31-54:

(The Ethical Concepts of David the Invincible. *In* David the Invincible, Collection of Articles. Erevan. Pp. 31-54.)

Գարագաշյան, Ա. (Garagashian, A.)

- 1895 Քննական պատմութիւն Հայոց, ըստ նորագոյն պատմական, լեզուաբանական եւ բանասիրական տեղեկութեանց. 4 մաս. Թիֆլիս:

(Critical History of Armenia, Based upon Most Modern Historical, Linguistic and Philological Data. 4 parts. Tbilisi.)

Գուրբան, Խ. (Gurian, Kh.)

1944 Մեսրոպեան Աստուածաշունչը քանասիրութեան լոյսին տակ. Գահիրէ. էջ 709, 780-781:

(The Mesrobian Bible in the Light of Philological Studies. Cairo. Pp. 709, 780-781.)

Գրիգորեան, Գ. (Grigoryan, G.)

1980 «Արիստոտելի աշխատութիւնների մեկնութիւնները միջնադարյան Հայաստանում». Արիստոտելը եվ հայ փիլիսոփայութիւնը, Հոգւածների ժողովածու. Երեւան. էջ 26-46:

(The Commentaries on Aristotle's Works in Medieval Armenia. In Aristotle and Armenian Philosophy, Collection of Articles. Erevan. Pp. 26-46.) Summaries in Russian and English.

Դավիթ Անհաղթ, Հոգւածների ժողովածու.

1980 Երեւան:

(David the Invincible, Collection of Articles. Erevan.)

Դավիթ Անհաղթը՝ Հին Հայաստանի մեծ փիլիսոփան.

1983 Հայկական ՍՍՀ ԳԱ Հրատարակչութիւն, Երեւան:

(David the Invincible, the Great Philosopher of Ancient Armenia. Publication of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences. Erevan.) Selected papers presented on the occasion of the 1500th anniversary of David at the symposium held in Erevan, May 1980, and the session held in Moscow, June 1980. For a complete list of the papers presented in Erevan see Section C of this Bibliography.

«Դավիթ Անյաղթը լեհերէն».

1972 Զարթոնք (Պէյրուք), 3 Սեպտ.:

(David the Invincible in Polish. Zart'onk [Beirut], September 3.)

Դուրեան, Եղիշէ (Durian, Eghishē)

1933 Պատմութիւն Հայ մատենագրութեան. Երուսաղէմ. էջ 35-36:

(History of Armenian Literature. Jerusalem. Pp. 35-36.)

Զամինեան, Ա. (Zaminian, A.)

- 1941 Պատմութիւն Հայոց Հին Գրականութեան. *բ. տպագր. Պէյրուս*. էջ 111-112:
(History of Ancient Armenian Literature. 2d printing. Beirut. Pp. 111-112.)

Զարբհանալեան, Գ. (Zarbhanalian, G.)

- 1889 Մատենադարան հայկական թարգմանութեանց մատենաց, Դ-ԺԳ դար. *Վենետիկ*. էջ 321-322, 395, 675-676.
(Library of Ancient Armenian Translations, IVth-XIIIth Centuries. Venice. Pp. 321-322, 395, 675-676.)
1897 Հայկական հին դպրութեան պատմութիւն. *3-րդ տպագր. Վենետիկ*. էջ 314-324:
(History of Ancient Armenian Literature. 3d printing. Venice. Pp. 314-324.)

Թահմիզյան, Ն. (T'ahmizyan, N.)

- 1961 «*Էջեր հայկական վաղ միջնադարյան երաժշտական գեղագիտությունից*». Տեղեկագիր Հասարակական Գիտությունների (Երեւան), *թ.* 2, էջ 49-60:
(Pages from the Early Medieval Armenian Musical Aesthetics. *Teghegagir Hasarakakan Gitut'yunneri* [Erevan], no. 2, pp. 49-60.)
1962 «*Ձայնի մասին ուսմունքը հին եվ միջնադարյան Հայաստանում*». Բանբեր Մատենադարանի, *թ.* 6, էջ 135-170:
(The Science of Sound in Ancient and Medieval Armenia. *Banber Matenadarani*, no. 6, pp. 135-170.) Summaries in Russian and French.
1968 «*Ներդաշնակության հենքի ուսմունքը միջնադարյան Հայաստանում (5-6-րդ դդ.)*». Պատմա-բանասիրական Հանդես, *թ.* 1, էջ 75-92:
(Teaching of Harmony in Medieval Armenia. *Patma-Banasirakan Handes*, no. 1, pp. 75-92.) Summary in Russian.
1980 «*Դավիթ Անհաղթը եւ հայ երաժշտական մշակույթը*». Դավիթ Անհաղթ, Հոդվածների ժողովածու. *Երեւան*. էջ 91-122:
(David the Invincible and the Armenian Musical Culture. *In David the Invincible, Collection of Articles*. Erevan. Pp. 91-122.)

Լոսեվ, Ա. (Losev, A.)

- 1980a «*Դավիթ Անհաղթի փիլիսոփայական-պատմական*

սխրանքը». Պատմա-քանասիրական Հանդես, Թ. 1, էջ 40-51:

(David the Invincible's Philosophical and Historic Feat. *Patma-Banasirakan Handes*, no. 1, pp. 40-51.) Summary in Russian.

- 1980b «Դավիթ Անյաղթի փիլիսոփայական սխրանքը». Հայկագեան Հայագիտական Հանդես (Պէյրուիթ), Թ. 8, էջ 109-114:

(David the Invincible's Philosophical Feats. *Haigazian Armenological Review* [Beirut], no. 8, pp. 109-114.)

Խաչատրյան, Պ. (Khachaturyan, P.)

- 1969 Հայ միջնադարյան պատմական ողբեր (ԺԴ-ԺԷ դդ.). *Երեւան. էջ 22-24, 26, 119:*

(Medieval Armenian Historical Elegies, XIV-XVIIth Centuries. Erevan. Pp. 22-24, 26, 119.)

Խաչիկյան, Յա. (Khachikyan, Ya.)

- 1966 «Արվեստների դասակարգման պատմությունը». Պատմա-քանասիրական Հանդես, Թ. 3, էջ 25-38:

(A propos of the History of the Classification of the Arts. *Patma-Banasirakan Handes*, no. 3, pp. 25-38.) Summary in Russian.

- 1980 «Արվեստը Դավիթ Անհաղթի իմացաբանական համակարգում». Պատմա-քանասիրական Հանդես, Թ. 1, էջ 63-76:

(Art in David the Invincible's Epistemological System. *Patma-Banasirakan Handes*, no. 1, pp. 63-76.) Summary in Russian.

Խրլոպյան, Գ. (Khrlopyan, G.)

- 1974a «Դավիթ Անհաղթի պատկերացումը ընկերային իմաստասիրության առարկայի մասին». Երեւանի Համալսարան, Թ. 1, էջ 44-47:

(David the Invincible's Concept of Social Philosophy. *Erevani Hamalsaran*, no. 1, pp. 44-47.)

- 1974b «Մարդու պրոբլեմը Դավիթ Անհաղթի սոցիալական իմաստասիրության մեջ». Գիտական Աշխատությունների Ժողովածու, Հոգեբանական Գիտությունների Բաժին (Երեւան), Թ. 1, էջ 203-216:

(The Problem of Man in David the Invincible's Social Philosophy. *Gitakan Ashkhatut'yunneri Zhoghovatsu*, Hogebanakan Gitut'yunneri Bazhin [Erevan], no. 1, pp. 203-216.)

- 1978 Հայ սոցիալական իմաստասիրության պատմություն.
Երեվան. էջ 292-340:
(History of Armenian Social Philosophy. Erevan.
Pp. 292-340.)
- Կոնիքեր, Փ. (Conybeare, F.)
1893 Համեմատութիւն Դաւիթ Անյաղթի գրեանց յունարէն
բնագրի հետ. *Անգլերէնէ թարգմանեց Փարսադան
Տէր-Մովսիսեանց. (Արտատպուած «Արարատ»-ի
1892-93 թթ.): Վաղարշապատ. 51 էջ:*
(A Comparison of David the Invincible's Works with
the Greek Versions. Trans. from the English by P'ar-
sadan Tēr-Movsisants'. Offprint from 1892-93 issues
of *Ararat*. Vagharshapat. 51 pp.)
- 1893 Քննութիւնք գրոց Դաւիթ Անյաղթի թարգմանու-
թեանց Արիստոտէլի. *Վիեննա:*
(A Study of David the Invincible's Translations of
Aristotle. Vienna.)
- Հարությունյան, Էդ. (Harut'yunyan, Ed.)
1972 Դեդուկտիվ տրամաբանության տեսության հարցեր.
Երեվան. էջ 86, 328-330:
(Problems of Theories of Deductive Logic. Erevan.
Pp. 86, 328-330.)
- 1979 Տրամաբանության փիլիսոփայություն. *Երեվան.
էջ 126-157:*
(Philosophy of Logic. Erevan. Pp. 126-157.)
- 1980 «Արիստոտէլի Անալիտիկաները Դավիթ Անհաղթի
մեկնաբանութեամբ». Արիստոտէլը եվ հայ փիլիսո-
փայությունը, Հոդվածների ժողովածու. *Երեվան.
էջ 47-71:*
(Aristotle's *Analytics* as Interpreted by David the In-
vincible. In *Aristotle and Armenian Philosophy*, Col-
lection of Articles. Erevan. Pp. 47-71.) Summaries in
Russian and English.
- Հովսեփյան, Վ. (Hovsep'yan, V.)
1979 Գեղագիտական ուսմունքների պատմություն.
Երեվան. էջ 175-179:
(History of Aesthetic Teachings. Erevan. Pp. 175-
179.)
- Մադոյան, Ա. (Madoyan, A.)
1980 «Դավիթ Անհաղթ եվ Ներսես Շնորհալի». Դավիթ
Անհաղթ, Հոդվածների ժողովածու. *Երեվան. էջ
123-142:*

(David the Invincible and Nersēs Shnorhali. *In* David the Invincible, Collection of Articles. Erevan. Pp. 123–142.)

Մադոյան Ա., Միրզոյան Հ. (Madoyan, A., and Mirzoyan, H.)

1980 «Դավիթ Անհաղթի Սահմանաց Գրքի անանուն մեկնությունը». Բանբեր Երեվանի Համալսարանի, Թ. 1, էջ 115–158:

(The Anonymous Commentary of David the Invincible's *Book of Definitions*. *Banber Yerevani Hamalsarani*, no. 1, pp. 115–158.)

Մամիկոնյան, Հ. (Mamikonyan, H.)

1966 «Տիպականի եվ անհատականի հարաբերության միջնադարյան տեսությունների պատմությունից», Մարդը եվ նրա կերպարը գրականության մեջ. Երեվան. էջ 97–113:

(Apropos of the History of Medieval Theories on Relations Between the Universal and the Specific. *In* Man and His Image in Literature. Erevan. Pp. 97–113.)

Մանանդեան, Յ. (Manandian, H.)

1904 «Դավիթ Անյաղթի խնդիրը նոր լուսաբանություն», Ուսումնասիրություն Դավիթ Հարֆացի փիլիսոփայիմ վերագրուած երկերի. Վաղարշապատ. 39 էջ:

(The Problem of David the Invincible in a New Light. *In* Study of Philosophical Works Attributed to the Philosopher David Hark'ats'i. Vagharshapat. 39 pp.)

1928 Յունաբան դպրոցը եւ նրա զարգացման շրջանները (Փննական ուսումնասիրություն). Վրեհնա:

(The Philhellene School and Its Periods of Development [A Critical Study]. Vienna.)

Մելիֆսեթ-Բեկ, Լ. (Melik'set'-Bek, L.)

1946 «Դավիթ Անհաղթի Վրաստանում լինելու շուրջը». Գրական-բանասիրական Հետախուզումներ, Գիրք 1. Երեվան. էջ 243–267:

(On the Question of David the Invincible's Sojourn in Georgia. *In* *Grakan-Banasirakan Hetakhuzumner*. Book I. Erevan. Pp. 243–267.)

Մելվիլ, Յուրի (Melvil, Yuri)

1980 «Դավիթ Անյաղթի փիլիսոփայութեան սահմանումները եւ դրանց արդիական նշանակությունը». Հայկազեան Հայագիտական Հանդես, Թ. 8, էջ 99–108:

(David the Invincible's Definitions of Philosophy

and Their Significance in Modern Times. *Haigazian Armenological Review*, no. 8, pp. 99-108.)

Մինասյան, Բ. (Minasian, B.)

1980

«Հազար հինգ հարիւրամեայ դափնեկիրը՝ Դավիթ Անյաղթ». Նոր Ապրիլ (Հալէպ), Ա. Տարի, Թ. 3, էջ 5-14:

(David the Invincible, the 1500-year Laureate. *Nor April* [Aleppo], vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 5-14.)

Միրզոյան, Հ. (Mirzoyan, H.)

1980

«Դավիթ Անհաղթը եւ նոր շրջանի հայ փիլիսոփայական մտքի սկզբնավորումը». Դավիթ Անհաղթ, Հոգվածների ժողովածու. Երեւան. էջ 5-30:

(David the Invincible and the Beginnings of Modern Armenian Philosophical Thought. *In* David the Invincible, Collection of Articles. Erevan. Pp. 5-30.)

Միրզոյան Հ. եւ Մադոյան Ա. (Mirzoyan, H., and Madoyan, A.)

1980a

«Դավիթ Անհաղթի Սահմանաց գրոց մեկնության հեղինակի շուրջը». Բանքեր Երեւանի Համալսարանի, Թ. 1, էջ 115-119:

(On the Authorship of the Commentary on David the Invincible's *Book of Definitions*. *Banber Yerevani Hamalsarani*, no. 1, pp. 115-119.)

1980b

«Լուծումնք սահմանաց գրոց երկի տեսական արժեքը». Դավիթ Անհաղթ, Հոգվածների ժողովածու. Երեւան. էջ 211-226:

(The Theoretical Value of the *Interpretation of the Book of Definitions*. *In* David the Invincible, Collection of Articles. Erevan. Pp. 211-226.)

Մխիթարյան, Գ. Ե. (Mkhit'aryan, G. E.)

1980

«Դավիթ Անհաղթի հասարակագիտական հայացքները». Դավիթ Անհաղթ, Հոգվածների ժողովածու. Երեւան. էջ 55-68:

(The Social Concepts of David the Invincible. *In* David the Invincible, Collection of Articles. Erevan. Pp. 55-68.)

Մուրադյան, Ա. (Muradyan, A.)

1967

«Հայ քերականական տերմինաբանության կազմավորումը». Պատմա-բանասիրական Հանդես, Թ. 1, էջ 125-133:

(The Origin of the Armenian Grammatical Terminology. *Patma-Banasirakan Handes*, no. 1, pp. 125-133.)

- 1971 Հունարան դպրոցը եւ նրա դերը հայերենի փերականական տերմինաբանության ստեղծման գործում.
Երեւան:
(The Philhellene School and Its Role in the Creation of the Armenian Grammatical Terminology. Erevan.)
- 1981 «Դավիթ Անհաղթի անձնավորության, ժամանակի եւ գիտական ժառանգության հարցի շուրջը». Պատմաբանասիրական Հանդես, Թ. 1, էջ 194-216:
(On the Question of the Identity, Chronology, and Scientific Legacy of David the Invincible. *Patma-Banasirakan Handes*, no. 1, pp. 194-216.)
- Յովսէփեան, Գ. (Hovsep'ian, G.)
- 1907 *Գրախօսութիւն David der Philosoph*, von Dr. Missak Khostikian (Bern, 1907) *գրքին*. Արարատ (Վաղարշապատ), Հոկտ.-Նոյմ., էջ 961-969:
(Review of *David der Philosoph*, by Dr. Missak Khostikian [Bern, 1907]. *Ararat* [Vagharshapat], October-November, pp. 961-969.)
- 1908 «Դավիթ Հարթացին եւ Պիտոյից գիրքը». Արարատ (Վաղարշապատ), Փետր., էջ 203-216:
(David Hark'ats'i and the Book of Knowledge. *Ararat* [Vagharshapat], February, pp. 203-216.)
- Ն. Ա. [Նիկոլ Աղբալեան] (N. A. [Nikol Aghbalian])
- 1919 «Դիտողութիւններ Ն. Ադոնցի նոր գրքի վրայ». Արարատ (Էջմիածին), էջ 65-71:
(Comments on the New Book by N. Adontz. *Ararat* [Ėjmiatsin], pp. 65-71.)
- Նազարեան, Շուշանիկ (Nazarian, Shushanik)
- 1981 «Դավիթ Անյաղթը եւ Հայոց Միջնադարեան Գեղարւեստական գրականութիւնը (Ակնարկ)». Բազմավեպ, Թ. 3-4, էջ 243-288:
(David the Invincible and the Medieval Armenian Creative Literature [A Survey]. *Bazmavep*, nos. 3-4, pp. 243-288.)
- Նարսկի, Ի. (Narsky, I.)
- 1980 «Դավիթ Անյաղթի ուսմունքի մասին՝ յատկանիշների եւ յատկութիւնների առնչութեամբ». Հայկագեան Հայագիտական Հանդես, Թ. 8, էջ 121-125:
(David the Invincible's Teachings on Specifics and Properties. *Haigazian Armenological Review*, no. 8, pp. 121-125.)

Նուցուրիան, Շ. (Nutsubidze, Sh.)

- 1941 «Հայաստանը եվ արեվելյան ռենեսանսը». Սովետական Գրականություն (Երեվան), թ. 12, էջ 96-100:
(Armenia and the Renaissance in the East. *Sovetakan Grakanut'yun* [Erevan], no. 12, pp. 96-100.)

Ոսկեան, Համազասպ (Oskian, Hamazasp)

- 1963 Ցուցակ հայերէն ձեռագրաց Մխիթարեան Մատենադարանին ի Վիեննա. Հատոր Բ. Վիեննա. (տե՛ս անուանացանկի մէջ՝ Դաւիթ Անյաղթ Ներգինացի.)
(Catalogue of Armenian Manuscripts in the Mekhitarist Library in Vienna. Vol. 2. Vienna.) See index under "David the Invincible Nerginats'i."

Չալոյան, Վ. (Ch'alyan, V.)

- 1944 «Վերածնութեան շրջանի հայ փիլիսոփայութեան պատմութեան մասին». Սովետական Գրականություն, թ. 6-7, էջ 78-89:

(On the History of Armenian Philosophy in the Renaissance Age. *Sovetakan Grakanut'yun*, nos. 6-7, pp. 78-89.)

- 1975 Հայոց փիլիսոփայութեան պատմություն (Հին եվ միջին դարեր). Երեվան. էջ 93-219:

(History of Armenian Philosophy [Ancient and Medieval Periods]. Erevan. Pp. 93-219.)

- 1976 «Դաւիթ Անհաղթ». Հայ մշակույթի նշանավոր գործիչները. Երեվան. էջ 98-110:

(David the Invincible. In Famous Armenian Cultural Figures. Erevan. Pp. 98-110.)

- 1980a «Ընդհանուրի եվ եզակիի արիստոտելյան ըմբռնումը պատմական Հայաստանում», Արիստոտելը եվ հայ փիլիսոփայությունը, Հոդվածների ժողովածու. Երեվան. էջ 72-84:

(The Aristotelian Concept of Universals and Specifics in Historic Armenia. In Aristotle and Armenian Philosophy, Collection of Articles. Erevan. Pp. 72-84.)

- 1980b «Դաւիթ Անհաղթ (բանասիրական ակնարկ)». Պատմա-բանասիրական Հանդես, թ. 1, էջ 52-62:

(David the Invincible, Philological Comments *Patma-Banasirakan Handes*, no. 1, pp. 52-62.)

Պողարեան, Ն. (Bogharian, N.)

- 1966- Մայր ցուցակ ձեռագրաց Սրբոց Յակոբեանց. Հատոր
1979 1-9. Երուսաղէմ. (Տե՛ս անուանացանկերուն մէջ՝ Դաւիթ Անյաղթ):

- (Grand Catalogue of St. James Manuscripts. 9 vols. Jerusalem.) See indexes under "David the Invincible."
- 1971 Հայ գրողներ. *Երուսաղէմ. էջ 73-76:*
(Armenian Writers. Jerusalem. Pp. 73-76.)
- 1973 «Սուրբ Ներսէս Շնորհալու ձեռագիր աշխատութիւնները Երուսաղէմի Հայոց սուրբ Հակոբյանց վանքի ձեռագրատան մէջ». Էջմիածին, Դեկտ., էջ 40-43:
(Manuscripts of St. Nersēs Shnorhali's Works in the Library of Manuscripts at the Armenian Monastery of St. James in Jerusalem. *Ējmiatsin*, December, pp. 40-43.)
- Պողոսյան, Պ. Մ. (Poghosyan, P. M.)
1980 «Եօթնագրեանքի առեղծվածը եւ Դավիթ Անհաղթը». Դավիթ Անհաղթ, Հոգվածների ժողովածու. *Երեւան. էջ 143-210:*
(The Enigma of the *Hexaemeron* and David the Invincible. In *David the Invincible*, Collection of Articles. Erevan. Pp. 143-210.)
- Ջահուկյան, Գ. (Jahukyan, G.)
1954 Քերականական եւ ուղղագրական աշխատությունները հին եւ միջնադարյան Հայաստանում. *Երեւան. էջ 53-55, 121-149:*
(Grammatical and Orthographic Works in Ancient and Medieval Armenia. Erevan. Pp. 53-55, 121-149.)
- 1956 «Դավիթ քերականական աշխատության նորահայտ ամբողջական ձեռագիր տեքստը». Բանբեր Մատենադարանի, Թ. 3, էջ 241-264:
(The Newly Discovered Complete Manuscript Text of David's Grammar. *Banber Matenadarani*, no. 3, pp. 241-264.)
- Ստեպկին, Նիկոլայ. (Styajkin, Nicolai)
1980 «Ուշ հելլենիզմի դարաշրջանում դիալեկտիկական տրամաբանութեան զարգացման շարժում Դավիթ Անյաղթի նշանակութեան մասին». Հայկագեան Հալագիտական Հանդէս, Թ. 8, էջ 115-120:
(David the Invincible's Contribution to the Development of Dialectical Logic in the Age of Late Hellenism. *Haigazian Armenological Review*, no. 8, pp. 115-120.)
- «Սրբոց վարդապետացն Հայոց Մովսէսի եւ Դաւթի հարցմունք ըստ Երկաթնակացն».
1879 Արարատ (*էջմիածին*), էջ 180-189, 210-219:

(The Holy Armenian Vardapets Movsēs and Dawit^c Concerning the Dyophysites. *Ararat* [Ējmiatsin], pp. 180–189, 210–219.)

Սրուանձտեանց, Գ. (Sruandztiants^c, G.)

1874 Հնոց եւ նորոց. Կ. Պոլիս:

(From the Old and the New. Constantinople.)

Տաշեան, Յ. (Tashian, H.)

1895 Ցուցակ հայերէն ձեռագրաց Մատենադարանին Միփարեանց ի Վիեննա. Հատոր Ա., Վիեննա. (Տե՛ս անուանացանկի մէջ՝ Դաւիթ Անյաղթ):

(Catalogue of Armenian Manuscripts in the Mekhitarist Library in Vienna. Vol. 1. Vienna.) See index under “David the Invincible.”)

Տէր-Մկրտչեան, Գ. (Tēr-Mkrтч^cian, G.)

1896 Խորենացու պատմութեան ուսումնասիրութիւն. Վաղարշապատ:

(A Study of Khorenats^ci’s History. Vagharshapat.)

1903 «Դաւիթ Հարթացի», արտատպուած Արարատի 1902 թ. Սեպտ.-Հոկտ. համարներէն. Վաղարշապատ. 39 էջ:

(David Hark^cats^ci. Reprinted from September–October 1902 issues of *Ararat*. Vagharshapat. 39 pp.)

1979 Հայագիտական ուսումնասիրություններ. Գիրք Ա. Երեւան. էջ 145–146, 184, 253, 278, 283, 286:

(Armenological Studies. Book 1. Erevan. Pp. 145–146, 184, 253, 278, 283, 286.)

Ցուցակ ձեռագրաց Մաշտոցի անվան Մատենադարանի

1965– Կազմողներ՝ Օ. Եգանյան, Ա. Զեյթունյան եւ Փ.

1970 Անթարյան. 2 հատոր. Երեւան. (Տե՛ս անուանացանկերուն մէջ՝ Դավիթ Անհաղթ):

(Catalogue of Manuscripts in the Mashtots^c Matenadaran. Compiled by Ō. Eganyan, A. Zeyt^cunyan, and P^c. Ant^cabyan. 2 vols. Erevan.) See index under “David the Invincible.”

Փիլիսոփայության պատմության համառոտ ակնարկ

1979 Խմբ. Մ. Իովչուկի, Տ. Օյզերմանի եւ Ի. Շչիպանովի. Թարգմ. ուղևերեն 3-րդ հրատարակութենէն. Երեւան. էջ 118–119:

(A Brief History of Philosophy. M. Iovchuk, T. Oyzerman, and I. I. Shchipanov, eds. Trans. from 3d Russian edition. Erevan. Pp. 118–119.)

Քոլանջյան, Ս. (K^colanjyan, S.)

1980 «Դավիթ Անհաղթի Սահմանի իմաստասիրութեան

երկի ուսմիներեն հրատարակության հայագիտական արժեքը». Դավիթ Անհաղթ, Հոգվածների ժողովածու. Երեվան. էջ 227-268:

(The Contribution to Armenian Studies of the Roumanian Version of David the Invincible's *Definitions of Philosophy*. In David the Invincible, Collection of Articles. Erevan. Pp. 227-268.)

Օրմանեան, Մաղափա. (Örmanian, Maghak'ia)

1913- Ազգապատում. 3 հատոր. Կ. Պոլիս, Երուսաղէմ.

1927 Յօդուած՝ 219, 288, 295, 297-299, 338, 988, 992, 1352, 1999, 2071, 2137:

(National History. 3 vols. Constantinople-Jerusalem. Sections 219, 288, 295, 297-299, 338, 988, 992, 1352, 1999, 2071, 2137.)

Russian

Adamian, A.

1955 *Esteticheskie vozzrenia srednevekovoi Armenii: Epokha rannego feodalizma* (Aesthetic Views in Medieval Armenia: Early Feudal Period). Erevan. Pp. 24-92.

Adonts, N.

1915 *Dionisii Frakiiskii i armianskie tolkovateli* (Dionysius Thrax and the Armenian Commentators). Petrograd.

1971 *Armenia v epokhy Iustiniana* (Armenia in the Epoch of Justinian). 2d ed. Erevan.

Antologiya mirovoi filosofii

1969 (Anthology of World Philosophy). 4 vols. Moscow. Vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 634-639.

Apresian, G.

1968 *Esteticheskaya mysl' narodov Zakavkaz'ia* (Aesthetic Thought Among the Peoples of the Transcaucasus). Moscow. Pp. 27-29, 34-36, 42-43, 46, 48, 116, 163.

1973 *Iz istorii armianskoi esteticheskoi mysli* (From the History of Armenian Aesthetic Thought). Erevan. Bk. I, pp. 9, 76-79, 80, 82-83, 86-88, 91-92, 93, 98-99, 101-102, 140, 150-151, 267.

Arevshatian, S. S.

1960a "David Anakht (Nepobedimyi)" (David Anakht [the Invincible]). *Sovetskaia entsiklopediia*. Moscow. Vol. 1, p. 425.

- 1960b "Opredeleniia filosofii Davida Nepobedimogo" (David the Invincible's Definitions of Philosophy). In *David Nepobedimyi (Anakht), Opredeleniia filosofii* (David the Invincible [Anakht], Definitions of Philosophy). Erevan. Pp. V-XXVII.
- 1967 "David Nepobedimyi i ego Tolkovanie *Analitiki Aristotelia*" (David the Invincible and His Interpretation of Aristotle's *Analytics*). In *David Nepobedimyi, Tolkovanie Analitiki Aristotelia* (David the Invincible, Interpretation of Aristotle's *Analytics*). Erevan. Pp. 5-35.
- 1971 "Nekotorye voprosy datirovki armianskikh grekofil'skikh perevodov VI veka: K istorii armian-vizantiiskikh literaturnykh svyazei" (Some Problems in the Dating of VIth Century Philhellene Translations: Toward a History of Armeno-Byzantine Literary Relations). *Teghe-kagir* (Erevan), no. 3, pp. 70-98.
- 1972a "David Anakht (Nepobedimyi)" (David Anahaght [the Invincible]). *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*. 3d ed. Vol. 7, p. 480.
- 1972b "Puti stanovleniia drevnearmianskoi filosofii" (The Development of Classical Armenian Philosophy). *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 10, pp. 106-116.
- 1973 *Formirovanie filosofskoi nauki v drevnei Armenii (V-VII vv.)* (The Development of Philosophical Science in Ancient Armenia [V-VII Centuries]). Erevan. Pp. 12, 14, 20-22, 144-145, 159, 167-168, 187, 195, 198-199, 202-203, 205, 208, 210, 217-218, 220-228, 233-235, 239-241, 269-327.
- 1975 "David Anakht i ego rol' v razvitii drevnearmianskoi filosofii" (David the Invincible and His Role in the Development of Philosophy in Ancient Armenia). In *David Anakht, Sochineniia* (David the Invincible, Works). Moscow. Pp. 5-28.
- 1976 "David Anakht i ego Analiz *Vvedeniia Porfirii*" (David the Invincible and His Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*). In *David Anakht (Nepobedimyi), Analiz "Vvedeniia" Porfirii* (David the Invincible, Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*). Erevan. Pp. v- xxxi.
- 1979 "Platon v drevnearmianskikh perevodakh" (Plato in Ancient Armenian Translations). In *Platon i ego epokha* (Plato and His Age). Moscow. Pp. 269-278.

- 1980a "David Anakht." *Literaturnaia Armenia*, no. 6.
- 1980b *David Nepobedimyi-vydaiushchiisia filosof drevnei Armenii* (David the Invincible, Famous Philosopher of Ancient Armenia). Moscow.
- Arevshatian, S., and N. Tagmizian.
- 1967 "Muzykal'naia teoriia drevnei i srednevekovoi Armenii" (Musical Theory in Ancient and Medieval Armenia). In *Muzykal'naia estetika stran Vostoka* (Aesthetics of Music in the Countries of the East). Moscow. Pp. 33-375.
- Arutiunian, E. [Harut'yunyan, E.]
- 1973 "Sillogistika Aristotelia v istolkovanii Davida Anakhta" (Aristotle's Syllogism According to David the Invincible's Interpretation). *Banber Yerevani Hamalsarani*, no. 3, pp. 108-127. Summary in Armenian.
- Bol'shaia entsiklopediia*
- 1902 (Great Encyclopedia). S. N. Iuzhakova, ed. St. Petersburg. Vol. 8, p. 15.
- Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*
- 1952 (Great Soviet Encyclopedia). Moscow. Vol. 13, p. 257.
- Brutian, G.
- 1980 "Logika Davida Nepobedimogo (Anakhta)" (David the Invincible's Logic). *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 3.
- Chaloian, V.
- 1944 "Uchenie Davida Nepobedimogo" (The Teachings of David the Invincible). *Teghekgagir* (Erevan), nos. 6-7, pp. 53-72. Summary in Armenian.
- 1946a "Drevnearmianskaia interpretatsiia logiki Aristotelia" (The Ancient Armenian Interpretation of Aristotle's Logic). *Teghekgagir*, no. 4, pp. 43-60.
- 1946b *Filosofiia Davida Nepobedimogo* (The Philosophy of David the Invincible). Erevan.
- 1950 "Osnovnye vekhi razvitiia filosofskoi mysli Armenii" (The Fundamental Landmarks in the Development of Philosophical Thought in Armenia). *Nauchnye Trudy Akademii Nauk Armianskoi S.S.R., Filosofskie Nauki*, vol. 1.
- 1959 *Istoriia armianskoi filosofii* (History of Armenian Philosophy). Erevan. Pp. 92-94, 96-119, 183-184, 218-220, 291-293.
- 1968 *Vostok-Zapad* (East-West). Moscow. Pp. 138-140, 142, 171, 175.

- 1974 *Razvitie filosofskoi mysli v Armenii (Drevnii i sred-nevekovyi periody)* (The Development of Philosophical Thought in Armenia [Ancient and Medieval Periods]). Moscow. Pp. 53-81, 83-96, 99-117, 198-201, 216-217, 231-232, 260-265.
- 1980 *Filosofia Davida Nepobedimogo i ee vliianie na posleduiushchikh myslitelei* (The Philosophy of David the Invincible and His Influence upon Later Thinkers). Erevan.
- Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*
- 1893 (Encyclopedic Dictionary). St. Petersburg: F. A. Brockhaus and I. A. Efrem. Vol. 10, p. 4.
- Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*
- 1953 (Encyclopedic Dictionary). Moscow. Vol. 1, p. 498.
- Gabrielian, G.
- 1962 "Ocherk istorii armianskoi filosofskoi mysli" (Outline of the History of Armenian Philosophical Thought). *Yerevani Hamalsarani Hratarakch'ut'yun* (Erevan), pp. 59-74.
- 1980 *David Anakht*. Erevan.
- Istoriia filosofii*
- 1957 (History of Philosophy). Moscow. Vol. 1, pp. 257-258.
- Istoriia filosofii v SSSR*
- 1968 (History of Philosophy in the USSR). Moscow. Vol. 1, pp. 47-66.
- Kalandarishvili, Gr.
- 1955 *Ocherki po istorii logiki v Gruzii* (Outline of the History of Logic in Georgia). Tbilisi. Pp. 89, 108-110.
- Kedrov, G.
- 1961 *Klassifikatsiia nauk* (Classification of the Sciences). Moscow. Vol. 1, pp. 50-52.
- Khachikian, Ia.
- 1969 "Iz istorii klassifikatsii iskusstv" (From the History of the Classification of the Arts). *Tezisi dokladov III Zakavkazskoi konferentsii istorikov nauk, posviashchennoi 100-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia V. I. Lenina* (Proceedings of the Third Conference of Historians of Science in the Transcaucasus, Dedicated to the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of V. I. Lenin). Tbilisi, pp. 306-307.
- 1972 "Istoricheskaia tematika" (Historical Themes [in Aesthetics]). In *Iskusstvo i obshchestvo, VI mezhdunarodnyi*

- kongress po estetiki* (Art and Society, Vith International Congress of Aesthetics). Moscow. Pp. 264-265.
- 1980 "Iskusstvo v gnoseologicheskoi sisteme Davida Anakhtha (Nepobedimogo)" (Art in the Gnoseological System of David Anahgt [the Invincible]). *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 3.
- Kondakov, N.
- 1975 *Logicheskii slovar'-spravochnik* (Dictionary of Logic). Moscow. Pp. 116, 127, 202, 212, 604.
- Kratkii ocherk istorii filosofii*
- 1975 (Brief Outline of the History of Philosophy). M. T. Iovchuk, T. I. Oizerman, and I. Shchipanov, eds. 3d ed. Moscow. Pp. 98-99.
- Kul'tura rannefeodal'noi Armenii: IV-VII vv.*
- 1980 (Armenian Culture in the Early Feudal Period: IV-VII Centuries). S. Arevshatian, S. Eremian, and E. Danielian, eds. Erevan.
- Kuchuk-Ioannesov, Kh.
- 1914 *Kratkii ocherk armianskoi literatury V veka* (Brief Outline of Fifth-Century Armenian Literature). Offprint from a volume dedicated to A. N. Veselovsk. Moscow. P. 9.
- Makovel'skii, A.
- 1967 *Istoriia logiki* (History of Logic). Moscow. Pp. 228-235, 236.
- Malaia sovestskaia entsiklopediia*
- 1959 (Small Soviet Encyclopedia). 3d ed. Moscow. Vol. 3, p. 255.
- Marr, N.
- 1898 "K kritike Istории Moiseia Khorenskogo: G. Khalatiants, *Armianskii epos v Istории Armenii Moiseia Khorenskogo*" (Review of G. Khalatiants', *The Armenian Epos in the History of Armenia by Moses Khorenats'i*). St. Petersburg. Offprint from *Vizantiiskii vremennik*, nos. 1 and 2.
- 1909 "Ionnan Petritsskii: Gruzinskii neoplatonik XI-XII veka" (Ioann Petritsskii: Georgian Neoplatonist of the XI-XIIth Century). St. Petersburg. Offprint from *Zapiski Vostochnogo otdeleniia Imperatorskogo Ruskogo Arkheologicheskogo obschestva* (Report of the Oriental Section of the Russian Imperial Archeological Society), vol. 19.

- Mirzoian, G.
1970 "K voprosu ob izuchenii armiano-gruzinskikh filosofskikh sviazei" (Problems in the Study of Armenian-Georgian Philosophical Relations). *Banber Yerevani Hamalsarani*, no. 2, pp. 141-156. Summary in Armenian.
- Muradian, P.
1966 *Armiano-gruzinskie literaturnye vzaimootnosheniia v XVIII veke* (Armenian-Georgian Literary Interrelationships in the XVIIIth Century). Erevan. Pp. 176-177, 181-183.
- Nutsubidze, Sh.
1942 *Taina Psevdo-Dionisiia Areopagita* (The Secret of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite). Tbilisi.
1960 *Istoriia gruzinskoi filosofii* (History of Georgian Philosophy). Tbilisi. Pp. 7, 23, 83, 104, 172, 177, 448-456, 459, 463, 483, 504, 512, 516.
1963 *Pëtr Iver i antichnoe filosofskoe nasledie (Problemy Areopagitiki)* (Peter the Iberian and the Ancient Philosophical Legacy [Areopagitical Problems]). Tbilisi. Pp. 58, 151.
1967 *Rustaveli i vostochnyi Renessans* (Rustaveli and the Eastern Renaissance). Sh. Khidasheli, ed. Tbilisi. Pp. 82-84, 113-114, 117-118, 286-287, 312-313.
- Ocherk razvitiia esteticheskoi mysli v Armenii*
1976 (Outline of the Development of Aesthetic Thought in Armenia). Ia. Khachikian, ed. Moscow. Pp. 20-28.
- Stiazhkin, N.
1967 *Formirovanie matematicheskoi logiki* (The Development of Mathematical Logic). Moscow. Pp. 75-76.
- Tagmizian, N.
1968 "David Nepobedimy i armianskaia muzyka" (David the Invincible and Armenian Music). *Sovetskaya muzyka*, no. 8, pp. 126-132.
1977 *Teoriia muzyki v drevnei Armenii* (The Theory of Music in Ancient Armenia). Erevan. Pp. 71-74, 76, 78, 80, 81, 105-107, 109, 128, 130-132, 165. Summary in English.
- Zubov, V.
1963 *Aristotel'* (Aristotle). Moscow. Pp. 73, 208-209, 211-213, 351.

Western Languages

- Arevšatyan, S. S.
 1981 "David l'Invincible et sa doctrine philosophique." *Revue des études arméniennes*, vol. 15, pp. 33-43.
- Arewshatian, S., and Grigorian, G.
 1974 "Główne rysy średniowiecznej filozofii Armeńskiej." *Studia Filozoficzne* (Warsaw), no. 11, pp. 47-59.
- Baumgartner, Matthias
 1915 *Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie der patristischen und scholastischen Zeit*. Berlin. P. 368.
- Busse, Adolf
 1892 *Die neuplatonischen Ausleger der Isagoge des Porphyrius*. Berlin.
- Chatschikyan, J.
 1968 *Aus der Geschichte des Problems "Kunst und Gesellschaft."* Erevan.
- Christ, Wilhelm von
 1905 *Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur bis auf die Zeit Justinians*. Munich.
- Conybeare, F. C.
 1891 "On the Ancient Armenian Version of Plato." *American Journal of Philology*, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 193-210.
 1892 *A Collation with the Ancient Armenian Versions of the Greek Text of Aristotle's Categories, De Interpretatione, De Mundo, De Virtutibus et Vitiis, and of Porphyry's Introduction*. *Anecdota Oxoniensia, Classical Series*, vol. 1, part 6. Oxford.
- "David"
 1876 *Dictionnaire Général de Biographie et d'Histoire, de Mythologie, de Géographie Ancienne et Moderne Comparée*. 7th ed. Ch. Dezobry and Th. Bachelet, eds. Paris. Vol. 1, p. 750.
 1901 *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie des Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. G. Wissowa, ed. Stuttgart. Vol. 4, cols. 2232-2233.
 1908 *Brockhaus' Konversations-Lexikon*. Berlin-Vienna. Vol. 4, p. 780.
 1929 *Larousse de XX^e siècle*. Paris. Vol. 2, p. 685.
 1934 *Dictionnaire Encyclopédique Quillet*. Paris. P. 1126.
 1960 *Grand Larousse Encyclopédique*. Paris. Vol. 3, p. 805.

“David l’Arménien”

1891 *La Grande Encyclopédie*. Paris. Vol. 13, p. 1005.

“David de Nerken”

1866 *Nouvelle Biographie Générale*. Paris. Vol. 13, cols. 214–216.

Faggin, G.

1957 “David Armeno.” *Enciclopedia Filosofica*. Venice-Rome. Vol. 1, col. 1408.

Jedynak, D.

1971 “David Niezwyciezony u ormianska szkola hellenofil-ska.” *Meander*, no. 10, pp. 419–426.

Khostikian, M.

1907 *David der Philosoph*. Bern.

Krumbacher, Karl

1897 *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur von Justinian bis zum Ende der Oströmischen Reiches (527–1453)*. Munich. Vol. 2, p. 432.

Neumann, Carl

1829 “Mémoire sur la vie et les ouvrages de David, philo-sophe arménien du V^e siècle de notre ère.” *Nouveau Journal Asiatique*, vol. 3, pp. 49–86, 97–157.

1836 *Versuch einer Geschichte der armenischen Litteratur: Nach den Werken der Mechitharisten*. Leipzig.

Noica, Constantin

1973 “La signification historique de l’oeuvre de Théophile Corydalée.” *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 285–306.

Praechter, Karl

1920 *Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Phi-losophie des Altertums*. Berlin. Vol. 1, pp. 366, 386, 623, 660, 662 ff., 667.

Prantle, K.

1927 *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*. Leipzig.

Rose, V.

1887 *Leben des heiligen David von Thessalonika, griechisch nach der einzigen bisher aufgefundenen Handschrift herausgeg.* Mit Beziehung auf David Invictus philoso-phus. Berlin.

Somalian, Sukias

1829 *Quadro della storia letteraria di Armenia*. Venice.

Ueberweg, Friedrich

1876 *History of Philosophy, from Thales to the Present*. 2d

- ed. Trans. from 4th German ed. by Geo. S. Morris.
London. Vol. 1, pp. 259, 410. (Also New York, 1887.)
- Westerlink, L. G.
1967 *Pseudo-Elias (Pseudo-David): Lectures on Porphyry's Isagoge*. Amsterdam.
- Zeller, Eduard
1886 *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*. Leipzig.
- Zeller, Eduard, and Mondolfo, R.
1964 *La filosofia dei greci nel suo sviluppo storico*. Florence.
Part 1, p. 406.

C. PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE DEDICATED
TO THE 1500TH ANNIVERSARY OF DAVID THE INVINCIBLE
EREVAN, MAY 1980

- Apresian, H. (Moscow). "David the Invincible and Contemporary Aesthetic Thought."
- Arevshatian, S. (Erevan). "The Role of David the Invincible in the Development of Ancient Armenian Philosophy."
- Benakis, L. (Athens). "Der Einfluss von David dem Armenier auf die byzantinischen Philosophen, insbesondere auf Nikephoros Blemysdes (13 Jahr.)."
- Berkov, V. (Minsk). "David the Invincible in Methods of Cognition."
- Bolognesi, G. (Milan). "Remarque sur les versions arméniennes attribuées à David l'Invincible."
- Brutian, G. (Erevan). "The Study of Logic as the Main Content of the Theoretical Heritage of David the Invincible."
- Chaloyan, V. (Erevan). "Epistemology of David the Invincible."
- Chrakian, E. (Boston). "The Ethics of David the Invincible and European Philosophy of the XVIIth Century."
- Danielian, E. (Erevan). "Cosmographic Concepts in David the Invincible."
- Gabrielian, H. (Erevan). "David the Invincible on the Duality of Truth."
- Ghougassian, J. (San Diego). "David Anhakht, the Aristotle of Armenia."
- Golovakha, I. (Kiev). "David the Invincible and Grigorii Skovoroda."
- Grigorian, G. (Erevan). "David the Invincible and Armenian Philosophical Thought in the Period of Developed Feudalism."

- Harutunian, E. (Erevan). "David the Invincible against Skepticism."
- Hovhannisian, H. (Erevan). "The Aesthetic Orientation of David the Invincible."
- Ivanyo, I. (Kiev). "David the Invincible and Aristotle on the Relationship between Philosophy and Art."
- Kalashian, L. (Erevan). "Ethical Problems in the Philosophy of David the Invincible."
- Kassymzhanov, A. (Alma-Ata [USSR]). "Aristotle's Concept of Logic and David the Invincible."
- Kessidi, F. (Moscow). "David the Invincible and Some Questions of Ancient Greek Philosophy."
- Khachikian, Y. (Erevan). "The Aesthetic Views of David the Invincible."
- Khatchadourian, H. (Milwaukee). "The Problem of Universals in David's Commentary on the *Isagoge* and al-Farabi's Paraphrase of the *Isagoge*."
- Khayrullayev, M. (Tashkent). "From David the Invincible to Avicenna."
- Kolanjian, S. (Erevan). "The Roumanian Translation of David the Invincible's *Definitions of Philosophy*."
- Kortian, G. (Montreal). "Neoplatonism of David the Invincible and Neoplatonical Arguments in German Philosophy."
- Kuksewicz, Z. (Warsaw). "La conception de l'homme chez David Anakht (l'Invincible)."
- Lafontaine, G. (Louvain [Belgium]). "La traduction arménienne des 'Catégories' d'Aristote par David l'Invincible."
- Liiceanu, G. (Bucharest). "La signification du néoplatonicien David dans l'histoire de la philosophie."
- Losev, A. (Moscow). "Historico-Philosophical Feat of David the Invincible."
- Madoyan, A. (Erevan). "David the Invincible and Nerses Shnorhali."
- Mahé, J.-P. (Paris). "Le parfait philosophe et la divinité dans les *Définitions* de David l'Invincible."
- Mamedov, Sh. (Moscow). "David the Invincible and the Development of Philosophical Thought in Azerbaijan."
- Melvil, Y. (Moscow). "Definitions of Philosophy of David the Invincible and Their Significance Today."
- Mirzoyan, H. (Erevan). "David the Invincible and Armenian Philosophical Thought of the 17th Century."
- Mkhitarian, G. (Erevan). "David the Invincible's Sociological Views."
- Nakhnikian, G. (Bloomington, Indiana). "David the Invincible on Definitions of Philosophy."
- Narsky, I. (Moscow). "David the Invincible's Teaching on Attributes and Properties."

- Nazarian, Sh. (Erevan). "David the Invincible and 18th-Century Poetry."
- Nersisian, V. (Erevan). "Aesthetic and Literary Problems in the Writings of David the Invincible."
- Poghosian, P. (Erevan). "David the Invincible and the Riddle of the Hexaemeron."
- Rogovitch, M. (Kiev). "Specifics of the Assimilation of the Philosophy of Antiquity in Ancient Armenia and Kievan Russia."
- Sanjian, A. K. (Los Angeles). "The Ethical Concepts in the Philosophy of David the Invincible."
- Sarkisian, S. (Sofia). "The Object and Properties in 'Categories' in David the Invincible's *Definitions of Philosophy*."
- Schmidt, E. (Jena [GDR]). "Tradition and Innovation in David's *Prolegomena*."
- Sokolov, V. (Moscow). "The Interrelationship between Ancient and Medieval Motifs in the Interpretation of the Subject of Philosophy by David the Invincible."
- Styazhkin, N. (Moscow). "The Role of David the Invincible in the Development of Dialectical Logic in the Epoch of Late Hellenism."
- Tahmizian, N. (Erevan). "David the Invincible and Armenian Musical Culture."
- Thomson, R. (Boston). "Notes on the Armenian Version of David the Invincible's Definitions of Philosophy."
- Torossian, E. (Erevan). "David the Invincible as an Interpreter of Aristotle's 'Categories'."
- Tutundjian, H. (Erevan). "The Psychological Concepts of David the Invincible."
- Tvaradze, R. (Tbilisi). "On the Problem of David the Invincible's Relationship to Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite."
- Urazbekov, A. (Alma-Ata [USSR]). "Continuity in Ethics: David the Invincible and al-Farabi."
- Vardanian, S. (Erevan). "The Medical-Biological Views of David the Invincible."
- Yedniak, S. (Lublin [Poland]). "The Practical Philosophy of David the Invincible."
- Yeremian, S. (Erevan). "Armenia during the Age of David the Invincible."
- Zaslavski, I. (Erevan). "Some Interpretations of Mathematical Problems in the Works of David the Invincible."

Contributors

- MILTON V. ANASTOS, Ph.D. (Byzantine History), Harvard University. Professor Emeritus of Byzantine Greek and History, UCLA; formerly Professor of Byzantine Theology, Harvard University, Dumbarton Oaks. Author of *Studies in Byzantine Intellectual History* (1979); co-editor of *Vigiliae Christianae, Viator*. Corresponding Fellow of Academy of Athens and of the Society of Macedonian Studies (Thessalonica), and Fellow of American Academy of Arts and Sciences and of Mediaeval Academy of America.
- HAIG KATCHADOURIAN, Ph.D. (Philosophy), Duke University. Professor of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Author of *The Coherence Theory of Truth: A Critical Evaluation* (1961); *A Critical Study in Method* (1967); *The Concept of Art* (1971); *Shadows of Time* (1984); and *Music, Film, and Art* (1985).
- GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN, Ph.D. (Philosophy), Harvard University. Professor of Philosophy, Indiana University, Bloomington. Author of *An Introduction to Philosophy* (1968); editor of *Bertrand Russell's Philosophy* (1974) and J. S. Hill's *Nature and Utility of Religion* (1958); with W. P. Alston, edited *Readings in Twentieth-Century Philosophy* (1963), and translated and wrote the introduction to Edmund Husserl's *The Idea of Phenomenology* (1963); with H. N. Castaneda, edited *Morality and the Language of Conduct* (1963). Member of the editorial boards of *Noûs* and *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*; consulting editor of *The American Journal of Jurisprudence* (formerly *National Law Forum*) and *Philosophy Research Archives*.
- HAGOP J. NERSOYAN, Ph.D. (Ethics and Philosophy of Religion), Columbia University. Professor of Philosophy, University of Dayton, Ohio. Author of *A History of the Armenian Church* (1960);

The Faith of the Armenian Church (1963); *André Gide: The Theism of an Atheist* (1969). A book of theoretical ethics is in preparation.

AVEDIS K. SANJIAN, Ph.D. (Near Eastern Studies), University of Michigan. Narekatsi Professor of Armenian Studies, UCLA. Author of *A Grammar of Classical Armenian* (1963); *The Armenian Communities in Syria under Ottoman Dominion* (1965); *Colophons of Armenian Manuscripts, 1301-1480: A Source for Middle Eastern History* (1969); *A Catalogue of Medieval Armenian Manuscripts in the United States* (1976); edited, with an introduction, *The Private Letters of the Poet Vahan Tekeyan* (1983); with Andreas Tietze, edited and translated *Eremya Chelebi Kümürjian's Armeno-Turkish Poem "The Jewish Bride."* Editor-in-chief of the *Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies*.

ABRAHAM TERIAN, Dr. Theol., University of Basel. Professor of Intertestamental and Early Christian Literatures, Andrews University, Michigan. Visiting Professor for Armenian Studies, University of Chicago. Author of *Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus: The Armenian Text with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary* (1981).

ROBERT W. THOMSON, Ph.D. (Early Christian Studies), Trinity College, Cambridge University. Currently Mashtots Professor and Director of Dumbarton Oaks. Author of *Athanasiana Syriaca* (1965-77); *Athanasius: Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione* (1971); *The Teaching of Saint Gregory: An Early Armenian Catechism* (1971); *Agathangelos, History of the Armenians* (1977); *Moses Khorenatsi: History of the Armenians* (1978); *An Introduction to Classical Armenian* (1975); *Elishē: History of Vardan and the Armenian War* (1982); with K. B. Bardakjian, *Textbook of Modern Western Armenian* (1977); with B. Kendall, *David the Invincible Philosopher: Definitions and Divisions of Philosophy* (1983).

DAVID ANHAGHT^c, THE 'INVINCIBLE' PHILOSOPHER

The fifth/sixth century Armenian Neoplatonist David Anhaght^c is recognized as the founder of several branches of Armenian philosophy, particularly logic. His philosophical writings have been studied by generations of Armenian scholars, and during the past several decades have been the focus of intensive scholarly attention in Soviet Armenia and elsewhere. Yet David himself remains an enigmatic figure.

In 1980 David's 1500th anniversary was marked by an international conference in Erevan. A year later the Armenian studies program at the University of California, Los Angeles, participated in the tribute with a symposium. A group of scholars representing the disciplines of philosophy, intertestamental and early Christian literature, and Byzantine and Armenian cultural history met to discuss the many controversial issues concerning David's life, works, and activities. Although no consensus was either achieved or expected, their analyses, presented in this volume, make a significant contribution to a better understanding of David's role as a philosopher and of his singular legacy to the cultural and intellectual history of Armenia.

Studies in Near Eastern Culture and Society

Issued under the auspices of the
G. E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies
University of California, Los Angeles

1.

Ismail K. Poonawala
Biobibliography of Ismā'īl Literature
(1977)

2.

Emilie Savage-Smith and Marion B. Smith
Islamic Geomancy and a Thirteenth-Century Divinatory Device
(1980)

3.

Richard G. Hovannisian, editor
The Armenian Image in History and Literature
(1981)

4.

James J. Reid
Tribalism and Society in Islamic Iran, 1500-1629
(1983)

5.

George Bournoutian
*Eastern Armenia in the Last Decades of Persian Rule, 1807-1828:
A Political and Socioeconomic Study of the Khanate of Erevan
on the Eve of the Russian Conquest*
(1982)

6.

Louis Awad, editor
Arabic Writing Today, Vol. III
The Literature of Ideas in Egypt, Part I
(1986)

7.

Avedis K. Sanjian, editor
David Anghat's, The 'Invincible' Philosopher
(1986)